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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with banking market imperfections, most especially real
resources costs and imperfect competition. A special focus is made on the empirical
estimation of the importance of such imperfections in the Portuguese market. The
thesis is organised in three different essays, being the first focused on real resources
costs, the second on market power and price and non-price competition and the third
chapter discusses the impact of such imperfections on the measurement of interest
rate risk.
The first chapter is an empirical study on real resources operating costs in Portuguese
banking. The approach followed is the stochastic cost frontier, because this
methodology allows the simultaneous estimation of measures of economies of scale
and scope as well as production efficiency and input substitutability estimates. The
theoretical framework developed differs from existing literature on the explicit
inclusion of the balance sheet constraint on the cost minimisation problem, being
concluded that deposits should be handled as an output. Results show a clear
evidence for the existence of economies of scale for the smaller banks and some costs
advantages for the larger ones associated with high productivity of their branching
networks. Economies of scope between deposits and loans were found for all but the
larger banks. Portuguese banks were found to be particularly cost inefficient.
The second chapter studies the evolution of market power on the Portuguese deposits
market under the current deregulation process. Using panel data, three equations
were estimated representing optimality conditions for deposit rates, advertising
expenditures and branches. An important conclusion is that interest rate and entry
deregulation were associated with an increase in both price and non-price
competition. The small banks were found to have virtually no market power on
deposits, being the situation especially unpleasant for the foreign institutions following
growth strategies. On the other hand, significant market power was detected for
banks with market shares for above 5%. However, above that level, we didn't detect
a positive relationship between the two variables. Thus, mergers between large banks
will not directly increase market power for the participating firms, although will create
a favourable situation for the overall industry, trough the price-concentration
relationship.
The third chapter analyses the problem of measurement of interest rate risk exposure
of a financial intermediary operating under imperfect competition. A solution
proposed by Dermine (1985) is criticised since it doesn't take in consideration the
optimising behaviour of such an intermediary. It is also shown that unlike in
Dermine's article, imperfect competition also affects exposure through durations of
assets and liabilities, and not only through goodwill. Another consequence of this
modelling approach is that other imperfections like required cash reserves and
operating costs (responsible for an operating leverage effect) seem to influence
exposure. An important conclusion is that duration gap analysis is biased and
inappropriate to measure exposure, being concluded that net worth immunization
requires that assets have different duration than liabilities, rather than equal.
10
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Introduction
This thesis is focused on banking market imperfections, i.e., real resources
transactions costs and imperfect competition, with a special emphasis on the
Portuguese market. It is organised according to the "three essay" format on which
three separated chapters correspond to essays related to the thesis main topic.
Financial intermediation is still characterised by two aspects that make it considerably
different from capital markets transactions: the level of real resources transaction
costs and the importance of market structure on competitive imperfections. The first
may not only result from the technological process of bank lending, which is much
more resource-consuming than the issue of bonds, but also from pure waste, i.e.,
productive inefficiency. The second is associated with the potential imperfect nature
of banking markets which may lead to the use of market power by some of the banks
at the expense of the borrowers and depositors.
All chapters in this thesis are based on a "theory of the firm model of the banking
firm", on which credit risk is ignored (i.e. different variables are handled on a certainty
equivalent basis) in order to allow a focus on both cost and market structures. We
start with a constrained optimisation problem of maximising profits subject to a
balance-sheet constraint. It is shown that under this framework deposits must be
regarded as outputs, rather as inputs as in Sealey and Lindley (1977) and most
banking literature. Therefore, we study the impact of both cost and market structures
considering the existence of two banking markets: loans and deposits.
The first chapter is devoted to the cost structure and productive efficiency. A
standard translog function is estimated for Portuguese banks using capital and labour
as inputs and deposits and loans as outputs. Instead of using the traditional
11
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econometric approach, we used a stochastic frontier formulation. The combination of
these two options allows the simultaneous determination of three important aspects of
banking costs: economies of scale, economies of scope and productive efficiency.
The second chapter is concerned with the impact of deregulation on both price and
non-price competition in the Portuguese deposits market. The focus on deposits lies
on the existence of quantitative credit ceilings for most of the past decade (they were
abolished only in 1991) which suppressed competition in the loans market. However,
the deposits market experienced a more progressive deregulation process, which may
be traced to 1986, and therefore allows the possibility to evaluate how market power
was affected by such deregulation. An empirical model of the banking market in
which firms compete by interest rate, branches and advertising is estimated using
panel data. The model relates competition to market concentration, market share and
other firm characteristics like ownership and age. In this study the individual marginal
costs estimated in chapter one for each observation are employed to detect the
interaction between prices and costs.
Chapter three studies the impact of both cost structure and market power on interest
rate risk. These two effects have so far been completely ignored in the banking
interest rate risk literature, which are based on measures developed for mutual funds
operating in perfectly competitive markets without intermediation costs. Although
based on Dermine's (1985) model of bank interest rate risk under imperfect
competition we try to go much farther in the evaluation of such exposure. First, we
argue that unlike the implicit assumption on most duration-gap models, banking
markets are not perfectly competitive and marginal costs are relevant, thus demanding
the adoption of an imperfect competition model of the banking firm. Second, unlike in
Dermine's (1985) model and most interest rate risk literature, we use a profit
maximisation approach, rather than a purely mathematical one. This approach leads to
12
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a result in which both market imperfections play an important role, thus breaking with
the currently existing literature.
The Portuguese market constitutes a particularly interesting case-study. Ten years ago
(1984) it was one of the most regulated western European markets. Strict
international capital controls together with an absolute barrier to entry in the banking
sector make it virtually protected against any external threat. All banks but three small
foreign-owned institutions were owned by the Government which accounted by more
than 95% of the market with just 11 individual institutions. Until 1990 all banks were
subject to a (binding) quantitative credit ceiling which was computed by the Banco de
Portugal according to each bank's liability base. Interest rate regulation persisted until
the 1990's, with the administrative imposition of a minimum rate on time deposits (to
encourage savings) which was progressively reduced and later removed, a maximum
rate on demand deposits (to protect the less efficient institutions) and a maximum rate
on loans (to prevent "usury" associated with the excess demand resulting from the
credit ceilings).
Entry in this market was banned until the approval of the Constitutional Amendment
of 1984. Nevertheless, several barriers to entry persisted and the new banks took
some time to be approved. In 1985 one finance institution was changed to bank status
and in 1986 only three new Portuguese private banks were authorised. New foreign
banks were progressively authorised but remained small. By mid 1989 the
Government was still the owner of banks representing 90% of the market. In 1989 the
(slow) privatisation process was initiated which combined with the growing
agressivity of some private banks led the Government's market share to fall to about
45% in 1993. During most of this time it was not only the banking charter that was
subject to strict restrictions since branching was highly regulated. Until 1986 all new
branches depended on the central bank's authorisation, which was somewhat
13
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automatic within the "4+1 rule", i.e., for every four new branches a bank had to open
a fifth one in one of the alternative locations in less-favoured regions indicated by
Banco de Portugal. In September 1990 a new original scheme was created: each bank
had to buy (at par) bad loans from the older nationalised institutions for each new
branch opened. Alternatively, they could buy shares of Finangest, a finance company
whose assets were only that type of loans. This scheme was also applied to the
authorisation of new banks during that period.
All these restrictions were abolished in December 1992. On that date, a new banking
law implementing the Second Banking Directive was passed and at the 31th of that
month, all banks had to comply with the 8% risk-asset solvency ratio. In a few words,
these banks, which lived under a highly regulated framework which allowed the
existence of a virtual cartel where inefficiency was not punished, banks held
substantial amounts of bad loans and excessive staff was a recurring problem among
the older institutions, suddenly found themselves operating under the same rules of all
other European banks. Thus, in less than ten years they evolved from a highly
protected framework to their complete integration in the single European market for
financial services.
The empirical studies in this thesis use panel data for 1986-1992. This way, we expect
to detect with the extent to which the deregulation process was accompanied by a
reduction in the mentioned market imperfections that flourished during the more
protective days. Thus, we expect to detect how much inefficiency is responsible for
the current level of banking costs and if there is any special trend on technological
evolution, together with the possible impact of deregulation on market power. The
combined effect of these two factors is responsible for the evolution of banks' prices.
If they are too attractive that constitutes an entry incentive to foreign banks, who
may be more competitive than the locals unless technical progress is evident and
14
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inefficiency is reduced. It is this context which we believe makes this country's case a
particularly interesting one, which deserves to be studied.
The combined results of chapters one and two are particularly relevant for merger
policy in Portuguese banking. They show that small banks are in a difficult situation,
which may only be solved via internal growth or mergers, since they have very high
marginal costs and are not able to exercise market power. On the other hand, mergers
between large banks seem not to result in increased market power for the
participating institutions. This conclusion results from the estimated constant returns
to scale and a positive relationship between market power and dimension, which
seems to become exhausted above certain small levels of market share.
Market power on deposits was found to be very dependent on several specific firm
characteristics other than size. Among those are the banks "age", i.e., banks operating
before the revolution benefit from higher margins, while new private retail banks
show a much higher price and non-price aggressivity. Therefore, the previously
nationalised banks, although slightly less efficient, are, in fact, in a favourable
competitive situation vis a a vis their new competitors. This result is particularly
important because the authorities always have protected the "old" banks (and in some
cases still own them) using the argument that they are unable to compete with the
new more cost efficient institutions.
Because of deposit insurance, regulators should also be interested in the impact of this
progressive liberalisation on banking profitability and individual institutions ability to
survive. Deregulation appears to be contributing to an increasing competitiveness of
the market. The extent on which this may affect the survival of some institutions is
difficult to assess, since it mainly depends on bank managers' ability to solve the
current high inefficiency levels in the industry. Although, theoretically, important cost
15
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savings may be achieved, so far only a small trend was detected (1% increase per
year). Results do also indicate that one particular aspect of this liberalisation trend,
privatisations, seems to be giving a positive contribution to efficiency. This may be an
indication that the Government's banking groups (which account for more than 45%
of the market) should also be privatised as a way to achieve a more cost efficient
banking system.
The significant market power found for the larger institutions, combined with the high
marginal operating costs and inefficiency suggest that the Portuguese economy is
paying a high price for financial intermediation. Although the first of these aspects
seems to be decreasing as a result of progressive liberalisation, the second is more
difficult to control. Bank managers should be aware of the burden they are imposing
and realise that progressive liberalisation and freedom of entry and exit are creating a
framework on which cost-efficiency will be a critical success factor for survival.
Results derived in chapter three do also show that in cost-inefficient markets the
measure of interest rate risk exposure should not be conducted using the traditional
measures. This will become particularly important when the BIS proposal in this field
becomes effective. By using this measures, which are biased in one direction, we may
end up in a situation on which banks may be forced to support the costs of
inappropriately measured exposures, while effectively exposed banks will be
exempted from equity coverage. Therefore, banking supervisors should be particularly
careful on the adoption of such measures for exposure measurement.
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Chapter One:
Economies of Scale and Scope and Productive Efficiency in
Portuguese Banking:
A Stochastic Cost Frontier Approach
1.1. Introduction
For more than a decade, Portuguese banks operated under a highly regulated
oligopoly, where the Government owned all but three institutions (more than 90% of
the market), interest rates for deposits and loans were set by the authorities and entry
was simply banned. In 1985 a progressive deregulation process was began and today,
only nine years later, these previously highly protected companies are now competing
against new institutions which were born under a more competitive framework and
they are all now part of a progressively integrated European market for financial
services.
This protectionist background, where all competition was virtually banned, may have
resulted in low productivity and lack of a marketing approach by the older banks.
Although there is some anecdotal evidence on this, there are so far no studies on the
productive efficiency of Portuguese banks. Therefore, questions such as "are public
banks less efficient than the new private ones?" and "did privatisations increase
efficiency?" still remain to be answered.
Portuguese banks have generally been considered to be very cost inefficient.
Following a financial analysts perspective, Alpalhdo and Pinho (1990) found that
operating costs measured as percentages of assets or operating revenues, clearly
17
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exceed typical values for OECD banks published by that organization's reports in
Bank Profitability. This fact combined with the current progressive reduction of
market concentration and the entry effects of the second banking directive, leads to
the question of the ability of the country's banks to survive. In fact, this combination
of high costs and fierce competition may lead to losses and the need for a
restructuring process within the sector through possible mergers and / or alliances.
The Single European Market on financial services is leading to a wave of mergers in
European banking. In Spain, such a wave was actively promoted and encouraged by
the authorities, while the Portuguese Government has apparently adopted the
opposite policy. With this study we try to evaluate the extent to which mergers may
increase both scale and productive efficiency in Portuguese banking. To assess the
first issue, the measurement of economies of scale is essential. In this chapter we
concentrate on scale effects on the cost side of the income statement. "Revenue scale
economies" are addressed in Chapter Two in the context of measuring market power.
In order to separate both effects, economies of scale and productive efficiency must
be estimated simultaneously. Also of interest is a note regarding the cost effects of
growth driven by the creation of new branches (firm scale economies) versus growth
effects of mergers (via plant scale economies).
Currently, one major debate within the industry revolves around the advantages of
mergers against alliances between autonomous specialised companies. If economies of
scale and scope do exist, then mergers may increase the bank's competitiveness. If, on
the contrary, no such economies are detected, alliances between separated specialised
companies are the correct choice to be made. To address this question, an empirical
evaluation of economies of scale and scope in Portuguese banking is, therefore,
essential.
18
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Another potential source of cost savings for Portuguese banks is the banks' capability
to increase productive efficiency. If high levels of inefficiency are found, then banks
have a considerable potential for cost reductions without the need for changes in
scale. By using panel data, it will also be possible to check the extent to which banks
are actually reducing their current inefficiency levels.
Most literature on the estimation of banking cost functions follows a multi-product
approach to bank production, assuming banks to be economic units that use several
inputs to produce different outputs. Generally, the duality between production and
cost functions is invoked in order to justify the interpretation of the estimated results
of the latter in terms of measures of economies of scale and scope. This approach is
commonly used for many other industries, variable cost functions generally being
modelled as either Cobb-Douglas or flexible translogs. No effort seems to have been
made to adapt it to the specificities of the banking firm. This goes beyond the mere
discussion of what the inputs and outputs of financial intermediaries should be.
As the reader may see in Clark (1988), output is generally measured as "earning
assets" while deposits are usually seen as inputs, following a seminal article by Sealey
and Lindley (1977). This means that, with the exception for labour, the roles of inputs
and outputs are assumed by the bank's assets and liabilities l . Surprisingly, the equality
accounting constraint, which must always be satisfied is ignored by them. Therefore, a
re-analysis of the theoretical foundations of these studies has to be made in order to
assess how the imposition of the balance sheet constraint affects the definitions of
inputs and outputs, as well as other assumptions that have been implicitly made in the
literature.
l ln some cases, namely Santos (1991), off balance sheet items are also considered as an output.
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The analysis of banks' costs may be conducted in three basic ways. One is the
"traditional" econometric estimation of some flexible cost function, generally a
translog. The other is based on parametric estimation of frontier cost functions, a
technique developed by Aigner, Lovell and Schmidt (1977), which has the advantage
of allowing the computation of Farrel 'S (1957) type measures of productive efficiency
together with measures of economies of scale and scope. Another, is the
determination of non-parametric frontiers based on Data Envelopment Analysis,
which is especially useful for measuring efficiency 2 . The three methodologies are
compared in Evanoff and Israilevich (1991), and Ferrier and Lovell (1990), in which
we can see that the techniques yield different results, continuing the controversy in the
literature regarding which of them is more appropriate for measuring efficiency. More
recently, surveys by Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) and Lovell (1993) provide
critical and comparative analyses of these alternative approaches.
So far, the only recent study on the subject of economies of scale and scope in the
Portuguese banking industry is that of Santos (1991), wherein the author estimated a
classical econometric cost function and followed the traditional translog /
intermediation approach and found the existence of economies of scale only for the
smaller institutions and the complete non-existence of any economies of scope
between the several "earning assets" variables, which he classified as outputs'. These
findings suggest that, unless disposing of significant market power advantage, larger
institutions may have chosen an inefficient operative scale. This conclusion is partially
corroborated by Barros and Pinho (1994) who, using the "survivor technique", found
that banks are moving to a scale between 5% to 10% market shares (measured
2A survey on this approach is provided by Ali and Seyford (1993).
3Results for the period 1985-88. Santos also estimates cost functions for more remote periods. Barata (1980)
studied the 1970's period.
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relatively to total assets), through the growing process of small institutions and the
loss of influence of the larger ones.
Given the above, the purposes of the present chapter will be the development of a
bank production model in which the balance sheet constraint is included, to test it in
order to detect possible differences in conclusions with Santos (1991) and to provide
measures of technical inefficiency based on the estimation of a parametric cost
frontier, using a pooled sample of Portuguese banks for the period 1987/1992.
The chapter is organised as follows. In Section 2 the theoretical foundations of the
model to be estimated are evaluated and discussed. In Section 3 the estimation
procedure and data are presented. Results are presented and discussed in Section 4.
Finally, the paper concludes in Section 5.
1.2. Microeconomic Foundations
1.2.1. Considerations on the Intermediation Approach
Existing studies on banking costs assume either implicitly or explicitly that the bank's
technology may be described by a transformation function which uses a vector of
inputs to produce a vector of outputs in the most efficient way:
F(Y,X) = 0	 (1.1)
where Y and X are vectors of inputs and outputs, respectively.
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Using the duality theory between production and costs, we may find a cost function
which reflects the technology described by (1.1)4:
C = C(Y,W)	 (1.2)
where W is the vector of input prices. Provided that C satisfies certain regularity
conditions, duality ensures that (1.1) and (1.2) describe the same technological
process. Therefore, direct estimation of a specific formulation for (1.2) allows the
verification of certain properties of the transformation function, namely the existence
(or not) of constant returns to scale and cost complementarities among outputs.
At this stage, what the researcher needs to do is to identify the inputs and outputs of
the banking firm. If the so-called production approach is followed, then the amount
of services provided by the bank will be classified as the output, while capital and
labour will take the role of inputs. Unfortunately, in most countries the information on
the amount of services provided is not available, and the so-called intermediation
approach, where that classification is based on accounting data, is followed instead.
The main controversy surrounding this issue lies in the classification of deposits as
inputs or outputs. Followers of Sealey and Lindley (1977) claim that banks are
productive units which use deposits and other funds to generate earning assets. As a
matter of fact, in his survey of the banking costs literature, Clark (1988, pg 22)
addresses this issue by saying "Deposits are treated as inputs along capital and
labour (..) authors who adopt this approach generally define the institutions various
dollar volumes of earning assets as measures of output" (sic).
4 Shepherd (1953, 1970), Diewert (1971).
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Regardless of the sound statement above, authors have been addressing this matter in
different ways. Early studies adopted a single-output approach to the banking firm
and different variables were used to proxy it. While some authors preferred to use
total assets, others adopted deposits, loans, the sum of deposits and loans, etc 5 . An
alternative view tries to create a "composite" measure of output using divisia indexes
or other aggregation methodologies6.
Recently there has been some unanimity on the classification of banks as multi-output
firms. Unfortunately, as Forestieri (1993, pg 68) put it "The most controversial issues
are the definition and measurement of output". It is in the classification of deposits
that there is more disagreement in the literature, since purchased funds are classified
as inputs in the majority of studies. Justification for the classification of deposits as
inputs ranges from a mere reference to Sealey and Lindley (1977) to an
argumentation based on the negative sign associated with them in the profit function.
Some authors argue that deposits are responsible for a significant part of banks' value
added and, therefore, classify them as outputs7 . Others give different treatments to
time (input) and demand (output) deposits based in the difference of services provided
to them. Others prefer to classify demand deposits as "fixed inputs"8.
In some of the recent literature doubts have been raised about the arguments above. A
good example is Hancock (1991, pg 32) who departed from the profit function and
defined a user cost for deposits as the difference between marginal revenue and costs
associated with them and says "If the deposit has a positive user cost (..) [it] is an
5A very extensive review of this literature is provided by Forestieri (1993). Other surveys are provided by Clark
(1988) and Gilbert (1984).
6Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey (1982) is the best example of this approach. Kim (1986) reviews these
studies and rejects the aggregation hypothesis based on Israeli data.
7Humphrey (1992) and Pulley and Humphrey (1993) are examples of this approach.
8Surveys on this subject are provided by Colwell and Davis (1992) and Forestieri (1993),
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input (..) if it has a negative user cost [it] is an output". There is also Humphrey's
(1992) solomonic view which classifies deposits as intermediate inputs, i.e., goods
that are produced by the bank in order to produce loans, the final output, thus
describing deposits as having both characteristics. In a famous book in this field,
Kolari and Zardkoohi (1987, pp 98-101) defined banks' production process as having
three-stages, each with a different output mix: in the first phase deposits are
produced, in the second it produces loans and securities and in the third there is a
vertically integrated process of production of deposits and loans.
More recently, some authors seem to have changed their mind and have adopted the
output classification for deposits. As an example, Pulley and Humphrey (1993) justify
their new approach on the grounds that "deposit services are such a large component
of bank value added - they use up half of all physical capital and labour input
expenditures" 9 . Following this line of approach, Berg and Kim (1991, 1994) classify
deposits as outputs and present an even more heterodox view by neglecting borrowed
and purchased funds (money market) on the grounds that they do not generate value
addedw.
Since deposits are the largest balance sheet item for the Portuguese banking sector
their classification becomes a critical issue for empirical investigation. A simple
theoretical model of the banking firm is developed in the next sub-section in order to
determine the best classification for deposits in the context of a theory of production
of the banking firm.
9Pulley and Humphrey (1993, pg 446).
10 In an earlier work, Berg (1991) argues that purchased funds do not use any real resources and therefore have
no role to play in a bank's cost function. Later, in Berg and Kim (1993), this approach was kept, although
deposits were handled as quasi fixed inputs since the authors' attention was concentrated on two loan market
segments. In Berg and Kim (1994) and Berg, Claussen and Forsund (1993) deposits are handled as an output.
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1.2.2. A  Long-Run Model of the Banking Firm
In this sub-section we shall separate the origination and funding of loans. As a matter
of fact, any institution may originate loans in any amount which are in no way related
to the bank's choice concerning their funding". After originating the loans, the
originator has to decide how to fund them. This may be done through the issue of
long-term debt, equity stock, deposits or purchased funds or, alternatively, the bank
may decide to securitise the whole issue and, therefore, sell all the loans to others
without losing the value-added associated with them. In other words, we shall assume
that there is a separation between the activities of origination and funding of loans.
Thus, we shall follow the "two phases" approach to banking production proposed by
Humphrey (1992). In the first phase, Berg and Kim (1994) is followed and it will be
assumed that outputs are individually originated by the use of physical capital (K) and
labour (N). In the second phase, the balance sheet equation is introduced to describe
the financial equilibrium of the firm.
Returning to the first phase, we may describe origination of loans (L) and deposits in
the following way:
L = L(K,N)	 (1.3)
D = D(K,N)	 (1.4)
Unlike the authors who adopt this perspective, we are also interested in the evaluation
of potential economies of scope. In order to allow for cost sub-aditivity, i.e., for the
11The best example of this situation is GMAC, General Motors Acceptances Corporation, which does not
collect deposits and is one of the most important originators of consumers loans in the US.
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existence of joint production of both deposits and loans in such a way that some
resources are shared by both activities allowing for economies of joint production,
expressions (1.3) and (1.4) are dropped in favour of a more general transformation
function:
F(L,D,K,N) = 0
	
(1.5)
Equation (1.5) describes the first phase of the bank's production and basically
corresponds to the approach followed by Pulley and Humphrey (1993). However,
there is a significant difference in the role played by joint production in the two
articles. These authors try to estimate the potential costs associated with a separation
between the "production" of deposits and loans resulting from securitisation of the
latter. Their argument is: if economies of scope do exist, than the reduction of the
loan portfolio due to dis-intermediation will result in cost dis-economies. In this
chapter it is hypothesised that real resources costs of loans are associated with their
origination and posterior monitoring. Therefore, in this context, securitisation of such
loans does not imply any reduction of "produced loans", but rather the mere transfer
of the securitised ones to an "off balance sheet" account 12 . In fact, in most cases the
originator, regardless of having securitised the loan or not, remains responsible for its
monitoring and, consequently, for the associated costs".
120rigination and monitoring seem to be the most real resource consuming activities associated with loans, and
they are unaffected by securitisation. If dis-intermediation occurs, in most cases the originator remains
responsible for collection of principal and interest, and for loan quality monitoring as well. Therefore, I think
that Pulley and Humphrey (1993) addressed this question in a wrong way, since there is probably no loss of
eventual economies of scope associated with securitisation: The reduction in loans they foresee is for "on
balance sheet" ones and if we account for all of them, i.e., including "off balance sheet loans" and all others
under the bank's monitoring, then securitisation does not affect the "total loans" concept relevant for banking
costs.
13A theoretical discussion of this issue is provided by Pennacchi (1988). Basically, this author concludes that
banks have a lower incentive to monitor securitised loans, unless obliged to provide some credit enhancement
themselves. Therefore, only loans requiring low monitoring effort constitute good securitisation candidates.
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After originating loans and deposits the bank's management needs to raise money to
cover any potential shortage of funds or to invest any surplus. This "second phase" of
the bank's production is mathematically described by the balance-sheet constraint,
which includes shareholders' equity (E). The bank's (static) long-run objective will be
the maximisation of economic profits, defined as:
MaxII = RLL+RsS-rKK-wNN-RDD-REE
	
(1.6)
{L,S,K,N,D}
s.t: F(L,D,K,N) = 0
pD+S+L+K=D+E
	 (1.7)
Where RL, Rs, RD and RE are the required rates of return on loans, securities, deposits
and equity, respectively, p is the non-earning cash reserves coefficient, rx is the
operating cost of capital and wN is the wage rate. The balance sheet constraint has, to
the best of my knowledge, been completely ignored in the banking costs literature.
This is absolutely remarkable for one main reason: most variables that are classified
either as inputs or outputs are tied together by this equality constraint which reduces
one degree of freedom in this problem and demands that one of those variables be
dropped from the model.
The discussion above leads to the choice of the variable to be dropped. Following
Berg (1991) and Berg and Kim (1991, 1994) the difference between money market
investments and purchased funds, denoted by S in this model, is the excluded variable.
Solving (1.7) for S and replacing in (1.6) the problem becomes:
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Max II = (RI, - Rs)L + (Rs(1-p) - RD)D - (ric + Rs)K - wN N - (RE - Rs)E (1.8)
{L,S,K,N,D}
s.t: F(L,D,K,N) = 0
The model above has some interesting features. First, it departs from an optimisation
problem where both profit function and balance sheet constraint are explicitly
considered, as in the short-run model of Klein (1971). As long as the money market
rate (net of required reserves) is higher than deposits' rates, they have a positive
contribution to the bank's profits. If this does not occur (in marginal terms) the bank
will choose to fund itself via money market purchased funds. In other words, the
margins over security / money market rates on both deposits and loans are the
"prices" that the bank charges on its outputs. Second, the cost of physical capital is
the sum of two components, one is the traditional functioning cost and another, also
important, is the opportunity cost of its funding, which is consistent with Jorgensen's
definition of user's cost of capital (if we ignore capital gains) but is surprisingly
ignored in most banking costs literature. Another important aspect is the negative
user's cost of equity capital, assumed to be exogenous in this model.
As in most of the literature in this subject, equity will, hereafter, be ignored. Its price
is very difficult to evaluate, as pointed out by Forrestieri (1993, pg 69) and it is
somewhat difficult to assess its contribution to the bank's production.
It is assumed that each bank makes its decisions in two stages. In the first,
management chooses the desired capacity defined as the amounts of loans and
deposits they wish to serve, denoted by L * and D* . This choice is generally assumed
to result from maximisation of long-run profits. In the second stage, the bank will
28
Essays on Banking
choose the cheapest way to produce the desired output mix, using the inputs capital
and labour:
Min C = (rK + Rs)K + wN N	 (1.9)
{K,N}
s.t.	 F(1:,
	
, , )=0
Using Shepherd's lemma and duality between production and costs, the problem (1.8)
and (1.5) may be represented by the following cost function:
C = C(L* , D*
 , rK + rs , wN)
	
(1.10)
Therefore, technology above may be represented by some flexible-form cost function
having loans and deposits as outputs and physical capital and labour as inputs.
1.2.3. Cost Function Specification
In order to proceed with an econometric estimation of (1.10) it is necessary to impose
some parametric form upon it. Most studies in economies of scale and scope of
financial institutions use the second order approach to the technology provided by the
translog cost function, which consists in a second order Taylor approximation to a
"true" cost function 14 . It is attractive in several ways. It allows a U-shaped average
cost curve, does not impose a priori restrictions on the elasticity of substitution and
14See Clark (1988) and Forestieri (1993).
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allows the computation of measures of the above for institutions of different sizes.
Another advantage is the one widely explored by Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey
(1982), consisting of the possibility of allowing the direct comparison between
branch and wholesale banking. Another, introduced by Hunter and Timme (1986), is
the interaction between time and other explanatory variables to test for technical
change. Although it has been recently criticised for showing inappropriate properties
for measuring economies of scope, there is thus far no widely accepted alternative".
Among the alternatives to the standard translog, the most popular is the introduction
of the Box-Cox (1964) transformation. Some studies use this transformation on the
outputs only and leave the log metric in the inputs, estimating what is now commonly
known as hybrid translog (ex: Santos, 1991). The underlying idea associated with the
choice of this formulation lies on the poor performance of the standard translog for
low levels of output, making it imprecise in measuring economies of scope.
Unfortunately, the use of the Box-Cox transformation has lead to results showing
properties similar to that of the translog (see Berger, Hunter and Timme, 1993, pg
225). In his application to Portugal, Santos (1991) experienced several problems with
his Box-Cox specification and was forced to adopt the translog in two of his three
panels.
Given the problems inherent in the Box-Cox transformation and considering the
econometric difficulties associated with the adopted estimation procedure, it was
considered preferable to use a simple formulation in order to reduce convergence
difficulties. Therefore, as in most banking costs literature, the specification to be
estimated in this study is a multi-output translog where branching is allowed to
15 See, for instance, Noulas, Miller and Ray (1993).
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interact with the other variables, as proposed by Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey
(1987). This explicit introduction of branches has been justified in the literature as a
way to allow the pooling of both single and multiple branch banks 16 . The function is:
ln(C) = ao +EP i ln(y)+ Ea1in(w)+1,,EEson(y)in(y)+
iEY	 iEW	 jeY
—
1 EE71.ln(w1)ln(w;)+EEpiiln(y.)1n(wi)+
2 iEw J Ew	 iEY jeW
yb ln(B)+ w	 1+E i ln(B)1n(y 1 )+ Elviln(B)1n(wi)
.1313.11 2 (.B ,	 kv
icY	 iEW
where:
W= {WK, WN} , Y—{K, N} and Wk rk + rs
B stands for the number of the bank's branches
The specification above must satisfy certain theoretical conditions in order to be
considered as a cost function. These are:
i) Symmetry:
outputs:	 OLD	 OD,L (1.12)
input prices:	 yN,K	 YK,N
ii) Input Price Homogeneity:
(1.13)
± ak = 1 (1.14)
yN,N	 yN,K	 = yK,N	 yicy. — 0 (1.15)
16This issue is discussed in Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey (1982).
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pL.N + pi.„K	 = 0 (1.16)
pD,N + pD,K	 0 (1.17)
kilN + kvK = 0 (1.18)
According to Shepherd's (1970) lemma, the demand for each production input may
be obtained by partial differentiation of the cost function with respect to the input's
price. Using it, the following system of factor shares equations may be obtained:
,.a,±yor in(wN )-Ey, ,K 1n(wK)+pw ln(L)+pD,, ln(D)+ W i ln(B)	 (1.19)
i E {N,K}
The inclusion of the number of the bank's branches is based on the assumption that
banks may reach different costs for the same level of both outputs, even if they
efficiently use their inputs whenever they choose different branching strategies. In
other words, the generalisation on this variable of the approximation to the cost
function is conducted in order to account for technological differences between
branching and wholesale banks. Implicit in this approach is the belief that physical
capital does not constitute a good indicator of the investment in branches, since the
same investment may be required to buy one large building in which to concentrate
operations or several smaller premises. Therefore, this variable is included to account
for the potential costs or benefits of the spatial implementation of the bankr.
17A discussion of this issue is found in Santos (1991).
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1.2.4. Economies of Scale and Scope
Different measures of economies of scale and scope based on the estimation of a
model such as the one described by equations (1.11) to (1.18) were proposed by
Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987), who adapted the usual single-product
measures for the multi-product firm. Economies of scale may be measured using the
overall economies of scale, as proposed by Panzar and Willig (1977):
The above measure may be interpreted in the following way. If all outputs are to be
increased by a common multiplicative factor, say X,, then (1.20) is equivalent to
KM. Therefore, OES > 1 implies that cost will have to increase more than
proportionately the increase of the output (diseconomies of scale) and for OES < 1
we shall have the opposite situation (economies of scale). Benston, Hanweck and
Humphrey (1982) argued that this measure is not appropriate for branching banks
because they "expand primarily by adding additional offices (which attract new
accounts) rather than by adding accounts or balances to existing offices" 18 In order
to adjust for this situation, they computed the total differential of the cost function in
order to the outputs and the number of branches and proposed the following measure
of augmented economies of scale AES, which is here generalised for the multi-output
firm:
AES= E  aln(C) 
icy aln(Y1)
aln(C) aln(B)
Ey aln(B) aln(y,) (1.21)
18Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey (1982, pg 445).
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The first measure (1.20) is sometimes referred to as plant economies of scale while
the second (1.21) is called firm economies of scale. The difference is based on the
fact that the first one implicitly assumes the number of branches as constant, and
therefore measures the sensitivity of costs to changes in the outputs for the "existing
plant", while the second takes into consideration the need to increase the number of
branches in order to expand outputs, as well as the way this interacts with the other
variables.
The measures above fall into what is sometimes called measures of ray economies of
scale, because they implicitly assume that all outputs always increase or decrease
along a straight line (for two outputs), i.e., a ray starting from the origin. Berger,
Hanweck and Humphrey (1987) criticise this approach on the grounds that firm
expansion may imply changes in the output mix, and therefore make these measures
inappropriate. To correct for these situations, they propose an alternative measure
which they called expansion path scale economies. This, instead of assuming that
output expansion follows a pre-determined ray (or straight line), is computed for
"typical" banks of different dimensions whose output mix may differ. The measure,
for a bank A moving to B's output level, with yB)yA , is:
(yB yA )/ yB
	
) aln(C(y8)) 
EPSCE =
y €1, (C(yB )— C(y A )) 1 C(?)	 aln(y) (1.22)
The measure of cost subadditivity has also been the subject of controversy, with the
measure proposed by Panzar and Willig (1981) being criticized by Berger, Hanweck
and Humphrey (1987), with the argument that the translog cost function does not
behave properly for very low levels of output. New arguments against their measure
were raised by Heathfield and Raja (1993), who showed that it may yield improper
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indications and show both types of economies for theoretical functions which do not
possess them. This measure is:
C(0 D) + C(L, — C(L,D) 
SCOPE=
C(L,D) (1.23)
The alternative measure proposed by Berger, Hanweck and Humphrey (1987),
designated by expansion path subadditivity, is gaining supporters and has two
important advantages over the traditional measure: it does not require the evaluation
of the translog at a zero level for one of the outputs; and duly incorporates the
change in firm output mix along scale expansion. Basically, this measure evaluates the
efficiency of a large firm B, comparing the cost of producing its output bundle with
the sum of the costs for two smaller firms, one for which data is observed, designated
by A, and another one (D), complementary to the latter, such that yE3 = yA ± yD and
their measure is simply:
C(yA)+C(yD)—C(yB)
EPSUB
	
	
(1.24)
C(yB)
1.2.5. Productive Efficiency
Productivity of financial institutions is becoming one of the most popular research
topics among banking economists, as may be observed in a recent issue of a
prestigious journal, which was dedicated entirely to the topic 19 . Nevertheless, only
recently has attention been devoted to efficiency measuring, and most particularly to
the topic of X-efficiency. Moreover, as Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993, pg 222)
19Allen Berger, William Hunter and Stephen Tinune (eds), "The Efficiency of Financial Institutions", Journal
of Banking and Finance, vol 17 (2-3), (April 1993).
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note "nearly all such papers had measured X-efficiency for US commercial banks,
with less than a handful of papers measuring the efficiency of (..) banks outside the
US".
Many justifications have been put forward for the detected levels of inefficiency in
financial institutions. For Portugal, high regulation and lack of competitiveness may
have reduced incentives for "cost competition", i.e., for individual banks trying to
increase their competitiveness through cost-reduction technological changes (see
Eckard, 1992). Older banks were also forced to hire excessive numbers of staff
returning from former Portuguese colonies in Africa, which may still be a factor today
in both technical (surplus staff) and allocative inefficiency. Agency problems may be
at the bottom of expense-preference behaviour of politically designated managers of
nationalised banks20.
The measurement of technical efficiency requires the existence of an estimated
frontier, parametric or non-parametric, which gives the most efficient way (cost) of
producing a given bundle of outputs. Having that information, we may compare the
actual cost incurred by the firm with the "efficient" value for that bundle and compute
a Farrel (1957) type measure of efficiency, which consists of the ratio between the
"efficient" and observed costs. This issue was introduced by Fare and Lovell (1978)
and later refined by Forsund, Lovell and Schmidt (1980) who connected this approach
to the different alternatives of frontier estimation.
20A classical reference to expense-preference behaviour in banking is Hannan and Mavinga (1980). Cebenoyan
et al (1993) use the econometric frontier approach to conduct such a test for American Savings & Loans. Mester
(1993) conducts this type of analysis estimating separate frontiers for manager-controlled and owner-controlled
S&L's.
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There is however, another major reason for the adoption of a frontier formulation
instead of a "traditional" econometric approach: the measures of economies of scale
and scope have been confounded with X-efficiency differences when the latter was
used (see Berger, Hunter and Timme, 1993, pg 227). Thus, a frontier formulation
must be adopted to allow the separation between the two effects.
Among the several alternative frontier methods, the parametric stochastic cost frontier
was chosen. The use of a parametric function has the advantage of allowing the
simultaneous computation of measures of economies of scale and scope and
productive efficiency, which allows a check upon the possible dominance of
inefficiency over economies of scale and scope as detected by Berger and Humphrey
(1991) using a "thick" (parametric) frontier approach. A stochastic frontier has
significant advantages over the deterministic alternatives, because it allows the
estimated error to be decomposed between the inefficiency component and the
statistical noise associated with measurement error and unanticipated random events
that affect production and costs. For a survey of frontier methods see Lovell (1993).
In Greene (1993) the econometric alternatives for frontier estimation are analysed and
surveyed. Berger, Hunter and Timme (1993) review frontier applications to the
financial services industry.
Unfortunately, the two-component error structure has an important disadvantage: As
Forsund et al (1980, pg 14) put it "[it] is not possible to decompose individual
residuals into their two components, and so it is not possible to estimate technical
inefficiency by observation. The best that one can do is to obtain an estimate of
mean inefficiency over the sample". This problem was somewhat softened by
Jondrow et al (1982) who proposed a decomposition for this two component error
term. But, as Bauer (1990, pg 43) commented: "Unfortunately, these estimates
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cannot be shown to be consistent estimates of u [the technical inefficiency
component]".
Keeping in mind the above criticisms, an approach similar to that employed by
Cebenoyan et al (1993) is followed in the present chapter 21 . Individual inefficiency
measures will be computed using their expected value as suggested by Jondrow et al
(1982), since this measure seems to be preferable to their "mode" estimate. In short,
the procedure is as follows:
The function to be estimated is of the form:
Ci,t = C (Yi,t , Wi,t , Bi,t) + Ui,t + Vi,t 	 (1.25)
Where Y and w are the vectors of outputs and input prices, respectively, i stands for
the bank's number and t for time. The residuals v have the usual properties, i.e., are
assumed to follow a normal distribution with zero expected value and a constant
variance cy,. The other residual u follows a half-normal distribution, with u ^ 0 and
variance o'2u . Residuals u and v are assumed to be independent. While the first of
these terms corresponds to the usual random disturbance used in econometrics, the
second is assumed to correspond to deviations from the cost function attributable to
inefficiency. In other words, non-negativity of u has to be imposed in order to ensure
that most actual observations correspond to values above the cost function, because
theory defines it as the minimum admissible cost to efficiently produce that bundle of
outputs given the input prices.
21 There is, however, a major difference from the case presented in that article: Cebenoyan et al (1993) used a
truncated normal distribution for u while in the present article the half-normal distribution is adopted.
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In order to estimate individual inefficiency errors, their expected values are computed
as (Jondrow et al, 1982):
\= a a  (4)(XE,,t/a)  
+ 
kci,t)
u v
a	 cD ( X 6i.t /a )	 a
(1.26)
where :
a
 V 2 2au+av and	 Ei,t = Ui,t Vi,t
ck(x) represents the standard normal density function
(I)(x)represents the standard normal distribution function
These estimators are unbiased but, unfortunately, not consistent. Nevertheless, they
are, until the present, the only ones available for estimating efficiency at the firm level.
For a discussion of this issue, see Greene (1993, pp 80-82).
Once computed, the above inefficiency indicator may be used to derive productive
efficiency indexes. For that purpose, a Farrel (1957) type measure is used. Productive
efficiency is simply the ratio between "efficient" (i.e. computed over the frontier) and
"total" costs. The relevant difference between them will simply be given by u, because
the v residual represents random effects unrelated to either technology or inefficiency.
Therefore, the measure is estimated as:
Where U is the cost component estimated to result from X-inefficiency.
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The above measure, which yields 1 for "efficient" banks, has the disadvantage of not
allowing a direct separation between technical and allocative inefficiency. Kopp and
Diewert (1982) developed a method for decomposing the two sources of inefficiency
based on "efficient" input demand functions. These authors use the input demand
functions derived from the cost function to estimate the efficient level of each of the
inputs, and therefore determine how much inefficiency results from the use of the
wrong input mix (allocative) and from the excessive use of inputs (technical).
An alternative method consists of the simultaneous estimation of a cost and share
function, in which deviations from the latter are considered to result from allocative
inefficiency, and deviations from the first will result from a composed error structure
summing allocative, technical and random effects22.
In this chapter special attention will be given to banks' staff. There is some anecdotal
and journalistic evidence for the existence of excessive personnel in some banks,
especially the older ones. Having estimated a frontier, the first step will be the
computation of an input demand function for labour:
ac	 ain(c)  c
. N(L,D,wx,wN)
owN ain(wN) wN
(1.28)
Having computed the "efficient" value for N, observation by observation, we may
compare these values with the actual number of employees and determine which
institutions show under and overstaffing. Obviously, the latter may result from
technical and / or allocative inefficiency.
22See Bauer (1990) and Greene (1993).
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1.3. Estimation and Data
1.3.1. Estimation
The parametric cost function (1.11) using panel data and imposing the error structure
of (1.25) is estimated using TSP's maximum likelihood algorithm. The number of
parameters to be estimated was reduced by the imposition all theoretical restrictions
required by the theory (1.12 to 1.18). The log-likelihood function for the model
(1.25) above is the cost frontier variation of the one proposed by Aigner, Lovell and
Schmidt (1977, pg 26) for production frontiers:
ln(2)=_n 14)—	 +141:1)(1)
2 n
	 2a	 a
(1.29)
where n stands for the number of observations, / for likelihood, and (1)(x) for the
cumulative normal distribution.
In order to avoid convergence difficulties, the iterative process (Gauss-Newton) was
initialised using the starting values for a and proposed by Waldman (1978) and
reported in Greene (1982). All stationary points found during iterations were checked
for possible situations of local optimum, the "third moment" method proposed by
Waldman (1982) being used to decide whether or not resume the process following
other direction.
A problem occurred when the process, sometimes, converged to points where one (or
both) parameters a or were negative. Whenever this situation arose, the process
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was reinitiated from that point using the absolute values of those previously estimated
parameters. Generally, the model converged after a few iterations.
The Variance-Covariance matrix estimates were obtained using the Berndt-Hall-Hall-
Hausman (1974) method (hereinafter, BHHE) and the White (1982) "robust" method.
The latter has significantly important advantages, namely by being "robust" to
misspecification and heteroscedasticity, and therefore was the one adopted to figure in
the results. It should be noted that since all banks, from different sizes, were pooled in
the sample, the presence of heteroscedasticity may not be discarded, and therefore
this variance-covariance matrix estimator should be used.
Several formulations for (11) - (25) were tested. In what will, hereinafter be called
Model A, all variables in (11) were included. This equation was also estimated
without imposition of the theoretical restrictions, as it was concluded, through a Wald
test, that the resulting estimates violated those restrictions and, therefore, the
estimated equation did not correspond to a cost function. In another version of (1.11),
hereinafter designated Model B, the "number of branches" variable was omitted. Once
again, in this version, theoretical restrictions had to be imposed a priori since the
otherwise resulting estimates violated them.
There are two reasons for making the a priori introduction of the theoretical
restrictions. As in most of the literature, we impose them to assure that the resulting
estimates do have the economic properties of a cost function, which are absolutely
essential to allow the interpretation of the results in terms of economies of scale and
scope. The other reason is associated with the econometric procedure used: by
imposing those restrictions, the number of parameters to be estimated is significantly
reduced and estimators' efficiency, as well as convergence, is greatly increased.
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In order to detect any possible technical change, a time trend was also included under
different alternatives, from the inclusion of a single parameter to a fully second-order
generalisation on this variable. The latter is basically the approach suggested by
Hunter and Timme (1986).
Early estimates indicated a negative correlation in banks' efficiency indexes and the
number of new branches opened in the year. This could be an indication that some
costs associated with the opening of new branches may have been taken as costs
rather than investments. On the other hand, it is reasonable to admit that in its first
year the new branches do not have the same productivity as the others. In order to try
to correct this situation, a rather more complex inefficiency error was also tested:
= In ( A Bo +1) z21n 2 ( A	+ 1 ) + U,t + vi,t	 (1.30)
With this specification, banks that do not open new branches are unaffected (in
becomes zero) and inefficiency resulting from u becomes isolated from the "new
branches" effect. The 1 inside the logarithms is necessary to avoid computation of
ln(0).
1.3.2. Data
This study was based on data published by the Associaccro Poriuguesa de Bancos in
its annual bulletin, for the years 1986/1992. In order to avoid using end of year data,
balance sheet items (stock variables) were computed as the average of their end and
beginning of year values. In some cases, when significant asset or liability composition
changes were detected, half year accounts were used to improve the accuracy of
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computed averages. A similar procedure was followed to compute the number of
bank's branches and employees for each year. For income statement data (flow
variables) figures accumulated until 31 December were used. Therefore, one year of
observations was lost, yielding an unbalanced panel for 1987/1991. New banks were
added to the panel on the second year of their operations.
All banks except the Caixa Geral de DepOsitos (CGD) were included in the sample.
The CGD was excluded due to the fact that its dimension twice exceeds that of the
second largest bank and results seemed to be severely sensitive to its inclusion or
exclusion from the sample, making it an "outlier" in this context. Given its dimension
and the monopoly situation from which it has benefited in several markets during part
of the sample period, it was opted to drop this institution, choosing to work only with
the remainder of the sample.
From the procedure above, 140 observations were obtained which were organised in
an unbalanced panel with 2 to 6 observations per bank.
The price of labour was computed as the ratio of total labour expenses per worker.
This approach, widely used in the literature, has some unpleasant disadvantages but,
unfortunately, is difficult to replace. In fact, this is more of an average than a marginal
cost for labour and therefore not very suitable for the computation of marginal costs
for the bank's products. For the data set used, there is also the problem associated
with different accounting practices regarding the treatment of the banks' future
pension obligations, which go from fully accounted contributions to pension funds to
situations (especially in the case of several nationalised banks) in which this cost is
totally ignored and absent from the income statement.
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It is also interesting to note that this variable is declining in the banks' dimension (see
Table 1.1., computed using 1986 prices). There are two reasons for this. Small
wholesale corporate banks hire highly qualified personnel for the most part, while
larger banks always have high percentages of less skilled workers such as tellers and
attendants in branches. If we assume that banks expand their operations keeping their
skilled/unskilled workers ratio constant, average costs above will constitute a
reasonable measure of marginal costs of labour and, therefore, despite the criticisms
above, it is here used to evaluate the price of labour.
TABLE 1.1.
Average Salaries and Bank Size
ASSET SIZE SALARY
<20M 3,205
20M- 100M 2,544
100M - 250M 2,161
250M - 500M 1,847
>500M 1,830
millions of 1986 contos	 1986 contos
The computation of the user's cost of capital is a more controversial issue. Following
Santos (1991), all costs other than labour incurred by the bank were allocated to
capital, depreciation included. This last item, although not being an expense, but
rather just a cost for tax purposes, has to be included since that is the only available
way to proxy the economic depreciation of assets and for the costs on advertising
and royalties paid to open new branches (both depreciated over three years for
accounting purposes). Consistent with (1.10), an average money market rate was
added to the average of above expenses to total capital in order to account for the
opportunity costs of the bank's investments in fixed assets.
45
Essays on Banking
One problem with the above procedure lies in the inclusion or not in this variable of
the operating expenses not directly associated with labour. This problem is due to
accounting practices which take into the same account all kinds of services acquired
from third parties. If we decide to include them, a bizarre situation occurs: banks
which primarily lease their branches will have an exceptionally high cost of capital,
since this option results in a very high balance for this "miscellaneous costs" account
and results in a very small physical capital account, yielding a very high ratio between
them. On the other hand, if those costs are excluded, then an important part of real
resources costs will not be accounted for, making resulting estimates somewhat
unreliable. Therefore two alternative solutions will be tested: the first one will take all
costs other than wages as capital costs; the second will assume that depreciation and
the opportunity cost of capital are the only relevant items for capital, but keep
"miscellaneous" as an independent part of total costs.
This last approach is somewhat more atypical and may be justified in the following
grounds: "miscellaneous costs" are generally variable costs used to produce output
directly together with capital and labour. Therefore, they should be included as an
input into the transformation function together with the two "primary" factors. The
only problem with this approach is the impossibility of differentiating price and
quantity in their total amount, leading to the need to model the problem assuming a
unit input price for these "miscellaneous" costs, hereinafter denoted by M. The firm's
problem, considering this cost allocation alternative, will be:
MinC=M+(5-FRs)K+wNN	 (1.31)
(K,N,M}
s.t. F	 M,K,N)=0
	 (1.32)
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This problem has a generic solution similar to (10), which makes this approach
compatible with the estimation of its second order approximation (1.11). Here, 5
stands for the depreciation rate. With this approach we obtain a "user cost" for capital
which is similar to Jorgenson's when capital gains are ignored. From the above it may
be seen that first derivatives of (1.31), in order to input prices, yield the input demand
functions for both capital and labour, although such a procedure may not be followed
for M.
Measures of economies of scale based on estimates of (1.11), using the above
definition of user's cost of capital, should now be interpreted in the context of duality
relative to the transformation function (1.32).
Estimations based on formulation (1.9) will be called models A(1) and B(1), while the
ones based on (1.31) will be designated A(2) and B(2), respectively.
Summary descriptive statistics for the most relevant variables are shown in the
following tables. Cost of capital is defined according to the two alternatives presented
above.
Table 1.2.
Summary Descriptive Statistics
Variable Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum
C 7,952.2 8,226.0 229.4 39,032.4
L 105,602.8 96,721.1 2,518.4 398,749.9
D 170,788.2 182,080.4 210.4 658,834.9
WN 2,774.9 2,162.7 1,298.0 25,450.3
WK(1) 64.7% 43.3% 20.9% 333.4%
WK(2) 28.0% 7.6% 16.7% 54.9%
B 64.1 68.1 1.0 254.0
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Table 1.3.
Correlation Matrix
var C L D WN WK(1) WK(2) B
C 1.000
L 0.927 1.000
D 0.917 0.885 1.000
WN -0.103 -0.026 -0.159 1.000
WK(1) -0.154 -0.139 -0.215 0.347 1.000
WK(2) -0.184 -0.172 -0.189 0.280 0.745 1.000
B 0.950 0.855 0.912 -0.285 -0.236 -0.224 1.000
A few comments on the data above are called for: Costs, deposits and loans are
expressed in millions of contos (one thousand escudos) deflated to 1986 prices. Price
of labour is expressed in contos for the same base year. The reader should note the
difference between the two alternatives for the computation of the price of capital.
Most notably, the fact that some values for wk(1) are incredibly high.
1.4. Results
1.4.1. General Results
With the variables defined as above, the four alternatives considered for the cost
frontier were estimated as specified in Section 3 with the specific imposition of
theoretical restrictions. All tested dummy variables were rejected as having very low
associated t ratios. The same applies to the different alternatives of including the time
trend, which seems to indicate that no technical change has occurred during this
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period. Therefore, results presented here correspond to the base versions A and B of
the model as explained above. Similar reasons lead the error structure (1.30) to be
dropped, as well, in favour of the simple two-residual (u and v) structure.
As a note, prior estimation of the models without imposition of theoretical restrictions
yielded results that, in some cases, did not converge to frontier solutions and, in all
cases, Wald tests performed on those restrictions revealed that these estimates
violated them.
The first thing to be checked is which model alternative, A or B, should be used. As
will be seen later, all estimates seem to provide similar conclusions concerning
economies of scope, but divergences are found for economies of scale. To be more
precise, the two versions of model B show economies of scale for the first two classes
of banks and dis-economies for the remainder. Although this represents a "typical"
result in the literature, it may result from mispecification if branches do, in fact,
effectively interact with the other variables.
To check for this, a Wald test was computed for both specifications A(1) and A(2).
The null hypothesis was that all parameters associated with the branching variable
were simultaneously zero. The resulting values were 259.6 for A(1) and 169.2 for
A(2) which for a chi-square distribution with 5 degrees of freedom allows the
rejection of the null hypothesis for both models (critical value for 99.5%: 16.75).
Considering the results of this test, we shall henceforth, as in most banking costs
literature, concentrate our attention on the more general formulation A. This simply
means that banks owning a small number of branches do not have the same
technology as the others. The extent to which the introduction of the branching
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variable is enough to incorporate that technological difference is always difficult to
evaluate.
Estimated coefficients for these models follow in the next pages. As the reader may
see, in all cases except B(2) the t statistic associated with X allows the rejection of
the null hypothesis, since this parameter is zero, and therefore the estimated functions
possess frontier properties, a conclusion that is reinforced by the high values of the
third central moment of the estimated composed residuals23.
All estimated cost frontiers are increasing in the output quantities (despite the
negative sign associated with the first order terms in the outputs and in the number of
branches). The same occurs for input prices. Nevertheless, whenever the first version
of the cost of capital is used, the significance of most parameters associated with
output quantities are not statistically significant. As an example, in A(1) the only
significant parameter associated with deposits is TB, (the parameter which gives the
interaction between deposits and branches).
Model B(1) performs very poorly, since only four out of ten cost function parameters
are statistically significant, and is therefore discarded.
It should also be noted that the estimation procedure for White's (1982) variance-
covariance matrix for both versions of model B never converged. Therefore, estimates
based on BHHH are produced.
23Not shown. All exceeded the value of 100.
50
Essays on Banking
Given the considerations above, attention will be concentrated on model A(2). For a
better understanding of the situation, measures of economies of scale and scope will
be computed for both versions of model A. Decomposition of observed costs between
the three components follows in appendix A.1.
Table 1.4.
Estimates for Model A
MODEL A(1) MODEL A(2)
Para Value Std Error t statistic signif Value Std Error t statistic signif
a o 14.871	 9.083	 1.637 * 21.665	 7.910	 2.739 **
13 L -3.049	 1.588	 -1.921 * -2.920	 1.701	 -1.716 *
13 D -0.348	 1.185	 -0.294 -2.368	 1.544	 -1.533
a. N 4.286	 2.227	 1.924 * 6.201	 1.981	 3.130 ***
5 LL 0.483	 0.121	 4.001 *** 0.422	 0.139	 3.031 **
5 LD -0.106	 0.078	 -1.373 -0.124	 0.063	 -1.960 **
5 DD 0.026	 0.071	 0.363 0.134	 0.076	 1.764 *
y Tor -0.139	 0.299	 -0.465 -0.775	 0.250	 -3.102 ***
p LN -0.325	 0.124	 -2.622 ** -0.169	 0.139	 -1.216
p DN 0.198	 0.099	 2.001 * 0.257	 0.103	 2.496 **
B 3.246	 1.075	 3.019 ** 3.883	 0.857	 4.530 ***
BB -0.008	 0.123	 -0.064 0.073	 0.072	 1.022
D 0.140	 0.069	 2.037 * 0.066	 0.096	 0.687
L -0.277	 0.111	 -2.503 * -0.236	 0.091	 -2.608 **
K 0.020	 0.117	 0.171 0.061	 0.083	 0.738
1/a 2.527	 0.379	 6.669 *** 3.483	 0.444	 7.849 ***
X 2.823	 1.034	 2.730 ** 1.819	 0.863	 2.107 *
Signifficance: 	 * = 10%,	 ** = 5%	 and	 *** = 1%	 for two-tail test
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Table 1.5.
Estimates for Model B
,
MODEL B(1) MODEL B(2)
Para Value Std Error t statistic signif Value Std Error t statistic signif
a o 28.386	 19.843	 1.431 -23.713	 13.654	 -1.737 *
13 L -4.244	 2.717	 -1.562 -1.450	 2.304	 -0.630
13 D -0.033	 1.781	 -0.018 0.876	 1.634	 0.536
OC N 3.574
	 3.012	 1.187 7.752	 1.900	 4.081 ***
5 LL 0.240	 0.182	 1.321 0.507	 0.217	 2.339 **
5 LD -0.194	 0.111	 -1.740 * -0.360	 0.138	 -2.613 **
5 DD 0.275	 0.087	 3.154 *** 0.327	 0.104	 3.140 ***
y isTN -1.003	 0.370
	 -2.709 ** -0.717	 0.297	 -2.416 **
p LN 0.385	 0.227	 1.700 * -0.127	 0.276	 -0.460
p DN -0.062	 0.160	 -0.389 0.069	 0.184
	 0.376
1/cr 1.770	 0.105	 16.916 *** 2.010	 0.383	 5.254 ***
X.
,
3.714	 1.272	 2.921 ** 1.091	 0.747	 1.460
Statistics based on BHHEI Variance-Covariance estimates
In order to better understand the estimates above, it is interesting to evaluate the
resulting marginal costs for both deposits and loans. Such computation, as happens
for economies of scale, may be conducted at both plant and firm levels. For the latter,
an evaluation of how branching is related to the outputs must be performed. That is
the purpose of the next sub-section.
1.4.2. Output Mix and Branching
In this sample, banks of different sizes are pooled. This situation leads to possible
problems associated with changes in output mix among classes of different dimension.
Figure 1.1. below shows that smaller banks are almost specialised in lending, while
the bigger ones spread from a few cases in which deposits and loans match, to a more
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general situation in which deposits greatly exceed loans 24 . Some dispersion is found
for banks with a number of branches ranging from 10 to 25.
This situation implies that both economies of scale and scope must be evaluated
through "expansion path" measures, (1.22) and (1.24) respectively, and raises the
question of how much these two "extremist" types of banks may be losing with the
possibility that scope economies actually do exist.
Figure 1.1.
Output Mix and Branching
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In order to compute "firm" level measures of economies of scale and scope, as well as
marginal costs, a relationship between the log of branches and the logs of outputs
24The graph is constructed in logs in order to provide a better understanding of differences among banks of
different sizes.
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must be estimated (see expression 21). Following Benston, Hanweck and Humphrey
(1982), the following relationship is estimated:
ln(B)= 0 0 + O L In (Li,t) + OD In(D,,t)+ O LD In(L)In(D) 0 11, 111 2 (L) + O DD 1n 2 (D,,t) +
(1.33)
in which pt is the usual white noise type econometric residual.
Unfortunately, in results from ordinary least squares (OLS) most of the parameters
above were not statistically significant and all resulting aln(B)/aln(D) estimates
showed negative values for the larger institutions. Given the suspicion regarding
heteroscedasticity, a Goldfeld-Quandt (1965) test was performed and the null
hypothesis of homoscedasticity was rejected25 . As a consequence, Aitken generalised
least squares (GLS) were applied, assuming that the variance of the residuals is
inversely proportional to bank's total assets. Although some general improvement
was found, negat:vity of the above elasticity persisted for the largest three institutions.
Given this situation, a different alternative was tested:
Bo — 00 + OL Lo + OD Do + OLD Lo Do + OLL 0,t + ODD re,1+1-1j3	 (1.34)
Estimates obtained by OLS also showed significant heteroscedasticity and a similar
GLS procedure was used. After successive estimates in which the less significant
parameters were dropped, until only significant ones remained, the following estimate
was retained:
25Residual variance for the smaller institutions was much higher than that computed for the larger ones.
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Table 1.6.
Branching Regression Estimates
Param	 Estimate	 t statistic
0 D 4.4137E-07 9.723
0 LD 6.05703E-16 2.532
0 0 DD -4.97947E-16 -2.947
This regression has a r squared of .901 and a F statistic of 19.2. To obtain the above-
mentioned elasticity for any of the outputs the following computation is made:
d ln(B) dB Y
= -- for Y EIL,D1
d ln(Y) dY B (1.35)
The resulting estimate shows positive values for that elasticity for all banks in the
sample. The required number of branches is increasing in both outputs, but it is
surprising to discover that loans and branches are only indirectly related, i.e., the only
significant coefficient associated with loans is the one in which they interact with
deposits. This seems to confirm some anecdotal evidence that, in general, branching
expansion boosts deposits much more than credit. Probably, the above result may
reflect a situation in which credit generated by new branches may result from the new
attracted depositor customers, which would be reflected by the discovered indirect
effect.
In order to obtain a better understanding of these regression results, the above
elasticities are displayed in Figure 1.2. below:
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Figure 1.2.
Output Expansion and Branching
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Individual estimates depend on each bank's output mix but it becomes obvious that
the number of branches required to increase deposits in a certain percentage is a
decreasing function of existing offices, while the opposite seems to happen for loans,
especially for the largest branch networks. Actually, with the exception of the latter
case, loans and total branches seem to behave very independently.
Also interesting to note is that the above elasticity is generally much higher for
deposits that for loans, with the exception of the larger branch networks.
The above conclusions seem to imply an important competitive advantage for the
larger networks, especially if the usual hypothesis that market power is positively
correlated with dimension is actually verified. In that case, large institutions may
inexpensively prevent their rivals from growing in the market for deposits: not only
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will the marginal effect of their branches be higher, but they may also be able to
attract deposits generating higher margins.
These conclusions may also explain why many banks choose to concentrate on the
market for loans and mantain only one or two offices. In order to attract a significant
amount of deposits it is necessary to make huge investments in new branches, which
may be too expensive and not profitable in the short run. To understand the rationality
of this option, it is necessary to evaluate the potential cost benefits from
diversification (scope) and from growth at the firm level (scale), together with an
analysis of how market power is related to size. The latter will be the subject of a
separate chapter, while the first is analysed in the next two sub-sections.
1.4.3. Marginal Costs and Input Price Sensitivity
As in most empirical studies of banking costs some negative marginal costs were
found at the plant leve1 26 . Although this may result from inaccuracies in the measuring
of the "real" prices of capital and labour, it is always impossible to exactly understand
where those unrealistic results come from. A closer look at individual estimates from
models A(1) and A(2) indicated that this result is more frequent for banks which pay
average salaries below sample mean for the year and for institutions which show high
ratios of total assets to total branches (which could be a productivity indicator) and
for banks who do also have an important investment banking activity, not covered in
26Santos (1991) was particularly affected by this phenomenon. In one of his estimations all classes but one
showed negative marginal costs for some of his outputs.
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the present study. It was also found that individual negative marginal costs are more
frequent in models A(1) and B than in specification A(2), which may reflect their
poor econometric performance.
When marginal costs are estimated at mean values of observations for the different
classes of size, this problem only affects loans of one class. This may, in fact,
corroborate the fact that observations which show "outlier" values for some of the
variables may be hurt by measurement errors that result in this phenomenon.
Estimated values for model A, follow in the next tables:
Table 1.7.
Marginal Costs Estimates for Model A(2)
Marginal Costs
Asset Size
Plant Measures Firm Measures
Loans Deposits Loans Deposits
< 20M 0.68% 1.17% 0.69% 4.90%
20M - 100M 0.50% 1.45% 0.59% 4.74%
100M - 300M 0.66% 1.44% 0.97% 3.39%
300M - 500M -0.15% 2.06% 0.55% 3.30%
> 500M 0.30% 1.95% 1.61% 2.41%
AVERAGE:	 _ 0.26% 1.89%_ 1.12% 2.89%
size: millions of contos deflated for 1986 prices
Table 1.8.
Marginal Costs Estimates for Model A(1)
Marginal Costs
Asset Size
Plant Measures Firm Measures
Loans Deposits Loans Deposits
< 20M 0.26% 1.48% 0.28% 6.29%
20M - 100M 0.01% 1.30% 0.11% 5.15%
100M - 300M 0.58% 1.15% 0.91% 3.26%
300M - 500M -0.25% 1.64% 0.50% 2.96%
> 500M 0.63% 1.48% 1.99% 1.95%
AVERAGE: 0.33% 1.47%_ 1.24% 2.54%
size: millions of contos deflated for 1986 prices
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From the tables above, we always find marginal costs for loans to be lower than those
for deposits. More surprisingly, most firm-level values for loans are even lower than
plant figures for deposits. This may result in part from excessive capacity for loans
associated with the long credit ceilings period, in which existing banks were subject to
a progressive (in real terms) reduction of their loan portfolio. Another explanation is
that operating costs associated with loan accounts are diluted by higher balances than
the ones associated with deposit accounts.
The negative marginal cost for loans obtained for the [300,500] class may result from
the "low" input prices found. It is in this class that the major number of "troubled"
nationalised banks is concentrated. These are old institutions, where depreciation
averages are small due to low investments in more modern equipment and which, in
most cases, do not include future pension obligations under labour costs. The latter,
combined with a high ratio of unskilled/skilled labour is reflected in a low average
salary for this class. These facts, combined, may imply a null "true" marginal cost for
loans in this class. In this case, we would have a U-shaped marginal cost curve for
loans with a minimum in that class.
Marginal costs for deposits are monotonically increasing at the plant level in A(2) but
show a U-shaped behaviour for A(1). The explanation for this contradiction can only
be found in the different approaches followed in the computation of the cost of
capital. As a matter of fact, smaller institutions in most cases do not even own the
facilities in which they operate, leading to a very low amount of accounting physical
capital. Consequently, whenever all costs other than salaries are allocated to capital
the resulting "cost of capital" measure becomes severely high (up to 333%) which
inflates the computed marginal costs for model A(1) relative to A(2).
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Firm-size measures of marginal costs for deposits are considerably higher than those
for plant, reflecting a high estimated cost of expansion through branching. This effect,
however, is decreasing on bank size, showing a significant advantage for large banks
which results from the effect already discussed at the end of the previous sub-section.
As a last note, it is detected that computed marginal costs in model A(1) are more
dispersed than A(2). This may constitute a good indication that the cost of capital
measures for the first model may be very imprecise and introduce additional noise into
the estimated results. This conclusion is reinforced by their high volatility (Table 1.2.)
and the generally higher standard errors in estimates for A(1).
Table 1.9.
Input Price Sensitivity
Asset Size
Model A(1) Model A(2)
dInC/dInWn dInC/dInWk dInC/dInWn dInC/dInWk
< 20M 0.814 0.186 0.195 0.805
20M - 100M 0.859 0.141 0.534 0.466
100M -300M 0.745 0.255 0.663 0.337
300M - 500M 0.736 0.264 0.660 0.340
> 500M 0.718 0.282 0.741 0.259
The impact on total costs of changes in the input prices may also be obtained from
direct derivatives. The reader should recall that by Shepherd's lemma the derivatives
above correspond to the factor shares. All such results are positive for all classes of
size considered, although a few negative results for individual observations were
found. The above estimates show the input price elasticities of total costs. Due to a
priori imposition of theoretical restrictions on input price homogeneity, the sum of
the computed results for each model is equal to one, which is in accord with the
definition of factor shares. The results above show the importance of choosing
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appropriate measures of input prices since resulting estimates will be strongly
dependent on the choice made.
For the classes considered, only the last one (corresponding to the largest banks)
shows similar estimates for the two alternative cost of capital specifications. They
show a higher sensitivity to salaries than to the price of capital, indicating that labour
accounts for the highest share of total operating costs. To be more precise, they show
that for every 1% of salary increase total, operating costs rise slightly more than
0.7%. For model A(2) the lower the bank's size the, less will be the impact of salary
changes, which is in accord with a higher capital / labour ratio for the smaller banks,
but is opposite to the results of model A(1).
The impact of new branches on total costs was also tested, and was found to be very
dispersed at the individual observation level but much more regular when evaluated at
mid-points of classes. Those costs are decreasing with asset size, ranging from 85
thousand contos (1986 prices) for the small banks and progressively declining to 40
thousand contos for the larger ones.
1.4.4. Economies of Scale and Scope
Results from the frontiers above are now used to check for the possible existence of
economies of scale and scope. Deriving the cost frontier for each of the outputs, it is
possible to obtain measures of marginal costs and ray economies of scale (expression
1.20). As may be seen in Tables 1.10. and 1.11. below, estimated values for both
versions of model A are similar, showing that these measures are not too sensitive to
the cost of capital measurement.
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Both models predict economies of scale for the smaller banks in the sample. This,
which results directly from declining marginal costs of deposits, is already an "almost"
standard result in this literature (see Forestieri, 1993) and was also found in Portugal
by Santos (1991). This conclusion is reinforced by the estimated values for expansion-
path scale economies, which show economies of scale for banks which move from
class 1 to class 2.
Table 1.10.
Estimated Measures of Ray Economies of Scale
Class Asset Size
Ray Economies of Scale
A(1) plant A(1) firm	 A(2) plant A(2) firm
1 <20M 0.231 0.725 0.323 0.668
2 20M - 100M 0.270 1.091 0.377 1.005
3 100M - 300M 0.485 1.197 0.533 1.180
4 300M- 500M 0.429 0.927 0.515 0.954
5 > 500M 0.538 0.893 0.578 0.957
Since we found significant output mix differences along the "expansion path" (see
Section 1.4.2., Figure 1.1.) estimates using formulation (1.22) would give a better
approach to the effective gains from dimension change, and our attention shall
concentrate on them. It is, however, convenient to note that the two approaches
present compatible conclusions.
When expansion is made from class two to class three, dis-economies of scale are
found at the firm level, which are associated with a peak of the marginal cost for
loans. At this size, no significant advantages result from the branching network, and
average labour costs are still high. This result seems to be associated with a change in
the output mix trend. In Figure 1.1. we saw that the ratio L/D is decreasing in the
bank's size, but for the classes 2 to 3 this trend appears to be temporarily positive but
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then starts to descend again. This fact is related to individual strategies of the banks
which fall into classes 2 to 3 and should not be generalised as part of an expansion
path which all growing banks must follow. Therefore, the above measure is probably
exaggerated, and should be interpreted with extreme care.
Table 1.11.
Estimated Measures of Expansion Path Scale Economies
Expansion Path Scale Economies
Class A(1) plant A(1) firm	 A(2) plant A(2) firm
1 -2 0.230 0.912 0.297 0.850
2 - 3 0.515 1.270 0.568 1.223
3 -4 0.428 0.859 0.509 0.911
4 -5 0.561 0.921 0.615 0.960
The biggest advantage is found for banks which move from classes 3 to 4, which may
benefit from slight economies of scale in their expansion. Less obvious are those
economies for banks moving to the largest size class. These results are associated
with a declining plant marginal cost for deposits together with a favourable change in
output mix in which the progressively less-costly product becomes the most important
output.
This last result is surprising because it contradicts most empirical findings for other
countries, as well as the ones obtained for Portugal by Santos (1991). An explanation
for the apparent contradiction between estimated (by most authors) dis-economies of
scale and many banks' desire to grow lies in the translog's tendency for U-shaped
curves leading to the "need" to show increasing marginal costs for the largest
institutions as a counterpart to the decreasing values found for the smaller ones.
In this chapter these "supereconomies" of scale are only found in model A. Ray type
estimates for specification B show the typical U-shaped marginal cost curve with
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economies of scale for small banks and dis-economies for the large ones. On the
other hand, expansion path subadditivity measures for that specification show
constant returns to scale for all classes.
The contradiction between the two models is, therefore, associated with the
interaction between the number of branches and the other variables. The estimated
declining marginal cost of branches, together with estimates of (1.34) which show a
significant advantage of larger branching networks on "producing" deposits (the most
important output for larger banks), are combined in a measure which shows a firm-
size overall cost expansion advantage. Thus, some kind of network economies seem
to be responsible for this conclusion.
The contradiction between these findings and Santos' (1991) are most likely a result
of the different input and output classification. In this study it is found that deposits
are the output which consume the most in terms of real resources, and this one is
handled as an input in Santos (1991). Moreover, we find that interaction between
deposits and branching is responsible for some kind of cost advantage for the larger
institutions, and this effect is, obviously, absent from that author's estimations27.
As the present study is based on a real resources cost function, the conclusion above
may be contested along the line of Humphrey's (1990, pg 40) arguments that "if only
operating costs are used in a statistical analysis of bank scale economies (.) greater
scale economies (..) will typically be measured". This author bases his conclusion on
the finding that for US banks, the ratio of total operating costs (in which he ignores
the opportunity cost of physical capital) to total assets is declining on the bank's size
27Also, in Santos (1991) no firm size measures are computed for the specifications on which several earning
asset measures interact with branches.
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while the ratio of total costs to assets remains much more stable. There are two
reasons for not accepting such arguments in the present context: First, for the reasons
presented before, we believe that deposits should be handled as an output, and
therefore, is their margin and not just their interest cost that is relevant for the bank's
profits. Second, that declining relationship is not verified by Portuguese banks, the
two ratios relationship with size being very similar .
In the section on output mix and branching we found that some (small) banks
specialise in loans while others (large) show a very high deposit / loan ratio. This may
constitute an indication that gains from specialisation exist and that Portuguese banks
do not benefit from economies of scope. To check for this, measure (1.23) was
computed for both models, using 1 as a proxy for zero output. The conclusion is that
substantial economies of scope do exist for all classes.
Unfortunately, the above conclusion seems to result from the limitations of the
translog cost functions for the measuring of these economies. For many observations,
arithmetic errors occurred due to the very high values of the resulting estimates.
Changing the proxy for zero to 1000 significantly modified the magnitude of the
results but not the conclusions.
To check for jointness in the cost function, a test on the relevant parameters is
performed. A cost function is said to show jointness in production of two outputs if
increases in production in one of them reduces the marginal cost of the other. This is
equivalent to testing the sign of the cross derivatives. Therefore, a sufficient condition
for its existence is (see Clark, 1988):
OL X OD ± OLD <0
	 (1.36)
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For model A(1) the left-hand side of (1.36) yields 0.956 and the associated t statistic
is 0.325, which does not allow the rejection of the null hypothesis of non-jointness.
For A(2) the test yields 5.211 and a t statistic of 1.904, which not only allows
rejection of non-jointness but also shows some dis-economies of joint production.
The contradiction between the previous alternative tests may be solved by the use of
expansion path subadditivity measures because they simultaneously incorporate the
previously mentioned effects and combine them with the detected change in output
mix.
Results for that measure may be found in Table 1.12., below. Both versions of model
A show similar results. All banks, with the exception of the larger ones benefit from
cost subadditivity. For the latter, dis-economies of scope around 4% of total costs
were found. This seems to indicate a reason why larger banks are not making efforts
to increase their loan / deposit ratio. On the other hand, the table below shows that
smaller banks benefit from significant expansion path cost subadditivity which means
that, when they expand their size and the deposit / loan ratio together, cost economies
are generated, effects which must be added to the previously found expansion path
scale economies.
Table 1.12.
Estimated Measures of Expansion Path Subadditivity
Class
Exp Path Subadditivity
A(1) A(2)
1 - 2 0.268 0.079
2 - 3 0.238 0.230
3 -4 0.100 0.083
4 - 5_ -0.046 -0.035
Results for classes 2 to 3 have to be interpreted with care, due to the reasons already
presented in the discussion of expansion path scale economies.
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The conclusions above are, in fact, consistent with some anecdotal evidence, since
most tasks are shared in small banks while the larger ones separate most activities and
may create a bureaucratic environment that generates costs disadvantages.
1.4.5. Input Substitution
The matter of input substitutability has been ignored in most of the empirical
literature on banking costs, but the importance of this issue was restated by Noulas,
Ray and Miller (1990). These authors used the classical intermediation approach and
found that capital and labour were closer substitutes than financial liabilities and real
resources inputs. In this essay only the first two are handled as inputs, for the reasons
previously raised. Moreover, unlike those authors, we have some doubts on the way
in which a bank may keep its earning assets constant while dropping all financial
liabilities and increasing capital and labour to replace them. In other words, it does
not seem reasonable to model banking technology in a way that money and real
resources are substitutes in the production of monetary values of earning assets.
To check on input substitutability the Allen-Uzawa partial elasticity of substitution is
computed. This is defined as:
where S stands for input cost share.
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Results for both versions of model A show similar conclusions. For A(1) the above
elasticity yields 1.025 (t = 63.3) and for A(2) yields 1.097 (t = 8.3). Therefore, both
elasticities are statistically significant and slightly above unity, showing that capital
and labour are close substitutes in the production of banking products. In neither case
may the hypothesis of unit elasticity of substitution be rejected.
1.4.6. Productive Efficiency
One of the most surprising findings in this study is the relative sensitivity of individual
inefficiency scores to the model specification. As a matter of fact, the average value
for u always decreased whenever new variables were added to the regression, and
therefore the average asymmetric residual worked more as a goodness of fit measure
rather than as an indication of an average of technical inefficiency. Nevertheless, this
average is quite similar for both model A alternatives, being just slightly higher for
model B. And it was especially in the latter that significant sensitivity to specification
was found.
Appendix Al.. shows the decomposition of costs for model A(2). The columns show
the observed costs, followed by costs at the efficient frontier, costs resulting from
inefficiency, costs due to random effects and the productive efficiency indicator
defined in (1.27). We find an average productive efficiency value of 0.826 ranging
from 0.471 to 0.963. The interpretation for this is that, on average, Portuguese banks
use 17% more real resources than actually needed for the production of their output
bundles. As a matter of comparison, Cebenoyan eta! (1993) found 15% waste for US
savings and loans associations. Evanoff and Israilevich (1991, pg 25) survey this type
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of measurement for the US, and for 11 studies they mention only two showing
average inefficiency levels above the one estimated here for Portuguese banks.
To explain inefficiency determinants, some authors regress productive efficiency
estimates on several independent variables. Lovell (1993, pg 53) recommends that
"Variables under the control of the decision maker during the time period under
consideration belong in the first stage [frontier estimation]. Variables over which the
decision maker has no control during the time period under consideration belong in
the second stage [efficiency determinants estimates] ". Nevertheless, some authors
have been less cautious with this, namely Cebenoyan et al (1993) and Mester (1993).
In this essay several variables were tested as efficiency determinants. Market share on
deposits (MSD) was considered as a proxy for size and both MSD and its squared
value were included to allow for non-linearity. Also included was a dummy variable
called PUB (=1 for nationalised) to check for efficiency differences between
nationalised and private banks. To account for possible cost advantages for the older
banks, a variable called AGE (-1 for bank created before 1974) was also considered.
A dummy variable designated by GROS (=I for wholesale) was also included to
check for differences between retail and wholesale banks. Since non-price competitive
expenditures may be handled by the model as "inefficiency" in some cases, the ratio of
advertising to deposits (ADV) was also included.
Another variable which might affect estimated efficiency is branching expansion, since
new branches take a certain time to attain their associated "desired" level of outputs.
To account for this, the branch growth rate (BRX) was added to the regression. The
same was done for the loan to deposit ratio (LD) and branch to deposits ratio (BRD)
to check for the possible correlation between efficiency and the output mix -
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branching relationship. The last variable included was time (T) in order to detect for
possible changes in efficiency over time.
The dependent variable is the productive efficiency indicator, as defined by expression
(27). Estimates based on OLS showed significant heteroscedaticity and once again
Aitken's GLS estimators were used, it being assumed that residuals variance is
inversely related to total assets. After dropping variables with statistically non
significant parameters, we obtained the estimated regression, the results of which
follow in Table 1.13.
Table 1.13.
Efficiency Determinants Estimate
Variable Coefficient Std Error t -statistic	 Signiff
MSD -2.53218 0.96240 -2.63111 ***
MSD2 18.14660 6.99344 2.59481 **
AGE 0.12810 0.03281 3.90419 ***
PUB -0.07972 0.02384 -3.34413 ***
GROS -0.06724 0.04436 -1.51555
ADV -32.69920 10.66030 -3.06738 ***
T 0.00912 0.00043 21.29960 ***
This regression has an r-squared of .284 and an F statistic of 8.708. The small value
for the r-squared may be an indication that observation-specific factors are more
important than the considered variables. Nevertheless, this approach enables the
identification of some general efficiency determinants, which in some cases does not
occur when both time and firm-specific dummies are included.
The effect of market share on efficiency is convex, declining from zero to a minimum
of 7% and then grows back to zero close to the 14% level and is positive from there
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on. Its impact, nevertheless, is very small, reaching a value close to -0.7% at the
minimum.
Another interesting finding is that older banks show, on average, higher efficiency
scores, which may be associated with the fact that most their assets are already fully
depreciated and they may also benefit from cheaper rents on their premises.
More interesting is the finding that nationalised banks are less efficient than the
private ones, which may reflect overstaff and excessive investment in large bank
headquarters and mislocated branches, or may simply reflect an agency problem
associated with the separation between ownership and management, or both.
Wholesale banks seem to be less efficient than retailers, although the corresponding
coefficient is clearly on the frontier of rejection of the null hypothesis. This could
reflect the non-existence of a common technology for the two types of banks, but
estimates based on the retailers' subsample indicated problems with the statistical
significance of the parameters.
Clearly significant is the parameter associated with the advertising / deposits ratio,
which constitutes an indication that this type of model often confuses servicing costs
and non-price competition related costs. Therefore, some more research on the
determinants of non-price competition in banking and the separation between these
costs and the others directly associated with the generation of basic bank services
needs to be performed in order to correctly understand the meaning of computed
marginal costs and efficiency indexes.
Another important conclusion is that across sample average efficiency grew about one
percent per year, which seems to indicate that the current restructuring process that
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the sector is experiencing has a positive impact on efficiency. This is corroborated by
the fact that all privatised banks except one experienced an increase in efficiency in
the year following privatisation.
Figure 1.3. shows the evolution for some recently privatised banks. From here it may
be concluded that only BPA did not show an efficiency increase after privatisation,
while BFB simply continued a trend started before it, which reflects the success of the
turnaround process started in 1989. Curiously, BPA is, in fact, the only case on which
privatisation did not imply significant changes on the management team. On the other
hand, for both BTA and BESCL, privatisation was associated with a change in a
declining efficiency trend.
Figure 1.3.
Productive Efficiency: Privatised Banks
• BESCL 	 o BPA	 ' BTA	 o	 BFB
The effect of branching expansion strategies on banking efficiency was also checked.
Figure 1.4. shows the evolution of efficiency indexes for the two most aggressive new
private retail banks.
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Both BCP and BCI show lower efficiency ratios than the older banks depicted in
Figure 1.3. For BCP, 1989 represents the end of its first phase, i.e., the consolidation
of what is generally designated as its "traditional network", and in that year the bank
had its highest efficiency ranking. Starting in that year, this bank started a major
expansion through a new branching network (Novarede), which had negative
repercussions on efficiency. Nevertheless, as in 1989, as soon as the new branches
become more productive, i.e., originate more deposits and loans, the efficiency
indicator starts to grow again. Although more efficient than BCP until 1989, BCI's
expansion (after a successful takeover by Banco de Santander) led to similar
efficiency evolution, but ended with lower values for that indicator than BCP's. The
lesson seems to be that expansion leads to a temporary decrease in efficiency which
may be overcome if, and only if, that policy results in a sufficiently high number of
new customers (and balances) that compensates the increase in real resources.
Otherwise, expansion will merely imply a decrease in productivity and increased
average costs not explained by technology but, rather, by pure waste.
Figure 1.4.
Productive Efficiency: New Private Banks
1988
	
1989
	
1990
	 1991
	
1992
--"- 13CI -°- BCP
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As explained before, the stochastic frontier does not allow for a direct separation
between allocative and technical efficiency. Nevertheless, using factor demand
functions, one may try to determine which resources are responsible (being
excessively used), as proposed by Kopp and Diewert (1982) as a first step to
separating inefficiency between technical and allocative components. Unfortunately,
since we may not know the exact amount of capital used by the banks (due to the
different accounting methods for leased and owned facilities) we are able to attempt
such computation only for labour.
The procedure is the following: First, using individual bank's data, demand for labour
is computed for each bank. Then, demands for individual banks are added and
compared with the actual number of bank's employees. This procedure was
employed for the whole sample and for each year separately.
The first important conclusion is that versions A(1) and A(2) yield entirely different
results. Cost of capital definition 1 leads to very high values for this variable, which
results in the conclusion that banks operate with 20% fewer workers than they
"should". This is contrary to all evidence and any observer will immediately conclude
that this result is absurd. On the other hand, version A(2) shows a situation on which
most Portuguese banks suffer from excessive staff. Nevertheless, the actual values for
excessive staff were dependent on the value of the money market interest rate used.
To be more concrete, if the average value for 1992 is used, than we find about 500
surplus employees in the sector, but if alternatively, we use end of year figures, then
surplus staff grows to 1500 (sample total staff: 50,553).
This contradiction is related entirely to the alternative definitions for the cost of
capital in banking, and have the merit of showing the inadequacy of measure 1, still
very popular in the banking costs literature. It also shows that the decomposition of
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inefficiency into technical and allocative components is crucially dependent upon input
price measurement and that conclusions obtained may be severely biased if an
inappropriate measure is used. Therefore, probably more important than the
discussion about how much inefficiency results from the misapplication of resources,
is the discussion on the appropriate measurement of the cost of capital for the banking
industry, a field in which more fundamental research has still to be performed.
Regardless of the described measuring problem, cost of capital sensitivity of measures
based in model A(2) are entirely in accord with the computed elasticity of
substitution. Consequently, we shall conclude that, since both factors are close
substitutes, during high interest rate periods, labour intensive strategies should be
adopted. This is due to the opportunity costs of financing physical capital which,
myopically, are often ignored by bank managers, since those economic costs are not
accounted for in the bank's income statement. On the other hand, as should be
expected, low interest rate periods should be associated with more capital intensive
strategies.
As a final conclusion, the use of input demand functions in this context, as proposed
by Kopp and Diewert (1982), should be undertaken with extreme caution. The high
sensitivity of figures and conclusions to input price measurement does not allow us to
gain much applicable information from them.
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1.5. Conclusions
In this chapter, two versions of a translog cost frontier are estimated in order to study
the existence of economies of scale and economies of scope between deposits and
loans. A second objective consisted in the checking of possible regular patterns of
banking inefficiency.
From a theoretical stand-point it is argued that banking production occurs in two
phases. In the first one, banks use capital and labour to originate deposits, which is
described by a transformation function. The second one is the fund matching of assets
and liabilities, which is described by the balance-sheet equation. By using this
framework we obtained profit functions in which deposits have a positive user price,
and therefore, unlike the classification used in most literature, they must be classified
as an output. Therefore, the empirical approach followed employs a "real resources"
cost concept rather than a "total" costs concept.
Results are based on the estimation of parametric cost frontiers. In relation to the cost
function formulation, it appears that consideration of the number of branches as a
variable that interacts with deposits and loans shows a better adherence than the
alternative, where this variable was excluded. Such estimation resulted in small
marginal costs for loans at both plant and firm levels and marginal costs for deposits
which are increasing at the plant level and decreasing at the firm level.
Also tested were two cost allocation alternatives, resulting in two different measures
for the cost of capital. It was found that measures of economies of scale and scope are
quite insensitive to this measuring problem while strong dependence on this variable
definition was detected in the measurement of input price sensitivity and, most
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importantly, in the decomposition of X-inefficiency between technical and allocative
components.
All computed measures of economies of scale seem to exclude the existence of dis-
economies of scale, with the exception of mid-sized banks, and found economies of
scale for the smaller banks. Possible small economies of scale for the larger
institutions associated with an apparent high productivity of large branch networks
may not be discarded. Therefore, we do not find evidence in favour of cost-reduction
mergers.
In relation to economies of joint production of deposits and loans, they were found, in
an expansion path context, for all banks except the largest ones, which may constitute
an indication that in the latter, separation of borrowing and lending activities achieved
such a high level that there are no longer any resources shared by them. Thus, the
specialised lending banks may, in fact, be losing potential cost economies associated
with the joint production of deposits and loans. On the other hand, large commercial
banks, in which deposits, in some cases, double total loans may also be discarding a
potential cost-saving strategy.
Contradiction with the findings of previous researchers - e.g. Santos (1991) - may be
attributed to a different output bundle choice, to a different econometric approach
and to the fact that this study uses more recent data. In particular, the treatment of
deposits as an output may be responsible for these contradictory results.
In relation to efficiency, it was found that Portuguese banks are wasting a significant
amount of resources (about 17%). Among the factors that were found to influence
negative efficiency are the public (Government) ownership of the bank, market share
on deposits of around 5%-9%, and the wholesale nature of the bank. The
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combination of the first of those factors describes the majority of nationalised banks,
and it is concluded that privatisation is an important policy for the reduction of
inefficiency in the sector.
As a first step to determine how much inefficiency is associated with technical and
allocative components, input demand functions were used to check for possible
excessive use of factors. The conclusion is that results were severely dependent upon
the measure of cost of capital employed, a field in which some additional fundamental
research seems to be necessary.
In relation to the search for a bank's optimal dimension, two important aspects must
be considered. First, although we did not find sufficient evidence to support a "natural
monopoly" conclusion for Portuguese banks, it is found that larger banks benefit from
some small cost advantage which is related to a high productivity of large branching
networks. Second, a full response to this question also implies the analysis of the
revenue side of profits which in turn demands a study on how market power is related
to the bank's dimension, an issue which will be addressed in a separate chapter.
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Appendix to Chapter One
Decomposition of Observed Costs (model A2)
Essays on Banking
OB SERV.
Observed
Costs
Efficient
Costs
Costs due
to Ineffic
Random	 Productive
Component	 Efficiency
ABN 91 334,573 362,529 29,186 -57,142 0.925
ABN 92 348,343 528,520 20,274 -200,451 0.963
BANIF 90 2,750,591 2,013,618 563,004 173,968 0.781
BANIF 91 3,692,451 3,177,639 523,115 -8,303 0.859
BANIF 92 4,552,686 4,260,322 532,332 -239,968 0.889
BARCL 88 543,435 402,658 108,426 32,351 0.788
BARCL 89 702,514 461,156 176,870 64,488 0.723
BARCL 90 2,024,572 1,064,850 679,320 280,401 0.611
BARCL 91 3,505,748 2,422,824 805,057 277,867 0.751
BARCL 92 4,082,009 3,932,327 448,069 -298,387 0.898
BBI 87 10,459,313 8,295,991 1,792,980 370,342 0.822
BBI 88 10,365,702 8,386,781 1,697,000 281,922 0.832
BBI 89 10,145,621 8,665,872 1,462,834 16,916 0.856
BBI 90 9,989,500 8,766,467 1,352,050 -129,017 0.866
BBI 91 9,965,548 9,349,012 1,158,794 -542,259 0.890
BBI 92 12,497,515 12,568,527 1,254,603 -1,325,615 0.909
BBV 88 2,060,482 1,296,204 555,375 208,903 0.700
BBV 89 2,055,581 1,539,390 400,825 115,367 0.793
BBV 90 2,694,774 1,581,587 800,141 313,046 0.664
BBV 91 2,455,325 1,690,254 568,002 197,069 0.748
BBV 92 4,154,873 4,098,116 433,957 -377,200 0.904
BCA 87 1,150,027 1,243,012 100,763 -193,748 0.925
BCA 88 1,217,774 1,216,269 123,967 -122,461 0.908
BCA 89 1,439,218 1,374,037 161,064 -95,882 0.895
BCA 90 1,550,845 1,141,826 313,634 95,385 0.785
BCA 91 1,979,740 1,274,980 514,374 190,385 0.713
BCA 92 2,255,715 1,775,213 393,692 86,810 0.818
BCI 88 1,334,983 1,091,567 213,244 30,172 0.837
BCI 89 2,161,925 1,908,984 288,444 -35,504 0.869
BCI 90 4,148,118 2,781,962 1,006,389 359,767 0.734
BCI 91 7,785,995 5,152,498 1,933,479 700,018 0.727
BCI 92 10,455,065 7,454,187 2,259,404 741,473 0.767
BCP 87 3,227,309 1,865,472 976,721 385,115 0.656
BCP 88 5,326,927 3,584,408 1,284,789 457,731 0.736
BCP 89 9,154,384 7,229,574 1,584,981 339,829 0.820
BCP 90 17,377,141 12,024,558 3,980,917 1,371,666 0.751
BCP 91 27,028,431 19,013,253 5,998,791 2,016,387 0.760
BCP 92 39,032,448 29,790,827 7,300,254 1,941,367 0.803
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OBSERV.
Observed
Costs
Efficient
Costs
Costs due
to Ineffic
Random
Component
Productive
Efficiency
BESCL 87 16,122,212 13,316,245 2,515,162 290,806 0.841
BESCL 88 18,032,326 15,104,457 2,721,965 205,904 0.847
BESCL 89 18,108,047 13,270,453 3,698,144 1,139,450 0.782
BESCL 90 21,226,330 15,149,669 4,577,499 1,499,163 0.768
BESCL 91 26,498,072 19,660,174 5,271,696 1,566,202 0.789
BESCL 92 31,966,328 25,205,577 5,554,504 1,206,247 0.819
BEX 91 685,972 622,729 85,872 -22,629 0.879
BEX 92 981,123 966,003 102,851 -87,731 0.904
BFB 87 9,917,837 6,861,836 2,272,748 783,253 0.751
BFB 88 9,712,849 7,358,847 1,846,401 507,602 0.799
BFB 89 9,587,393 8,487,559 1,271,524 -171,691 0.870
BFB 90 10,508,015 9,753,063 1,251,239 -496,287 0.886
BFB 91 12,515,742 12,164,768 1,348,003 -997,030 0.900
BFB 92 14,725,740 15,428,151 1,365,390 -2,067,801 0.919
BFE 87 3,492,444 3,872,861 292,828 -673,246 0.930
BFE 88 3,290,108 3,553,415 288,662 -551,970 0.925
BFE 89 3,683,566 3,808,225 350,268 -474,927 0.916
BFE 90 4,596,824 4,062,062 612,238 -77,476 0.869
BFE 91 5,019,511 4,548,933 630,817 -160,239 0.878
BFE 92 7,756,780 7,498,521 845,104 -586,846 0.899
BNP 88 327,534 361,032 27,742 -61,240 0.929
BNP 89 410,890 409,070 42,101 -40,281 0.907
BNP 90 514,942 429,214 78,634 7,094 0.845
BNP 91 632,805 610,319 69,286 -46,800 0.898
BNP 92 748,936 602,315 124,340 22,280 0.829
BNU 87 14,804,993 10,675,074 3,127,240 1,002,678 0.773
BNU 88 13,967,280 10,609,146 2,640,291 717,843 0.801
BNU 89 14,757,928 11,245,766 2,769,983 742,179 0.802
BNU 90 16,252,343 11,478,795 3,578,740 1,194,809 0.762
BNU 91 16,612,858 12,549,005 3,178,897 884,957 0.798
BNU 92 18,875,144 15,609,597 2,935,998 329,549 0.842
BPA 87 18,002,499 15,631,406 2,497,732 -126,639 0.862
BPA 88 19,175,599 16,634,880 2,666,158 -125,440 0.862
BPA 89 19,423,698 16,152,135 2,982,457 289,106 0.844
BPA 90 20,605,670 16,414,163 3,497,458 694,049 0.824
BPA 91 26,363,217 20,885,359 4,531,792 946,066 0.822
BPA 92 33,076,996 24,825,074 6,419,197 1,832,726 0.795
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OBSERV.
Observed
Costs
Efficient
Costs
Costs due
to Ineffic
Random
Component
Productive
Efficiency
BPI 88 833,178 433,385 282,551 117,242 0.605
BPI 89 1,129,101 654,488 340,533 134,080 0.658
BPI 90 1,798,681 861,760 654,600 282,322 0.568
BPI 91 2,655,707 1,036,792 1,098,192 520,723 0.486
BPI 92 16,302,813 13,491,779 2,531,689 279,346 0.842
BPSM 87 18,450,456 11,116,763 5,291,916 2,041,777 0.677
BPSM 88 18,716,710 11,550,568 5,190,520 1,975,623 0.690
BPSM 89 19,077,433 12,694,555 4,692,543 1,690,335 0.730
BPSM 90 19,505,730 13,845,515 4,252,862 1,407,353 0.765
BPSM 91 19,815,740 15,558,085 3,477,077 780,578 0.817
BPSM 92 22,533,752 18,598,335 3,521,411 414,006 0.841
BRASIL 88 246,411 184,386 48,132 13,893 0.793
BRASIL 89 269,023 204,350 50,850 13,823 0.801
BRASIL 90 281,546 236,820 42,084 2,642 0.849
BRASIL 91 341,692 297,025 47,282 -2,615 0.863
BRASIL 92 317,836 261,816 49,896 6,123 0.840
BTA 87 12,656,853 10,570,224 1,923,986 162,643 0.846
BTA 88 13,137,122 13,375,708 1,286,855 -1,525,441 0.912
BTA 89 13,431,838 12,052,479 1,726,797 -347,439 0.875
BTA 90 15,234,316 15,918,015 1,419,705 -2,103,404 0.918
BTA 91 18,490,716 21,191,042 1,470,221 -4,170,548 0.935
BTA 92 25,343,113 31,325,440 1,809,326 -7,791,653 0.945
CHASE 88 253,638 208,822 39,868 4,948 0.840
CHASE 89 229,422 222,800 24,754 -18,132 0.900
CHASE 90 298,059 215,091 62,853 20,116 0.774
CHASE 91 268,292 201,786 51,827 14,678 0.796
CHASE 92 252,977 218,787 35,426 -1,236 0.861
CITI 88 521,710 519,371 53,462 -51,123 0.907
CITI 89 680,179 560,506 106,686 12,987 0.840
CITI 90 847,199 707,531 128,782 10,886 0.846
CITI 91 774,503 661,800 111,568 1,135 0.856
CITI 92 766,204 640,105 116,378 9,721 0.846
CLP 88 2,155,587 1,754,439 348,051 53,097 0.834
CLP 89 2,425,996 1,925,482 415,247 85,267 0.823
CLP 90 3,532,936 2,364,118 860,515 308,303 0.733
CLP 91 2,999,113 2,567,044 430,311 1,759 0.856
CLP 92 3,116,084 2,624,531 464,332 27,221 0.850
CPP 87 7,178,268 5,150,656 1,531,421 496,191 0.771
CPP 88 7,431,548 5,294,755 1,608,280 528,512 0.767
CPP 89 8,754,646 6,258,215 1,881,980 614,452 0.769
CPP 90 9,128,396 7,346,351 1,513,113 268,932 0.829
CPP 91 10,287,054 8,639,549 1,543,225 104,280 0.848
CPP 92 11,565,653 10,240,265 1,533,404 -208,017 0.870
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OBSERV.
Observed
Costs
Efficient
Costs
Costs due
to Ineffic
Random
Component
Productive
Efficiency
DBI 91 691,519 602,118 95,321 -5,920 0.863
DBI 92 1,572,397 1,539,130 166,858 -133,592 0.902
GENERALE 91 264,747 249,032 30,604 -14,889 0.891
GENERALE 92 285,726 370,027 19,268 -103,569 0.951
MANUF 88 426,968 441,788 40,535 -55,355 0.916
MANUF 89 683,493 589,025 96,513 -2,045 0.859
MANUF 90 844,016 845,839 85,330 -87,154 0.908
MANUF 91 775,709 764,230 81,213 -69,734 0.904
MANUF 92 824,926 683,939 127,555 13,432 0.843
MELLO 91 934,983 350,735 393,990 190,258 0.471
MELLO 92 1,226,073 582,221 449,278 194,575 0.564
MG 88 3,620,522 3,410,586 417,181 -207,245 0.891
MG 89 4,348,920 3,809,925 590,973 -51,978 0.866
MG 90 4,838,713 4,575,801 552,840 -289,928 0.892
MG 91 4,882,574 4,800,211 513,421 -431,059 0.903
MG 92 5,761,609 5,669,208 604,791 -512,390 0.904
UBP 87 10,410,460 9,210,005 1,382,833 -182,378 0.869
UBP 88 9,872,183 9,284,134 1,141,752 -553,704 0.890
UBP 89 9,725,117 10,083,274 919,674 -1,277,832 0.916
UBP 90 10,149,246 10,472,514 968,663 -1,291,932 0.915
UBP 91 10,572,616 11,358,097 936,411 -1,721,892 0.924
UBP 92 14,738,642 12,319,554 2,235,847 183,241 0.846
all data in thousands of escudos, deflated for 1986 prices
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Chapter Two
The Impact of Deregulation on Price and Non-Price
Competition in the Portuguese Deposits Market
2.1. Introduction
Portugal has a long tradition of administrative restrictions on banking activity. Until
1986 all deposit and lending interest rates were set by authorities, entry in the market
was simply banned, opening of new branches depended on the central bank's
authorisation and all but three small institutions were owned by the Government.
This institutional framework led to a situation of virtually no competition in the
market.
In the early 80s, some banks decided to make a more affirmative use of non-price
instruments in order to gain (or avoid losing) market share. Branch expansion was the
main competitive instrument during that period, but unfortunately, opening of new
branches depended upon permission by the central bank, and was often denied to the
most solvent institutions as a way of "helping" the other ones. This contributed to the
consolidation of this virtual cartel. Advertising expenditures, at that time, were very
small.
After 1985, when a Constitutional amendment was passed, the regulatory framework
was significantly changed. Banking was opened up to the private sector and new
institutions initiated activities in the market. Although permission for new banks was
subject to a rationing process, more than ten new foreign banks established
themselves in Portugal from 1985 to 1990 and four new Portuguese private banks
were chartered in the same period. This may be compared to a total of 16 banks in
existence in 1982. Interest rate deregulation was progressively introduced, but the
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process only became completed in the early 90s. On the other hand, branching
deregulation was much slower and some restrictions persisted until 1992, i.e. one year
before this market's integration into the single European market for financial services.
In 1989 the first privatisation of a nationalised bank took place. The Government-held
institutions' market share dropped from above 80% in 1989 to about 45% in 1993, as
a result of privatisation of five such institutions and aggressive actions on the part of a
few of the new private banks. This change in ownership structure is expected to have
a significant impact on competition, since private sector banks are generally assumed
to be much more aggressive than their public competitors.
This deregulation process had an important impact on market concentration. As a
matter of fact, some new institutions rapidly achieved market shares above 4% at the
expense of the old institutions, which in some cases experienced negative real growth
rates. This concentration reduction is likely to have had an impact on the prices of
banks products. Our aim is to evaluate the extent to which this deregulation process
changed the pricing and non-price behaviour of Portuguese banking institutions.
Thus, unlike most price concentration studies in banking, our purpose is not to make
a comparison between banks operating in different local markets (with different
concentrations), but rather to evaluate the competitive impact of concentration
changes in one specific market.
A secondary purpose is to evaluate how banks' market power is related to dimension,
which is particularly important for merger policy. In the previous chapter, our study
on banking costs found no significant evidence for the existence of economies of
scale, although a higher productivity for large bank networks was detected. However,
if higher market power is detected for the larger institutions, they will possess a
significant competitive advantage which is not detected when the analysis is
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conducted for costs alone. In that case, mergers will increase bank's profits via the
margin generated by deposits and / or loans.
In countries where market power is related to size, bank mergers have to be evaluated
with extreme care. In that context, whenever two large banks become one single unit,
market concentration will increase and the new institution will achieve a significant
advantage over its competitors. If a price-concentration relationship do also exist,
such mergers will benefit the profitability of the whole industry via the concentration
effect. These gains for the banking sector result from lower depositor's surplus and
generate a net "deadweight loss". Thus, if these relationships are found, authorities
should evaluate the potential welfare effects of a bank merger before authorising it.
Given the interest rate regulatory regime, it is advisable to include non-price
competitive instruments in the analysis. Advertising and branching were the selected
variables, because of their importance and because of data availability. The inspiration
for this empirical test is the oligopolistic framework developed by Hannan (1991),
augmented to include non-price instruments.
This chapter concentrates on the market for deposits for several reasons. First, loan
market deregulation was much slower, where both price (interest rate) and quantity
(credit ceiling) were exogenously imposed by the authorities for the major part of the
sample period. Second, competition for loans occurred only for corporate customers,
since consumer credit was virtually non-existent and mortgage lending was restricted
to three banks until the late 80s, thus rendering the use of non-price competitive
instruments relevant only for deposits. Third, the empirical approach will be based on
the margins charged by the bank, which in the case of loans includes a risk premium
that must not be taken as part of a price-cost margin associated with market power
and the value of which is virtually impossible to estimate.
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The chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background for
the study. In section 3 the econometric procedures and data employed are presented.
Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical methodology and results. In section 5
we present the main conclusions of this study.
2.2. Theoretical Framework
2.2.1. Previous Research
Several authors have tried to measure the impact of market structure on banking
profits. The most popular approach is to regress a profitability index for banks or their
interest rates on several market structure and other control variables. Generally, this
approach has been employed in the US, where the main findings have been that highly
concentrated local markets are more profitable for financial institutions than the more
competitive ones. The most important references on this "reduced form" literature are
Berger and Hannan (1979), Evanoff and Fortier (1988), Heggestad (1979),
Heggestad and Mingo (1976) and Rhoades (1977, 1982). The early literature is
analysed and surveyed in Gilbert (1984) and a more detailed survey is conducted in
Weiss (1989). This approach is criticised by Clark (1986) who argues that this "single
equation" approach may fail to capture the different variables which are affected by
concentration, and proposes a multi-equation modelling strategy as a better
alternative.
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More recently, many authors have preferred to abandon this reduced form approach
in favour of structural models firmly based on the recent theory of industrial
organisation (JO). Although this is a general trend in the JO literature, special
attention has been devoted to the specificities of the banking industry. Generally,
these articles depart from a homogeneous product oligopoly model in which some
assumptions are made in order to allow the estimation of some conduct parameters
and/or their relationship with market structure. Examples of this approach are Berg
and Kim (1993, 1994), Nathan and Neave (1989), Spiller and Favaro (1984) and
Shaffer (1989, 1993). More recently, the differentiated product hypothesis was
introduced in this literature, along the lines of Hannan (1991), and examples of this
approach are provided by Hannan and Liang (1993) and Heffernan (1993). Barros
and Leite (1994) conducted an empirical study compatible with both approaches.
For Portugal, the price-concentration relationship is very difficult to test, since the
local market concept is somewhat difficult to apply in such a small country.
Nevertheless, in a recent work by Barros and Leite (1994), a variable based on the
concentration of branches by borough (concelho) was constructed in order to test the
effect of individual "local market" position over the bank's margins (computed at
national level). These authors worked with both sides of the balance sheet (deposits
and loans) using data for 15 banks in the 1991/92 period. They concluded that the
market for deposits is much more competitive than that for loans, but since risk was
adjusted through the use of reported provision allowances, conclusions for this
second market have to be handled with a certain amount of caution. Nevertheless,
their main conclusions seem robust, and their paper's principal contribution is that
spatial competition, i.e., branch location and local market concentration, are
important elements in the explanation of individual bank's market power.
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In this study both price and non-price competitive variables are included. Heggestad
and Mingo (1976) is the classical reference on this approach, although many
differences exist between the two studies. As a matter of fact, while we use
advertising and branches as non-price instruments in the context of a bank's
optimising model, Heggestad and Mingo (1976) use reduced form equations in which
interest rate and a few "service" variables (office hours, and several dummies related
to specific products) are used as dependent variables.
Generally, American literature on bank's optimising behaviour under deposit interest
rate ceilings assumes monopoly behaviour by which the bank sets some kind of
"implicit interest" rate consisting of goods or services provided to depositors in some
percentage of their deposit balance. Main references in this literature are Merris
(1985), Mitchell (1979), Spellman (1977), Startz (1983) and Whitesell (1992). A new
approach, developed by Heffernan (1992), uses individual product data to estimate an
"interest equivalence" to some non-price features of banking products. A problem
with some implicit interest literature is whether both types of interest are
complementary or substitute. For Whitesell (1992), interest rate deregulation has a
reduction impact over non-price instruments, but both types of interest will persist
(complementary) after it. On the other hand, for Startz (1983) such deregulation will
imply the complete elimination of "implicit" payments (substitutes). Evidence for the
UK from Heffernan (1992) seems to support the first view.
So far, there are few studies on the advertising behaviour of commercial banks. Even
for other industries, empirical studies on advertising practices are scarce, which seems
to result from the duopoly characteristic of most available structural theoretical
models. Roberts and Samuelson (1988) made an important contribution to this
literature and used a dynamic conjectural variation model to test for advertising
competition in the US tobacco industry. Their model separates advertising effects
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over the total market size and individual player's market shares, making it very robust
from a theoretical point of view but, on the other hand, very difficult to handle
econometrically. Gasmi, Laffont and Vuong (1992) used a more standard duopoly
framework and estimated individual first order conditions together with demand
functions, making specific use of separately estimated cost function marginal costs,
for the Pepsi - Coca Cola duopoly. In order to easily identify several behavioural
situations, they had to assume linear demand functions and developed a model
suitable only for duopoly markets.
The factor of determinants in branching location has received much greater attention
from researchers than the overall use of branches as a competitive instrument.
Examples of the first approach are Avery (1991) and Evanoff (1988) and for the
second are Barros (1994) and Cabral and Majure (1993). Barros (1994) used a spatial
competition model to discuss the use of branching as a competitive instrument in the
context of local markets while Cabral and Majure (1993) tested where branching
should be seen as a strategic complement or substitute, concluding in favour of the
first. Both studies indicate that branching determinants in urban and rural areas are
different.
2.2.2. The Model
In this chapter the differentiated product approach is followed. Basically, Hannan's
(1991) approach is extended for the use of a vector of non-price instruments and
attention is focused on the market for deposits. Thus, unlike the "implicit interest
theory" developed in Mitchell (1979), Merris (1985) and Startz (1983), non-price
competition is introduced via explicit instruments, rather than by computation of the
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subsidy implicit in the (low) charges on banking services. Our approach is, therefore,
more compatible with the pioneering work of Heggestad and Mingo (1976).
An important hypothesis to be made concerning the non-price instrument is that it
affects mainly deposits. This is not very unrealistic when we consider the sample
period that will be used for empirical work, since during most of that time bank's total
credit was subject to a binding ceiling and therefore banks' non-price effort was
directed toward attracting new depositors.
The model's other assumptions are:
i) The bank holds four kinds of assets: Cash reserves (R) which are a fraction
p of total deposits, Government Securities and Money Market investments
(S), Loans (L) and Physical Capital (K); S may be negative, meaning funding
from money market sources;
ii) The bank is funded with both Deposits (D) and Equity Capital (E);
iii) Banks face a continuously twice differentiable demand function for
deposits Di(r,,, r„V) where r„ is the vector of the interest rates paid on
deposits by all banks in the market, r s is the interest rate on Government
securities and V is the non-price instrument vector, a pitar r); > 0, arvarcii o
, aD/ars^ 0 , apdavi >0 and away; ^ o;
iv) Banks face a continuously twice differentiable demand function for loans
Li(rL , r), where 11 i s the vector of interest rates charged on loans and
adarLi>o and aLi/ani ^ 0;
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v) Banks are price-takers in a perfectly competitive money market / market
for Government securities;
vi) Bank equity capital is exogenous and constant;
vii) Real resources costs are given by a differentiable function C(D,L,V), with
aci/aDi>o, aciiaLi>o, acdavi>o;
Given the above and assuming the bank to be a profit maximising unit, each bank's
problem is (ignoring the i subscript) characterised by:
Max II = rL L + rs S — rD D — C(D,L, V)	 (2.1)
, rD , V}
st: pD+S+L+K = D+E	 (2.2)
Solving (2.2) for S and replacing in (2.1), after dropping the exogenous variables the
problem becomes:
Max ri = (11 —
 rs)L + (rs(1— p )— rD )D — C(D,L, V)	 (2.3)
{ri, 5 rD , V}
The first-order conditions for this problem will be:
an _ 0 an n all n
5= v --=v
ar.	 av
The first of those conditions characterises optimal behaviour in the market for loans
and will be ignored if any (or both) price or quantity is exogenously set by the
(2.4)
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authorities. For deposits, interest rates may be either exogenously set by authorities or
freely set by the bank. The first case may be described as:
rip ^
 ri;
	 (2.5)
Where the right-hand side represents the deposit rate ceiling. So, for the regulated
interest rate situation, in which the above expression is an equality whenever the
deposit rate ceiling is binding, the bank's optimal behaviour is described by
/	 ac	 apXaDi	 t 
= (no - — rD	 —	 -+E	 ac o
ay'	 op' avi J^ , avi avi	 ovi
The term awavi is generally designated by conjectural variations of firm i relative to
firm j. It may interpreted as firm i's beliefs in firm j's reactions to i's changes in the
non-price instrument. A zero value will imply that firm i completely ignores firm j
when making its non-price decisions and a unit value means that firm i believes that j
exactly matches its non-price decisions.
Although the above interpretation is generally adopted in the theoretical literature,
some authors have challenged its use in the context of econometric models and
proposed a re-interpretation of this methodology, in which such "conjectures" merely
represent deviations from perfectly competitive pricing. For a discussion of this issue
see Riordan (1985) and Dockner (1992).
When dealing with a panel of several firms it is virtually impossible to estimate all the
conjectural variation parameters involved and generally some simplifying hypothesis is
made to allow identification. In this study a solution based on Cubbin (1983) and
Waterson (1984) and also used in Hannan (1991) is followed. Although we do not
(2.6)
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=
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have the possibility of estimating a conjectural variation parameter as a consequence
of the differentiated product modelling, this approach allows a better understanding of
the estimated results.
Defining a weighted average conjecture:
0Di 
oci z avi  avi 
V jx; aVi E 	
kx; avk
Expression (2.6) becomes:
anilaD	 ci • ail a	 0
= (	 ars (1 — P) — rD —
	 Eay.	 api avi a" ki avi	 avi
From this expression it becomes obvious that the non-price elasticity of deposits
plays an important role in the solution of this problem. Evaluating it:
6
 (
aDi +ccVi E aa) vi
avi	 jxi a V  Di
Two extreme situations are worth investigating. One occurs when the firm ignores all
its competitor's reactions, i.e., assumes a=0, behaviour compatible with the Cournot
hypothesis. The result is simply:
(2.9)
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The other one, often identified with cartel behaviour, occurs when the firm believes
that all competitors will match its non-price variations exactly, i.e., a=1. The solution
is:
(op,	 ail v,
—
avi ki a Vi Di
(2.11)
It should be obvious that elasticity (2.10) has a higher value than (2.11) since
op, > 0 and the sum of cross derivatives is non-positive. Elasticity (2.9) may
now be expressed as a linear convex combination of the two extreme cases:
This means that the "perceived" non-price elasticity of deposits E ly will be dependent
upon the bank's conjectures and will assume its lower value for "collusive"
conjectures (c(A, = 1) and a maximum for Cournot conjectures (cev = 0). Therefore,
this el asticity's value will depend upon demand-specific characteristics and upon the
bank's conduct, here represented by parameter cc.
We may now solve (2.8) for V, incorporating (2.9) and rearranging:
V' rs ( 1 — —	 aci / aro' ,
a C / VI	
Ev (2.13)
Equation (2.13) above describes non-price competition behaviour under deposit
interest rate regulation. The amount of the instrument (V) will be proportional to the
amount of deposits. That proportion depends upon the margin generated by each unit
of deposits and upon marginal costs. Differences between banks will depend upon
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cost efficiency (more efficient institutions will provide more of the instrument), upon
demand characteristics (banks facing less elastic demand for deposits will be less
aggressive) and upon conjectures (Cournot leads to higher non-price competition).
Under unregulated deposit interest rates or whenever (2.5) ceases to be binding,
optimal behaviour of the banks will result from the solution of the system of equations
(2.8) and (2.14) below:
ani	 ac al) .	 ay al-)
= Di+(rs(i-p)-rD
	 +E
8 ID
 -D
k i art) ad))°
(2.14)
Defining a similar weighted average conjecture for deposit interest rates, the
"perceived" price-elasticity of deposits may be expressed as:
	
_ al);	 alp
ErD	 ariD	 —
	
a r ip 	 ar)b Di
(2.15)
With all parameters defined in a way similar to expressions (2.9) to (2.12), the
reduced form solution for this system, after replacing (2.16) in (2.13), is given by:
r ip = erD.	 (TS (1 P) a Ci api)1+ ErD
Vi 	 EV  rS ( 1 p) ac apt 
1+6',D	 ac avi
(2.16)
(2.17)
This reduced-form system has a particularly interesting feature. While, for the optimal
deposit rates, the only relevant perceived elasticity is the one for the deposit rate, for
the non-price instrument, both perceived elasticities will affect its optimal value. This
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fact is responsible for an ambiguous response of non-price competition to changes in
market structure. This is discussed in the following sub-section.
2.2.3. The Impact of Deregulation and Market Structure
Under this framework, non-price competition persists after interest rate deregulation.
Expression (2.17) shows the optimal value for this "implicit interest" (V/D) under free
interest rate competition. When deregulation is progressive, i.e., the rate ceiling is
smoothly increased until it is no longer binding, this "implicit rate" will gradually fall.
At a certain stage, the ceiling will coincide with the optimal rate given by (2.16) and
the values given by (2.13) and (2.17) coincide, and will be greater than zero. In other
words, unlike in the Startz (1983) monopolistic competition model, here deregulation
reduces implicit payments but they do not cease.
The above analysis is conducted under the usual ceteris paribus assumption, assuming
that all the other parameters remain constant. This may be its most severe flaw
because interest rate deregulation may affect both conduct and market structure in the
market. Under regulation, the only relevant conduct parameter is the one associated
with the non-price instrument. Deregulation may affect it and may also result in more
aggressive behaviour using the interest rate instrument. The combined effect on (2.17)
is, a priori, unknown, but the possibility may not be discarded that, after deregulation,
banks make more aggressive use of non-price instruments.
Another possibility is that after deregulation depository institutions use non-price
instruments as a way of increasing product differentiation and thus become less
sensitive to the most likely price war that will follow. Therefore, if product
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substitutability is directly related to the use of non-price instruments, deregulation
may imply an increase in their use as a way of generating market power.
To show how this may happen we need to evaluate the potential impact of
concentration changes over price and non-price competition. Hannan (1991, pg 72)
shows that if an increase in concentration has a positive impact over the average
conjectural variations parameter (da/dCR>0), then such an increase will also result in
a rise in loan interest rates. For deposits, it is also unambiguous that a concentration
increase will result in a reduction of the interest rate paid to depositors. For non-price
instruments on deposits, changes in market structure have an ambiguous result.
Denoting market concentration by CR, and assuming that this variable affects conduct
only through the parameter a, we may evaluate this effect (omitting i):
dEv	 d6rD 
d(V /D) (1+ clid±cRcrD)2
		
aclav
6v dCR rs( 1— p) — ac 1 ap
=	 xdCR
(2.18)
This expression has, a priori, an undetermined sign. Changes in concentration may
imply similar moves on both price and non-price competition (negative sign for 2.18)
or may result in opposite moves for them. In other words, if the market concentration
falls, it may result either in an increase in both types of competition or a more
aggressive pricing policy accompanied by a reduction of the "non-price" instrument
(measured as a percentage of deposits). A necessary condition for the first case is:
d8v	 dcrp 
( 1 - F Ed))
dCR cv dCR <
n
-
(2.19)
Since both elasticities are assumed to be negatively dependent on concentration (via
assumption that da/dCR>0), it is convenient to take their modulus and rewrite it as:
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Or, as another interesting alternative, as:
Ey
<  
riv - v aaviacR 
x
1 + E rEl
 110 - flD aarD / acR
(2.21)
The above result has a simple interpretation: In order to have a negative relationship
between non-price competition and concentration, the perceived non-price elasticity
of deposits has to change in response to a concentration variation in an amount, at
least, equal to the ratio cv / (1+ CID ). Thus, this non-price concentration relationship is
dependent upon demand characteristics (low demand sensitivity to rival's non-prices
leads to an inverse relationship), and upon the conjectures formation mechanism (if
the average conjecture for non-prices needs to be sensitive to changes in market
concentration).
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2.3. Empirical Implementation
2.3.1. Empirical Model
In this empirical test it will be assumed that, although some interest rates were still
administratively set by authorities, banks may have had the power to influence
customers to accept the low interest earning deposits. Thus, in this context, observed
differences between average deposit rates would reflect the banks' power over its
customers, the less powerful banks having to accept paying higher interest rates28.
Thus, although some strange interest rate regulations were still prevailing in 1988 and
part of 1989, we shall handle the model as in the deregulated scenario (2.16)-(2.17).
In order to estimate the determinants of (rate) margins in the market for deposits, we
shall follow Hannan and Liang (1993) and use the ratio between the interest rate on
deposits and its corresponding marginal return. Expression (2.16) may be rewritten
as:
rD	 6 rD
rs (1 — p) — a ci a D i 1+ eriD (2.22)
The right-hand side of (2.22) corresponds to an indicator of the bank's pricing policy
and depends on demand characteristics as well as on the bank's conduct, so far
expressed through the parameter a. An estimated value of zero signifies that the
28At the begining of the sample period the time deposits rate was set above its competitive value (to stimulate
savings) and the demand deposits rate was clearly below its optimum value (to avoid profitability problems
caused by the other regulation). In most cases banks offered their customers some combination of both types of
deposit or, for some customers, simply refused to accept time deposits. This bizarre regulation led, in practice,
to a situation in which banks had some (although not totally free) capability to influence their average deposit
rate but not the rates charged for individual products.
100
rs(1– P) – rip – ad/8D 	 1
—
rip 	 ETD
(2.23)
Essays on Banking
bank's pricing policy is totally independent of market conditions or that the bank pays
no interest to depositors. A value of one means that the bank passes to depositors all
of its marginal return (net of marginal costs). A value greater than one means that the
bank pays to depositors more than the marginal return on such funds. Therefore, this
measure is a ratio which may be used to evaluate market power whenever only price
is considered as a competitive weapon: the lower its value, the higher will be the
bank's power exercised over its customers.
The reader may note that the measure above does not correspond to the "usual"
market power measure generally used in the JO literature (the Lerner index), which
for the deposits market, may be expressed as:
Expressions (2.22) and (2.23) are just two alternative ways of expressing the same
optimality condition. And there is a univocal relationship between the right-hand sides
of both expressions. In other words, from the value of one of the above market power
indicators we may directly obtain the value of the other, making them perfectly
equivalent. However, some practical reasons lead to the choice of (2.22) as the best
alternative: it allows a direct test of "marginal revenue" pricing of deposits and it
behaves better whenever interest rates are observed to be set above marginal
revenue29.
29fri this context, "marginal return" means marginal revenue of funds applied in the money market net of the
non-earning cash reserves coefficient and real resources marginal costs. Marginal return pricing of deposits
occurs whenever the bank offers a rate which exactly matches that marginal return. As an analog to competitive
industrial markets, some authors classify this practice as "marginal cost pricing", although in the market for
deposits the bank sets the financial marginal cost rather than a price charged to consumers.
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Given the considerations above, we will test which variables influence the firms'
pricing conduct in the market. As suggested in the previous sections, the most
important explanatory variables for our test are the market concentration index (CR)
and market share (MS). Some control variables were added in order to account for
firm differences associated with ownership and strategy. Those dummy variables were
defined as AGE (=1 for "banks operating before 1974"), PUB (=1 for "Government-
owned"), FOR (=1 for "foreign-owned"), PRIVR (for "privately-owned retail banks")
and WHO (=1 for "wholesale banks"). To simplify the econometrics of this test, a
linear relationship was assumed, with the justification that it may be valid for
deviations around some central point. Equation (2.22) is therefore estimated in the
form:
(	
rD 
I-ID CRt + lis(MS0) +11ix X + uo
rs (1 — p) — ac / ap ,,, -
(2.24)
Where X is the vector of control dummy variables and 1,t x is the vector of associated
parameters, u is the usual white-noise econometric residual, and R s (MS) is a non-
linear function of the market share. Non-linearity between the price-marginal return
ratio is suggested by the data, as may be seen in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1. (where observations relating to CGD were omitted) suggests that may be
non-linear the relationship between the price-marginal return ratio and market share.
Three alternative specifications for that relationship are tested: linear, squared and
cubic polynomials.
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Figure 2.1.
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Market Share on Deposits
For non-price competition two different variables were considered: advertising and
branching. For the first one, total advertising (ADV) expenditures for each bank is
used as a measure of the bank's non-interest competition. The bank's cost function is
additive on advertising expenditures and actaADv=1. Then, in an analogous way to
the above, banks' advertising policy may be described as:
The right-hand side of expression (2.25) above characterises the bank's advertising
effort, where it is assumed that this is related to market structure, banks' market share
and other variables as above. Some banks have exceptionally high advertising
expenditures in the year of their privatisation (IPO's offer) and that effect must
therefore be discarded using a dummy variable (PR=1 if bank is being privatised that
year). The equation to be estimated is:
ADV. = p x PRo +(YcCRt +7s(MS, 3 )+y i x X)(rs(1—p)—aciaD) ,,t a,t + v0(2.26)
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The expression between the first parentheses in (2.26) represents the right-hand side
of (2.25) above, where regressors are the same as in (2.24). The product of the
second parentheses and the volume of deposits is the total margin generated on
deposits and v is the usual white-noise econometric residual. The reason for the non-
linear (on the regressors) specification of (2.26) as opposed to the simple linear
relationship (2.24) lies in the need to separate privatisation-specific promotional
expenditures from the advertising motivated by competitive reasons. Non-linearity in
the market share is also assumed.
For branching, writing the analog of expression (2.25) is straightforward, the main
difference between both expressions being the presence of the marginal cost of the
non-price instrument below:
B1 /Dix(ocitaB) = EL 
rs(i—p)—ac i /aDi 1+60
(2.27)
The total number of branches is a stock variable, rather than a flow as advertising. In
order to open a new branch, a bank has to consider the required investment against
expected present value of future cash-flows. Thus, a non-permanent drop on a bank's
margins will not necessarily imply the closure of some branches, since their future
profits may compensate short-run losses. This, associated with the very slow
deregulation process in this field and the adjustment difficulties found by Cabral and
Majure (1993) make the use of a partial adjustment process advisable:
Bt — Bt-1 =
	Bt-1)
	
(2.28)
Where B stands for the actual number of the bank's branches and B * their desired
value, obtained through the optimality condition (2.17), for V =B. Replacing it in
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(2.28) and considering the usual conduct determinants, including non-linearity in the
market share, as usual, yields:
B — iXaBxt 03, CRt + I3s (MS,)
	
+ — 2013,,t-1+ w.t
(2.29)
where:
m,,t = (rs(1-0—aC/aD)
2.3.2. Data
In order to test the impact of deregulation on both price and non-price competition in
the Portuguese market for deposits we will assume that the evolution of the market
concentration index reflects the competitive impact of deregulation. Authorities have
been introducing progressive liberalisation measures since 1985, by allowing new
private institutions, deregulating deposit and lending rates, and by adopting a more
open approach to new branch creation and location. The Herfindahl index for deposits
shows a progressive reduction in the market concentration which is most likely a
direct consequence of such liberalisation processesm:
i,t
30The Herfindahl index of market concentration is defined as the sum of the squared market shares of all firms
in a market.
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Figure 2.2.
Herfindahl Index: Deposits
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This change in market concentration was accompanied by important changes in the
relative importance of institutions in the market for deposits. The year 1992, the first
in which full liberalisation of branching installation was established, was the most
turbulent one. This evolution may be easier to understand through the analysis of the
variability index (VI), defined as:
Values for (2.30) follow in Table 2.1. In general, the evolution of the above
indicators shows a growing mobility (and contestability ?) of the market during this
liberalisation period. Therefore, the assumption that the concentration index evolution
and liberalisation efforts may be tied together is, apparently, not too strong.
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Table 2.1.
Variability Index
Year Variab
1989 2.60%
1990 3.20%
1991 2.80%
1992 5.10%
In order to evaluate the impact of this reduction on market concentration, a pool of
23 banks, representing more than 95% of the market, for the years 1988 to 1992 was
constructed. Balance sheet and income statement variables were obtained from the
Associaccro Portuguesa de Bancos bulletins, figures on branches were obtained on
those bulletins and from the Banco de Portugal for certain years. Estimates from
Sabatina (a marketing research institute) were the source of advertising data. All
money denominated variables were deflated for 1986 prices.
Data on interest rates on time and demand deposits at the individual bank level is not
available, leading to the need to work with an average deposit rate. Although this is a
common flaw of all empirical studies on the Portuguese market for deposits, it is
impossible to overcome with the available data. Nevertheless, the previously
presented arguments favouring the use of the "deregulated" model, even in the years
in which the deposit rate regulation was still in force, recommended the use of the
pool of deposits instead of its individual components.
Published interest expenses do not distinguish between deposits and money market
funding, making it impossible to separate the cost of the two types of funds. Thus, the
ratio between interest expenses and the yearly average of the sum of deposits and
purchased funds is used as an interest rate indicator. This problem may not be too
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serious if we recall that banks without market power in deposits are precisely the ones
who need to purchase (in relative terms) more money market funds and will show a
higher average rate. Thus, the rate measurement error here involved may not lead to a
bias in market power measurement.
Marginal return on deposits was computed as the yearly average of monthly money
market rates published by the Banco de Portugal multiplied by a factor which adjusts
for non-earning cash reserves and reserves invested at the central bank earning below
market rate (where the difference is used as part of an additional adjustment). The real
resources marginal cost for deposits was obtained through the author's estimate of a
stochastic cost frontier for Portuguese banks (1987-92). Plant-size marginal costs
were used since these represent the short-run costs which are relevant for pricing
decisions.
Deposits were defined as the sum of time and demand deposits together with
certificates of deposit and treasury bills sold under repurchase agreements. Market
shares on deposits were constructed assuming the relevant universe to be the banks
listed by the Associacdo Portuguesa de Bancos. Thus, the small rural savings
institutions were excluded, but they represent less than 2% of the market. The
Herfindahl index was calculated based on this universe and on the computed market
shares. Caixa Geral de DepOsitos was also excluded from the sample for the same
reasons mentioned in the previous chapter".
The marginal cost of branches was computed for each observation from the stochastic
cost frontier estimated in the previous chapter.
31Barros and Modesto (1994) provide evidence on the non-profit maximisation nature of CGD, which makes
this institution's behaviour incompatible with the structural model used in this study.
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Tables 2.2. and 2.3. present descriptive statistics for the most important variables
employed in the present study. Variables MRD, AD'VM and BRM represent the left-
hand sides of expressions (2.22), (2.25) and (2.27), respectively. Concentration is
proxied by the Herfindahl index (HERF). Summary descriptive statistics for the
variables used in this study follow in the next tables.
Table 2.2.
Summary Descriptive Statistics
MEAN STD DEV MINIMUM MAXIMUM'
MRD 0.856 0.160 0.435 1.191
ADVM 0.005 0.011 0.000 0.075
BRM 0.241 0.334 0.069 3.383
HERF 0.115 0.006 0.105 0.121
MSD 0.033 0.033 0.000 0.123
AGE 0.682 0.468 0.000 1.000
PUB 0.427 0.497 0.000 1.000
FOR 0.364 0.483 0.000 1.000
PRIVN 0.182 0.387 0.000 1.000
WHO 0.173 0.380 0.000 1.000
Table 2.2. above shows that, on average, Portuguese banks pay deposit rates which
represent only 85.6% of the marginal return they may obtain with them. However, if
we assume that these market power indicators are normally distributed, the t-ratio
(1-.856)/160 yields 0.900, which doesn't allow the rejection of the hypothesis that
the real value for that ratio is one. In other words, based only on the statistics above,
we may not reject a perfectly competitive scenario for this market. Advertising
expenditures represent an average of 0.5% of total margins generated by deposits, but
are very dispersed, rising up to 7.5%. Branching behaviour is also very dispersed.
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Table 2.3.
Correlation Matrix
MERD
MRD ADVM BRM HERF MSD AGE PUB FOR WHO
1.000
ADVM 0.124 1.000
BRM 0.135 0.017 1.000
BEERF -0.293 -0.056 -0.172 1.000
MSD -0.302 -0.227 -0.329 0.027 1.000
AGE -0.315 -0.376 -0.262 0.000 0.486 1.000
PUB -0.393 -0.294 -0.273 0.197 0.563 0.590 1.000
FOR 0.542 0.158 0.370 0.000 -0.680 -0.498 -0.653 1.000
PRIVN -0.149 0.187 -0.091 -0.176 0.088 -0.184 -0.407 -0.356 1.000
WHO 0.184 -0.060 0.439 0.075 -0.439 -0.411 -0.395 0.604 0.215
Table 2.3. above shows that the three dependent variables are negatively correlated
with market concentration, market share and the bank's age. Variables AGE and PUB
are strongly correlated, which comes as no surprise, since most of the older banks
were nationalised and the majority of them were not privatised during the sample
period. It should also be noted that public ownership is positively correlated with
market share, reflecting the fact that the nationalised banks still (at the end of 1992)
occupy the most important positions in this market. The FOR and WHO dummies are
also highly correlated because most wholesale banks are foreign-owned.
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2.4. Estimation and Results
2.4.1. Estimation Procedure
The system of non-linear equations (2.24), (2.26) and (2.28) is estimated using the
full information maximum likelihood technique (FIML). Using TSP's FINIL estimates
as a starting point, an additional iteration is performed to obtain White's (1980)
robust estimates for the variance-covariance matrix of the parameters. This last
feature is particularly important given that panel structure of the data may lead to
heteroscedasticity problems.
The three equations are estimated simultaneously since they result from the same set
of first order conditions and, therefore, there is a high likelihood that some
contemporaneous covariance may exist between their residuals. In this context, OLS
estimators are biased and inconsistent. We believe that the proposed procedure has
an advantage over the single equation approach to market power on deposits (2.24),
given the obvious interaction that must exist between explicit pricing (rate) of banking
products and their correspondent promotion (advertising) and distribution
(branching). To put it concisely, the whole "marketing mix" has to be considered as a
whole, rather than its individual components separately. We also believe that it offers
a better alternative to Clark's (1986) approach, since his different equations are
specified in an ad-hoc manner, and do not explicitly result from profit maximising
behaviour.
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2.4.2. Results
Estimates for the system of equations (2.24)-(2.26)-(2.28) follow in the next page.
Several formulations for the relationship between dependent variables and the market
share were tested, namely linear, quadratic and cubic forms. Although a simple linear
formulation failed to provide a good relationship between market share and the
dependent variable, a good adjustment was found when cubic and quadratic
polynomials were used. This means that the effect of market share and price (non-
price) margins is highly non-linear. In Table 2.4 below, results are presented for the
linear (model one) and cubic (model two) specifications.
In two equations the Herfindahl index has an associated significant negative
coefficient, meaning that the fall in market concentration was accompanied by a more
aggressive price and advertising behaviour among Portuguese banks, while branching
policy seems to be less sensitive to that variable. To test the robustness of this
conclusion, the concentration variable was replaced by a time trend, which was only
significant for the first equation. Thus, the effect captured by the Herfindahl index
goes beyond a mere trend, although some colinearity exists between the two variables
which results from the evolution depicted in Figure 2.2. Therefore, these results
indicate that both structure and conduct in the market have moved in the expected
way.
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Table 2.4.
System Estimates
Variable
Model One Model Two
Estimate	 Std Error T Stat	 Signif Estimate Std Error T Stat Signif
Interest Rate Equation:
CONST	 1.852 0.232 7.985 *** 1.782 0.237 7.511 ***
HERF	 -9.478 2.118 -4.475 *** -9.636 2.077 -4.639 ***
MS	 0.722 0.465 1.552 9.196 3.213 2.862 **
MSA2 -158.896 64.424 -2.466 *
MSA3 818.875 348.600 2.349 *
AGE	 -0.069 0.041 -1.679 * -0.083 0.424 -1.945 *
PUB	 0.059 0.042 1.401 0.053 0.039 1.357
FOR	 0.249 0.042 5.871 *** 0.312 0.042 7.417 ***
PRIVR	 0.041 0.032 1.281 0.031 0.031 1.018
WHO	 -0.068 0.035 -1.919 * -0.047 0.034 -1.361
Pseudo R squared 0.423 0.448
Advertising Equation:
PR	 105101 24546 4.282 *** 120055 25481 4.712 ***
CONST	 0.019 0.004 4.634 *** 0.020 0.004 4.863 ***
HERF	 -0.085 0.036 -2.371 * -0.106 0.035 -3.031 * *
MS	 -0.020 0.008 -2.456 * 0.909 0.398 2.283 *
MSA2 -47.727 21.496 -2.220 *
MSA3 624.395 286.686 2.178 *
AGE	 -0.007 0.001 -7.111 *** -0.007 0.001 -6.245 ***
PUB	 0.001 0.001 1.289 0.001 0.001 1.028
FOR	 0.003 0.002 1.043 0.000 0.003 0.764
PRIVR	 0.002 0.001 1.817 * 0.001 0.001 1.466
WHO	 -0.007 0.003 -2.139 * -0.005 0.003 -1.372
Pseudo R squared 0.609 0.634
Branching Equation:
CONST	 0.625 0.230 2.717 ** 1.083 0.510 2.123 **
HERF	 -0.293 1.205 -0.243 -0.224 1.473 -0.152
MS	 -0.874 0.257 -3.406 *** -17.132 9.186 -1.865 *
MSA2 240.779 135.345 1.779 *
MSA3 -1096.000 618.710 -1.771 *
AGE	 -0.277 0.101 -2.740 ** -0.380 0.177 -2.142 *
PUB	 -0.089 0.028 -3.134 *** -0.105 0.042 -2.503 * *
FOR	 0.219 0.163 1.346 0.055 0.202 0.271
PRIVR	 -0.017 0.021 -0.824 -0.027 0.030 -0.921
WHO	 -0.448 0.261 -1.715 * -0.727 0.420 -1.729 *
X	 0.144 0.039 3.708 *** 0.113 0.042 2.695 **
Pseudo R squared 0.944 0.995
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The significance level of the estimated parameters in the table above is represented by
* (95%), ** (98%) and *** (99%), for two-tailed tests.
For the interest rate equation, the negative relationship between the dependent
variable and market concentration indicates that deregulation has induced a more
competitive conduct on the "price" instrument. If we keep the assumption that
concentration reflects the impact of deregulation on market structure, the negative
estimated coefficient is a clear indication that deregulation had a negative effect on the
margins generated by deposits. This effect is very likely to result from a more
aggressive behaviour on the part of the banks in this market, translated to their
interest rates through a revision of their conjectures about their competitors'
reactions. In other words, reduction in concentration may be associated with a less
cooperative behaviour by the major players, leading to an increase in their "perceived"
elasticities and, consequently, to lower margins on deposits.
This price-concentration relationship is particularly important for two reasons. One is
merger policy, where it is concluded that mergers of large banks (increased
concentration) may reduce competitiveness and increase bank margins. The other is
associated with freedom of entry, a policy which is reducing concentration, and may
in the medium term lead to a highly competitive situation and a "shake-out" of the
market.
Also interesting in this context is an analysis of the evolution of the estimated values
for the right-hand side of equations (2.22), (2.25) and (2.27) (which follows in
Appendix) in which banks are ranked by market share. For all banks (as a result of
the assumption of symmetry in reactions to concentration) these indicators rises over
time, indicating an increased competitiveness in this market. The estimated value of
(2.22) may be used to test against the hypothesis that its "true" value is one, i.e. that
114
Essays on Banking
the bank sets the prices of deposits equal to their marginal revenue. For 1988 this
hypothesis is not rejected only for one bank in the sample. With the decrease in
concentration, in 1992 a situation is reached in which four firms were estimated to be
practising marginal return pricing of deposits and, surprisingly, another five would be
paying interest on deposits exceeding their marginal return (see Appendix). Most of
the latter are foreign-owned and small.
Although this last finding seems somewhat difficult to understand, it may, in fact,
result from three different causes. One is that the implementation of dynamic pricing
strategies may result in such behaviour for small banks trying to grow quickly and
explore economies of scale or other size-effects 32 . Another is that it may result from
some myopia in the evaluation of real resources marginal costs involved in servicing
deposits. And the final one is associated with our need to ignore commissions and
other income which may be related to deposits33.
The effect of market concentration on the two non-price variables is different. While
in the case of advertising the strong increase in expenditures has to be explained, at
least partially, by the increased competitiveness of the market, the growing number of
bank branches during the sample period must be entirely justified by the increasing
deposit margins (associated with time deposit interest rate deregulation) and
privatisations. This last effect is detected via the significant negative coefficient of the
variable PUB in the branching equation.
32Given the anedoctal evidence on switching costs in the deposit market, a possible theoretical explanation for
this pricing policy is the one provided by Klemperer (1987).
33No data are available on the revenue generated by fees and commissions charged to depositors.
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The relationship between the interest rate market power and market share is more
difficult to interpret. Results for equation one show a positive non-significant
coefficient between the two. This could be an indication that the two variables are not
related. However, when the relationship between the two is specified in a more non-
linear way, statistically significant coefficients are found. The best results were
obtained with a third degree polynomial and suggest a curious inter-relation between
the two variables (see Figure 2.3 below).
Figure 2.3.
Market Power and Market Share
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The figure above suggests a negative relationship between market power and market
share up to the level of 4% 34 • It is likely that banks which are trying to grow will
become increasingly "price-aggressive", until they reach a dimension after which
market power may be exploited. The reader may also recall from the previous chapter
that plant-level marginal costs are positively related to bank size. It should also be
34The reader should recall that a rise on the left-hand-side of (2.22) is equivalent to a market power reduction.
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noted that most banks with market shares above that level are "old" (which has a
positive impact on market power), which in practice means that only the "new" retail
banks are facing low market power above that level. In this context it is interesting to
verify that market power estimates for privatised banks, which follow in the
Appendix, allow the rejection of the hypothesis of marginal return pricing of deposits
in the years following privatisation35 . Thus, we may conclude that the "old" bank
effect is clearly an important factor in the determination of market power.
Anther important aspect in the explanation of the shape of the figure above is the
large positive coefficient associated with the FOR variable. This may be interpreted as
an indication that foreign-banks have a strong disadvantage in this market, since that
parameter's estimate indicate that they have to pay in interest costs 30% more of their
marginal return than their local competitors. It should be noted that most small banks
are foreign, and combining this fact with the shape of Figure 2.3. above, we have to
conclude that the apparent advantage for the small banks is enjoyed only by the two
small Portuguese-owned institutions. As a matter of fact, one of those, which is
almost entirely focused on the islands of Azores, has the highest observed market
power in the sample.
The other variables always failed to become statistically significant in this equation.
Surprisingly, the new private retail banks' dummy is not significant, which seems to
confirm that their current "aggressivity" is associated with some price dynamics of
growth, which are somehow reflected in the effect depicted in Figure 2.3. above.
Coming back to the market power estimates, which follow in the Appendix, it is
found for all large banks that the marginal return pricing hypothesis is rejected, with
the exception of 1992 when such an assumption may not be rejected in the case of
35Privatised banks are BTA (1989), BPA (1990), BES (1991), BFB (1991) and CPP (1992).
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one private retail institution (BCP). Less pleasant is the situation of the majority of
the other small foreign-owned banks which, in 1992, were either following marginal
return or above marginal return pricing of deposits. Particularly disappointing is
CLP's situation, which is the only notable exception to the "old bank - strong market
power" rule.
For advertising, the estimated relationship with market share is also puzzling. When a
linear specification is estimated, we detect a negative relationship between the two
variables. However, higher degree polynomials provide different associations between
the two variables, something which requires a more careful interpretation. The
estimated relationship for model two is depicted in Figure 2.4. below.
Figure 2.4.
Advertising and Market Share
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From Figure 2.4. above we may conclude that market share has a strong positive
impact on advertising for the large banks. However, once again we must be cautious
in the interpretation of these equations, since the dummy variables employed may
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provide partial explanations for some of the findings. Somewhat surprisingly, the only
one of these which is statistically significant is AGE, which indicates that, as expected
under a Nerlove-Arrow (1962) or other dynamic context, new banks have to
advertise more than the older ones. The latter are all on the positive slope portion of
the curve, together with only one "new" institution. This may be interpreted in a way
which is similar to that regarding the previous equation, as demonstrating that
newcomers have to make an increased effort to support growth.
If we look at the linear specification (model one), the small negative coefficient
associated with market share should be related to other significant variables, as AGE,
PRIVR and WHO. Thus, this last model seems to provide a more "qualified" view of
the situation, by telling us hat wholesalers almost do not advertise. This explains why
the equation in model two provides a zero value for small market shares, and a strong
positive effect associated with the private retail banks, which are now competing
above the 5% market share.
Analysis of the estimated values for the right-hand side of (2.25) allows the
identification of a very curious pattern, which was partially detected by the parameters
associated with market share. Values for the "advertising / margin on deposits" ratio
are extremely low for the smallest banks in the sample (negative values were
estimated for a few observations), being higher for some intermediate size institutions.
The large commercial banks spend on advertising from 0.1% to 0.2% of the margin
generated by deposits in 1992, while the pattern for banks in the [2%, 4%] market
share range is irregular.
Some notable cases should be pointed out. First, among the largest commercial banks,
BCP (the only "new" bank among the largest) is the most advertising-oriented
institution (spending about 2% of its total margin generated in 1992). A smaller bank
among the top 10 institutions, BFB, also shows a ratio above its peers. The first is the
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largest new private bank while the second is a privatised institution. Both share in
announcing their intentions to strive for increased market share.
The impact of dummy variables AGE and FOR (although not statistically significant)
becomes clear if we note that, among the smaller institutions, BCI, Manufacturers
(today called Chemical Bank), BNP and Barclays are distinguished themselves by
having very high values for this ratio. They are all new, foreign-owned and have
publicly expressed their desire to grow in this market. The other small banks are
wholesale institutions which show very low levels of advertising expenditures.
It is also interesting to note that the dummy variable PR is undoubtedly statistically
significant, regardless of the specification tested, meaning that banks increase their
advertising expenditures during the year of their privatisation in order to contribute to
the sale of the shares (about 120 million escudos at 1986 prices - about twice that
value at today's prices).
For the branching equation we find another curious pattern. Branching effort is
decreasing in the market share variable up to the 5% level and stabilises above that.
This means that growing banks have decreasing branching costs up to that value for
the market share, spending a constant share of their margin for dimensions above that
level. This behaviour is compatible with a dynamic non-price model and with the
findings of the first chapter on the productivity of bank branches. That first
explanation is also corroborated by the statistically significant negative parameter
associated with dummy variable AGE, which shows that older banks are able to spend
a significant lower portion of their margin on branching than do the new institutions.
The estimated effect of market share (model two) is depicted in Figure 2.5 below:
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Figure 2.5.
Branching and Market Share
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Among the small institutions, the wholesale banks seem to benefit from a significant
advantage because they are able to generate higher margins, despite having no more
than two branches (effect of variable WHO). On the other hand, small entrants trying
to grow, act primarily through the expansion of the number of offices, which take
some time to attract deposits and generate margin, thus yielding the above mentioned
relationship with market share.
Also interesting is the finding that Government-owned banks make a lower branching
effort than the private ones (variable PUB). If we combine this finding with the
significant coefficient associated with dummy variable AGE, we have to conclude that
privatised banks increased their branching effort after privatisation36.
36The reader should note that the observations which are classified as "old" and not "public" are all relative to
privatised or foreign-owned institutions.
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The partial adjustment speed (X) is still very slow in this estimation (0.11). This may
be an indication that banks take some time to react to new environment conditions as
a result to the entry and exit costs involved in the implementation of banking offices.
The estimated values for the branching ratio, which follow in the Appendix, are
decreasing in the market share, where it is easy to identify some "outliers", i.e. banks
with particularly high values for the estimated right-hand side of (2.27). These are
BCP (the only "aggressive" bank found among the top 10 institutions), BCI,
Manufacturers, BNP and Barclays. All these have already been mentioned as having
the same kind of attitude concerning advertising as a competitive instrument, i.e.
being likely that they were using both instruments as complements as a mean to
support growth.
2.5. Conclusions
Among the major conclusions that are obtained from the present study is the fact that
during the deregulation period the market concentration fell while competitiveness
increased. This results from a strong correlation between both price and non-price
competition intensity and market concentration. In other words, the fall in
concentration was accompanied by an increased rivalry which resulted in lower
market power for banks. Also important is the finding that the combined effects of
deregulation and reduced concentration had a significant and positive impact on the
use of advertising as a competitive instrument, while for branching, no such effect was
detected.
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Another finding is that small banks have a marked disadvantage relative to the larger
ones: they have to pay higher interest rates, together with higher advertising
expenditures and branches per each escudo of margin generated by deposits. The only
exception to this rule occurs among the small wholesale banks, in which such a non-
price disadvantage is less pronounced.
One of the major objectives of the present study is to analyse the market power
effects of bank mergers. Results do not provide sufficient evidence on a positive effect
of size on market power. Although for the very small banks a strong disadvantage is
detected in this field. For institutions above levels of around 3% market share, we do
not detect such an effect. However, since a strong price-concentration relationship
was found, mergers of large banks should be evaluated with care, since they will
decrease concentration and, consequently, increase the overall market power of the
industry.
Also important to note is that a small group of new foreign-owned institutions with
market shares ranging from 1% to 1.5% is experiencing an especially difficult
situation, by paying interest rates that may exceed their marginal return, together with
the need to carry the highest non-price costs. This behaviour, however, may be easily
justifiable under a dynamic adjustment process for banks trying to achieve a high
market share, and therefore has to be seen as a cost which is associated with a growth
process. Barclays Bank is the most notable case within this group.
On the comfortable side are the "top 10" banks, made up of old institutions, which
were (all but one) Government-owned in 1988 (some of them already being
privatised). All seem to benefit from significant market power on deposits (with one
exception in 1992) and to be able to keep their customer base with lower advertising
and branching efforts than their smaller competitors. The exception is BCP, the only
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private institution within this group. Nevertheless, its situation looks far better than
that of the smaller private banks. For the privatised institutions in this group, an
increase in new branching creation was detected, while the other dependent variables
in the study seem to have remained unaffected by the change of ownership.
These last paragraphs show how variable market power and the use of non-price
instruments are from bank to bank. This raises the question of how the "representative
firm" studies of market power can reflect the true nature of the market. In a quite
simple test we found that the average market power indicator was not statistically
different from unity, which could be an indication of perfect competitiveness. After
estimating the model, we found that market power on price varied from large
powerful banks to small institutions paying interest rates that exceed the marginal
return on deposits. Thus, these "representative firm" studies may be biased by not
accounting for individual firm situations
In short, we found that the Portuguese market for deposits is becoming increasingly
competitive, which is most likely due to the current deregulation process. While for
the larger institutions a non-perfectly competitive behaviour is found (i.e. they are
able to exercise market power), an inverse situation is found for the smaller
institutions. For the latter, high competitiveness is driving some institutions to a highly
aggressive standing resulting in deposit interest rates set above their marginal return,
as well as on very high ratios of advertising and branches relatively to the margin
generated by deposits. For the banks in this situation, serious profitability problems
should be expected in a near future.
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Appendix to Chapter Two
Market Power Estimates
Essays on Banking
BANK/YEAR
MARKET POWER - INT. RATE ADVERT
eA/(1+eRD)
BRANCH
eB/(1-1-eRD)Value Test t Stat	 Concl
BPA 88	 0.842 0.158 3.511 Rd<MR	 0.0102	 0.062
BESCL 88	 0.755 0.245 10.813 Rd<MR	 0.0102	 0.155
BPSM 88	 0.726 0.274 12.058 Rd<MR	 0.0102	 0.182
BNU 88	 0.745 0.255 12.113 Rd<MR	 0.0102	 0.173
BTA 88	 0.740 0.260 12.772 Rd<MR	 0.0102	 0.174
BBI 88
	 0.741 0.259 12.623 Rd<MR	 0.0102	 0.173
UBP 88	 0.749 0.251 11.238 Rd<MR	 0.0102
	
0.175
BFB 88	 0.755 0.245 9.068 Rd<MR	 0.0102	 0.190
BFE 88	 0.722 0.278 8.751 Rd<MR
	 0.0102	 0.305
CPP 88	 0.754 0.246 8.579 Rd<MR	 0.0102	 0.200
BCP 88	 0.797 0.203 3.334 Rd<MR
	 0.0178	 0.737
MG 88
	 0.696 0.304 6.703 Rd<MR
	 0.0107	 0.394
CLP 88	 0.943 0.057 1.378 Rd=MR
	 0.0052	 0.585
BCI 88	 0.676 0.324 7.291 Rd<MR	 0.0168	 1.009
BBV 88	 0.924 0.076 1.848 Rd<MR	 0.0060	 0.624
MANUF 88	 0.899 0.101 3.098 Rd<MR	 0.0045	 0.361
BCA 88	 0.635 0.365 10.006 Rd<MR
	 0.0083	 0.498
BNP 88	 0.902 0.098 2.999 Rd<MR
	 0.0044	 0.356
BARCL 88	 0.946 0.054 2.356 Rd<MR
	 0.0129	 1.101
CITI 88	 0.894 0.106 3.296 Rd<MR
	 0.0047	 0.371
CHASE 88	 0.887 0.113 3.557 Rd<MR
	 0.0050	 0.386
BRASIL 88	 0.802 0.198 3.631 Rd<MR
	 -0.0021	 -0.001
BPA 89	 0.824 0.176 6.206 Rd<MR
	 0.0105	 0.115
BESCL 89
	
0.766 0.234 9.929 Rd<MR
	 0.0105	 0.174
BPSM 89
	
0.756 0.244 11.105 Rd<MR	 0.0105	 0.182
BTA 89
	 0.769 0.231 12.867 Rd<MR
	 0.0105	 0.175
BNU 89	 0.780 0.220 11.488 Rd<MR	 0.0105	 0.175
BBI 89	 0.776 0.224 12.397 Rd<MR
	 0.0105	 0.174
UBP 89	 0.779 0.221 11.615 Rd<MR	 0.0105	 0.175
BCP 89	 0.847 0.153 2.612 Rd<MR	 0.0182	 0.662
BFB 89	 0.785 0.215 9.487 Rd<MR	 0.0105	 0.185
CPP 89	 0.785 0.215 8.474 Rd<MR
	 0.0105	 0.200
BFE 89	 0.749 0.251 8.617 Rd<MR	 0.0105	 0.316
MG 89	 0.727 0.273 6.701 Rd<MR	 0.0110	 0.395
CLP 89	 0.980 0.020 0.510 Rd-MR
	 0.0053	 0.572
13CI 89	 0.722 0.278 6.553 Rd<MR	 0.0165	 0.978
BBV 89	 0.952 0.048 1.245 Rd=MR
	
0.0064
	
0.631
MANUF 89	 0.978 0.022 1.109 Rd=MR
	
0.0132	 1.100
BARCL 89	 0.976 0.024 1.226 Rd=MR
	
0.0133	 1.104
BCA 89	 0.664 0.336 9.338 Rd<MR
	 0.0087	 0.502
BNP 89	 0.940 0.060 1.994 Rd<MR
	
0.0044	 0.342
CITI 89	 0.922 0.078 2.690 Rd<MR
	
0.0051	 0.377
CHASE 89	 0.918 0.082 2.824 Rd<MR	 0.0053	 0.385
/BRASIL 89	 0.833 0.167 3.176 Rd<MR	 -0.0018	 -0.001
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MARKET POWER - TNT RATE ADVERT BRANCH
BANK/YEAR Value Test t Stat	 Conel eA/(1+eRD) eB/(1-FeRD)
BPA 90	 0.787 0.213 9.163 Rd<Mll	 0.0106	 0.163
BESCL 90	 0.766 0.234 9.621 Rd<MR	 0.0106	 0.183
BPSM 90	 0.767 0.233 10.777 Rd<MR	 0.0106	 0.182
BTA 90	 0.713 0.287 7.084 Rd<MR	 0.0098	 0.289
BCP 90	 0.855 0.145 2.563 Rd<MR	 0.0183	 0.650
BNU 90	 0.792 0.208 10.636 Rd<MR	 0.0106	 0.178
BBI 90	 0.789 0.211 11.460 Rd<MR	 0.0106	 0.175
UBP 90	 0.792 0.208 10.445 Rd<MR	 0.0106	 0.178
BFB 90	 0.794 0.206 9.376 Rd<MR	 0.0106	 0.185
CPP 90	 0.795 0.205 8.465 Rd<MR	 0.0106	 0.197
BFE 90	 0.751 0.249 8.677 Rd<MR	 0.0106	 0.335
MG 90	 0.735 0.265 6.745 Rd<MR	 0.0111	 0.400
BCI 90	 0.756 0.244 5.581 Rd<MR	 0.0156	 0.928
CLP 90	 0.985 0.015 0.388 Rd=MR	 0.0056	 0.582
BBV 90	 0.967 0.033 0.862 Rd=MR	 0.0063	 0.619
MANUF 90	 0.989 0.011 0.562 Rd=MR	 0.0132	 1.097
BARCL 90	 0.994 0.006 0.291 Rd=MR	 0.0130	 1.086
BCA 90	 0.672 0.328 9.021 Rd<MR	 0.0089	 0.507
BNP 90	 0.942 0.058 1.999 Rd<MR	 0.0048	 0.356
CITI 90	 0.933 0.067 2.347 Rd<MR	 0.0052	 0.374
CHASE 90	 0.928 0.072 2.537 Rd<MR	 0.0054	 0.384
BRASIL 90	 0.844 0.156 3.002 Rd<MR	 -0.0018	 -0.003
BPA 91	 0.808 0.192 7.320 Rd<MR	 0.0109	 0.173
BESCL 91	 0.795 0.205 7.948 Rd<MR	 0.0109	 0.185
BTA 91	 0.774 0.226 6.266 Rd<MR	 0.0114	 0.264
BCP 91	 0.883 0.117 2.186 Rd<MR	 0.0186	 0.646
BPSM 91	 0.799 0.201 9.015 Rd<MR	 0.0109	 0.181
BNU 91	 0.824 0.176 8.639 Rd<MR	 0.0109	 0.183
BFB 91	 0.825 0.175 8.287 Rd<MR	 0.0109	 0.186
BBI 91	 0.822 0.178 9.418 Rd<MR	 0.0109	 0.178
UBP 91	 0.825 0.175 8.101 Rd<MR	 0.0109	 0.189
CPP 91	 0.825 0.175 7.679 Rd<MR	 0.0109	 0.195
BFE 91	 0.779 0.221 7.814 Rd<MR	 0.0109	 0.340
BCI 91	 0.817 0.183 3.992 Rd<MR	 0.0186	 0.862
MG 91	 0.763 0.237 6.652 Rd<MR	 0.0114	 0.405
BBV 91	 1.013 -0.013 -0.361 Rd=MR	 0.0060	 0.588
CLP 91	 1.021 -0.021 -0.565 Rd=MR	 0.0057	 0.572
MANUF 91	 1.016 -0.016 -0.828 Rd=MR	 0.0137	 1.105
BARCL 91	 1.069 -0.069 -1.940 Rd>MR	 0.0142	 1.035
BCA 91	 0.702 0.298 7.997 Rd<MR	 0.0092	 0.507
BNP 91	 1.029 -0.029 -1.490 Rd=MR	 0.0132	 1.079
CITI 91	 0.962 0.038 1.411 Rd=MR	 0.0056	 0.379
BRASIL 91	 0.874 0.126 2.458 Rd<MR	 -0.0014	 -0.003
CHASE 91	 0.955 0.045 1.657 Rd<MR
	 0.0058	 0.393
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IMARKET POWER - INT RATE 	 ADVERT 	BRANCH
Test t Stat	 Conel eA/(1+eRD) eB/(1+eRD)BANK / YEAR Value
BPA 92	 0.862 0.138 3.632 Rd<MR	 0.0123	 0.265
BTA 92	 0.873 0.127 3.340 Rd<MR	 0.0123	 0.254
BESCL 92	 0.863 0.137 3.961 Rd<MR	 0.0123	 0.264
BCP 92
	 0.962 0.038 0.761 Rd=MR	 0.0195	 0.645
BPSM 92
	 0.895 0.105 3.481 Rd<MR	 0.0118	 0.178
BFE 92	 0.863 0.137 3.925 Rd<MR	 0.0118	 0.349
BNU 92
	 0.913 0.087 3.075 Rd<MR	 0.0118	 0.190
BFB 92
	 0.891 0.109 3.679 Rd<MR	 0.0123	 0.277
BBI 92	 0.913 0.087 3.001 Rd<MR	 0.0118	 0.197
UBP 92	 0.856 0.144 4.201 Rd<MR	 0.0110	 0.326
CPP 92	 0.855 0.145 4.201 Rd<MR	 0.0110	 0.327
BCI 92	 0.913 0.087 1.917 Rd<MR	 0.0195	 0.845
MG 92
	
0.838 0.162 5.186 Rd<MR	 0.0123	 0.437
CLP 92	 1.093 -0.093 -2.374 Rd>MR	 0.0072
	
0.605
BBV 92	 1.101 -0.101 -2.589 Rd>MR	 0.0069	 0.590
BARCL 92	 1.164 -0.164 -4.013 Rd>MR	 0.0148	 1.020
MANUF 92	 1.100 -0.100 -3.386 Rd>MR	 0.0147	 1.114
BCA 92	 0.785 0.215 4.654 Rd<MR	 0.0103	 0.518
BNP 92
	 1.104 -0.104 -3.570 Rd>MR	 0.0146	 1.106
CITI 92	 1.047 -0.047 -1.446 Rd=MR	 0.0065	 0.386
BRASIL 92	 0.960 0.040 0.752 Rd=MR	 -0.0005	 0.003
CHASE 92	 1.041 -0.041 -1.251 Rd=MR	 0.0068	 0.397
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Chapter Three
Banking Markets Imperfections and the Measurement of
Interest Rate Risk
3.1. Introduction
The theoretical foundations of the interest rate risk exposure of financial
intermediaries have received substantial attention by both academics and practitioners.
At the beginning, the immunisation of net interest margin was the major concern for
researchers, and the idea of matching sensitive assets and liabilities received a
growing interest which resulted in a large number of articles devoted to what was
called gap management. Later, the influence of interest rate movements on the market
value of the intermediary received increased attention in the literature, and the articles
by Simonson and Hempel (1982), Toevs (1983), Bierwag and Kaufman (1983, 1985)
and Dermine (1985) are good examples. Kaufman (1984) and Dermine (1987a)
provide simple and comprehensive approaches to the problem. More recently,
Bierwag and Kaufman (1991) adapted the duration gap management to the use of off-
balance sheet hedging instruments.
Empirical studies have, so far, been based on Stone's (1974) two-factor model, and
seem to show evidence of the sensitivity of bank's stock returns to interest rate
changes. Recent articles of Kwan (1991), Kohers and Nagy (1991), Akella and
Greenbaum (1992) and Neuberger (1992) provide good reviews on this literature.
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The extensive literature on this subject, now mostly oriented towards the needs of
practitioners37 , seems to be completely stabilised and we may say, as Dermine (1985,
pg 86), "one may wonder what more can be written on the management of interest
rate risk". In this last paper, the perfect competition hypothesis, which is usually
adopted in the literature, is replaced by imperfect competition and demand elasticities
of deposits were incorporated in the solution. In this chapter, there are two major
departures from the current interest rate risk literature: Operating costs are no longer
ignored and a profit (or market value) maximisation behaviour by the financial
intermediary is explicitly incorporated. Moreover, it is proved that under a profit (or
market value) maximisation framework Dermine's (1985) result is not valid. In a latter
section, competitive effects are explored, yielding conclusions based on oligopolistic
interaction.
More recently, the debate on the measuring of interest rate risk has gained special
importance as a result of the American savings and loans debacle and the proposals
issued by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision (BIS, 1993). The purpose of
that document is to provide a measure to be used for supervision purposes and to
compute a capital requirement for banks demonstrating an exposure exceeding some
pre-determined leve138.
The specific purpose of this chapter is to assess the degree to which market
imperfections may affect the usual duration measures of interest rate risk exposure. If
they are relevant then by neglecting them the measure proposed by the Basle
Committee on Banking Supervision may in fact create distortions in the requirements
of bank capital. More specifically, if the measure is biased in one particular direction,
37Antl (1988), Gilbert (1988), Smith et al (1990) and many others.
38A good review on this subject is provided by Dennine (1993).
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then exposed banks would perhaps be incorrectly considered "hedged" while hedged
banks may improperly be forced to raise capital to cover incorrectly measured
exposures. As capital is the most expensive source of funds, this means that the BIS
formula may result on the imposition of additional costs upon the wrong institutions.
This chapter is organised as follows: The next section presents the rationale for the
modelling of interest rate risk under an imperfect competition (monopoly) and profit
maximisation framework, and results are computed for this situation, showing the
shortfalls of Dermine's (1985) approach. Section 3 deals with the measuring of
interest rate risk by a monopolist bank and in Section 4 the same results are derived
for a competitive (oligopolistic) framework. Section 5 provides the chapter's main
conclusions.
3.2. The Basic Framework
3.2.1. Introduction
In this section a Klein (1971) type model of a monopolist bank is developed in order
to evaluate the implications of the introduction of market imperfections under a profit
maximisation framework, together with the inclusion of real resources operating
costs, thus allowing us to perform a test on the validity of Dermine's (1985)
conclusions under a more general situation. Additional considerations about the
management of interest rate risk based on bank's optimal behaviour make this model
fall into what Anthony Santomero (1984, pg 596) designated "two side models of the
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banking firm", in which balance sheet dimension, composition and articulation
between assets and liabilities are endogenous.
The neglecting of banks' operating costs in Dermine's (1985) model must be
considered odd" , since he assumes that changes in market determined interest rates
affect both prices (interest) and quantities for each intermediary. So, those changes in
dimension and composition of the balance sheet will certainly influence the bank's
costs, and thus should be included in any model of imperfect competition.
Nevertheless, Akella and Greenbaum (1992) is the only article on this subject where a
real resources operating costs function is specifically included, although those authors
do not explore the potential influence of this type of cost over interest rate risk
exposure.
Moreover, imperfect competition helps banks to survive in the financial market and
generate shareholder value . In fact, if this market were perfect, there would be a
very small place for financial intermediation. It is the information service provided by
banks, as discussed notably in Diamond (1984) and Fama (1985) that is the main
reason for their existence. Hence, Dermine's (1985) break with the traditional perfect
market approach was a significant step in the right direction. That is why Santomero
(1989) classified that model as an exception to the "infancy stage" of optimal
behaviour modelling in banking.
Thus, the measuring of interest rate risk in banking demands much more than the
simple computation of a duration gap, such as that in Kaufman (1984), rather
requiring a more complex approach.
39Baltensperger (1980) in the highly quoted survey severely criticizes banking literature for its common
negligence of real resources costs. Nevertheless, Santomero (1984, pg 588) comments on it by saying,
"Although (...) these criticisms are entirely correct, they do not appear to be particularly relevant or
fundamental". In this paper it will be proved that operating costs influence interest rate risk exposure.
40See Dermine (1987b).
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Optimisation behaviour is a crucial part of any imperfect competition model. In fact, it
is difficult to justify the changes in the bank's "own" interest rates in response to
fluctuations in Government securities' rates without explicitly modelling the bank's
objectives and instruments. By ignoring this we may find a solution which is not
consistent with the optimal behaviour of such institutions.
3.2.2. The Monopoly Model
The model's assumptions are:
i) The bank holds four kinds of assets: Cash reserves (R) which are a fraction
p of total deposits, Government Securities and Money Market investments
(S), Loans (L) and Physical Capital (K); S may be negative, meaning funding
from money market sources;
ii) The bank is funded with both Deposits (D) and Equity Capital (E);
iii) As in Klein (1971) the bank is monopolist in its "own" products, thus not
being affected by competitors' rates changes;
iv) Banks face a continuously twice differentiable demand function for
deposits D(r„,r, ), where rc, is the interest rate on deposits, rs the interest rate
on Government securities, OD/Or,, > 0, and OD/ar8^ 0;
v) Banks face a continuously twice differentiable demand function for loans
L(r,,rs), where ri, is the rate charged on loans and OL/ar,<0;
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vi) Banks are price-takers in a perfectly competitive money market / market
for Government securities;
vii) Bank equity capital is exogenous and constant;
viii) The bank is in a stationary state and maximises its market value, using r,,
and rL as instruments;
ix) Operating costs are given by a Variable cost function VC = VC(D,L),
where avciaD>o, and avcta,A, and real resources fixed costs (OFC);
x) Banks live perpetually and all profits are paid out as dividends where taxes
are ignored on both profits and dividends;
xi) Credit Risk is ignored, so 11 may be seen as the certainty equivalent of
the interest rate effectively charged on loans. Liquidity risk is ignored, as it is
assumed that pD is enough to face normal levels of withdrawals;
xii) The term structure of interest rates is flat and the bank's market power
and "own" interest rates do not depend on assets and liabilities' maturities.
As the reader may, perhaps notice, these are basically the hypotheses of Dermine's
(1985) article with the exceptions of (i) and (v) because we explicitly differentiate
assets in securities (where bank is price-taker), loans (where bank is price-setter) and
non-earning cash reserves; (viii) which states the optimisation objective; and (ix) a
real resources cost function is included.
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Given the hypothesis above, the bank's objective will be the maximisation of
present value of future cash-flows (CF):
Max MV = 1CF{r,,r.}	 r5
s.t:
pD+S+L+K = D+E	 (3.2)
where MV denotes the bank's market value and CF the bank's next period (steady
state) short-run cash-flow. The latter may be expressed as:
CF= r, .L + rs .S - ri) .D - VC( D,L ) - OFC	 (3.3)
Maximisation of (3.1) is equivalent to the maximisation of (3.3) since I-, is a given
exogenous parameter. Thus, the problem is equivalent to the maximisation of the
bank's profits subject to the balance sheet constraint (3.2). So, solving (3.2) for S and
replacing in (3.3) and keeping in mind that economic profit accounts for the cost of
equity financing, the bank's problem becomes41:
Max II = (r, -01, + (r, ( 1 -P ) - IrD )13 - (r, -r, )E - VC( D,L ) - rsK - OFC (3.4)
fr,,rD1
Expression (3.4) above decomposes the bank's economic profit into five components.
The first two items correspond to the margins generated by loans and deposits,
respectively, which are the bank's revenues. Then, there are three cost items. The first
41 In this model economic profit is equal to cash flow minus the rate of return required by shareholders. The
latter is excluded from cash-flow because it represents an opportunity cost of capital, rather than a cash
payment.
(3.1)
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is the costs associated with the use of equity, whose cost (r E
 ) is equal to the money
market (risk free) rate in this model since all systematic (market) risk was excluded,
thus making this term equal to zero. The other two are the variable and fixed costs.
The latter may be decomposed into a real resources component (OFC) and the
financial opportunity cost of the physical capital investments.
Ignoring corner solutions, the first order conditions for a maximum are (see Appendix
3.1):
an _ 0 an
all	 ' aro
And so, from now on, it will be assumed that the bank follows the optimal behaviour
described by the above conditions.
Let the market value (MV) of the banking firm be defined as the present value of
future cash-flows:
r
MV = 1—
r
[ r,.L + rs .S – r„,.D – VC(D,L) – OFC]
S
Which after a few analytical manipulations may be expressed as42:
1 ,	 \	 i f	 N	 \MV = pD + V, +V – VD +—
r
[kr, – roL +krs kl – p) – rD )D – VC – OFCI (3.7)
S
42The derivation here is analogous to Guttentag and Herring (1983) and Dermine (1985)
(3.6)
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which is a Guttentag-Herring (1983) type expression for the market value of the
banking firm. As in that article, the market value has two major components. First,
there is the difference between the market values of assets and liabilities, represented
by pD, V, , V, and VD as the values for cash holdings, loans, securities and deposits,
respectively. Second, there is the value of the bank as a going concern, usually
designated by goodwill (GW), thus:
GW =	 — roL + 0-s ki — \ — rD )D — VC(D,L) — OFC1
r,
and recalling expression (3.4):
1GW =[IT+ rx
So, the bank's market value is now separated into two components which will be
differently affected by changes in interest rates. Cash holdings have a constant market
value in the present but the other assets and liabilities are subject to interest rate risk,
since their market values fluctuate inversely to interest rate moves. Thus a duration-
like measure, as is usually undertaken in the literature, is essential for the measuring of
balance sheet exposure. Then, as Dermine (1985, pg 88) pointed out, there is also the
exposure of goodwill. In fact, as that author said "As the margin is likely to fluctuate
over time, one must take into consideration the future interest rate differentials and
volumes of deposits43
 to evaluate the market value of the intermediary". In other
words, interest rate fluctuations affect both margins and quantities and, consequently,
goodwill.
43And loans, in this article.
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Despite the importance of this result, some authors, namely Bierwag and Kaufman
(1983, 1985, 1991), still neglect the importance of the goodwill component of bank's
market value and its corresponding interest rate sensitivity. That approach, in my
view, although useful for the understanding of the impact of interest rate changes on
the bank's assets and liabilities' market values, is incomplete and fails to capture the
competitive nature of banking. Nevertheless, the two approaches may be seen as
complementary and focusing on two different components of banks' interest rate risk.
Thus, in this paper particular focus is made on the goodwill component.
In order to analyse this problem we have to calculate a measure of exposure and see
which factors influence goodwill's sensitivity to interest rate changes. That is the
purpose of the following section.
3.3. Measurement of Exposure in the Monopoly Case
3.3.1. Effective Duration Gap and Optimal Rate Setting
A change in the exogenous rate (r s ) will have two effects on the bank's value: the
change in the current market value of assets and liabilities, associated with the change
in their discount rate, plus the change in the bank's goodwill. This last effect results
from the change in future profits associated with the new prices and quantities that
will prevail in deposit and loan markets. Thus,
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dMV av,  dr, avs av,, dr,, dGW
= 	
 + — +	
dr,	 arL dr,	 ars 	 arD dr,	 dr,
(3.10)
converting (3.10) to elasticities:
Vs 	 VD  
+ TIG,,„ 
GW (3.11)ilmv.rs livL.rL 114„rs mv +11 vs,rs mv lvD.r D irD,rs mv	 ,  s my
where Thu denotes the elasticity of variable x relative to y (A%X/A%Y).
The interest rate sensitivity of assets and liabilities is measured by the asset's (liability)
effective duration (sometimes called interest-elasticity). For securities (and
analogously for the others):
avs rs 	 ay  1+ r r5	 = Ds rs	 s 1.1v = -- = ,
s 'rs	 ars Vs 	a(1+ r s ) Vs 1 + r,	 1 + r, (3.12)
where, Ds is a securities' Macauley's (1938) duration (and r5D8/(1+r5 ) is the
correspondent effective duration).
Expression (3.11) is analogous to Dermine's (1985) when we ignore the market for
loans, showing that interest rate sensitivity of a bank's market value is a weighted
average of assets', liabilities' and goodwill's sensitivity. So, it is impossible to disagree
when he says "The formula is more complex than usual (..) as it takes in account the
interest rate sensitivity of goodwill. (..) duration gap between assets and liabilities
should be related to interest rate sensitivity of goodwill" 44 .
44Der.- e (1985), pg 89.
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Using the optimal values for interest rates in Appendix 3.1, and assuming constant
elasticities of demand, it becomes clear that:
From expressions (3.12) to (3.14) it becomes clear that the sensitivity of goodwill is
not the only factor that makes the "traditional" duration gap analysis inappropriate,
since the impact of durations associated with assets and liabilities for which the banks
compete in imperfect markets are weighted by the sensitivity of "own" rates to those
of the competitive market. For loans, its duration is multiplied by a factor (3.13)
which is always less than one, whilst for deposits (3.14) is always greater than unity.
This means that a traditional zero effective duration gap strategy is, in fact, a situation
corresponding to a positive sensitivity of the market value of the firm to changes in
securities rates.
It is important is to note the consequence of ignoring marginal costs. If they are
assumed to be irrelevant, elasticity (3.13) will be equal to one, but (3.14) will be
1/ (1— p) which is greater than one, and therefore the argument against the use of the
"traditional" duration gap indicator as a measure of exposure would remain and does
not depend upon just the need to consider the sensitivity of goodwill. As a matter of
fact, only if both operating costs and required reserves are ignored, will the difference
between (3.11) and traditional approaches depend exclusively on goodwill.
In short, if all market imperfections are ignored, then the traditional duration gap
analysis is correct. Consideration of monopoly power implies the need to account for
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the sensitivity of goodwill. Additional consideration of financial intermediation costs,
i.e., bank's real resources costs and required cash reserves, introduce a bias on the so-
called "mutual fund type" duration gap measures. And the higher such costs are, the
higher that bias will be.
It is also interesting to note that the sensitivity of "own" rates depends not on
elasticities of demand (as in Dermine, 1985) but on the absolute values of securities
rates and marginal costs, instead45 . If, for the moment, we ignore goodwill, it
becomes clear that the higher the marginal costs are (and required reserves which are
just another type of cost), the higher the value of imv,R.s will be. In other words,
increases in banking marginal costs act, in relation to interest rate risk exposure, in the
same way as an increase in duration of liabilities. On the other hand, the influence of
this sensitivity of "own" rates to market rate moves is more important for low values
of the securities rate, which makes the inappropriateness of the traditional duration
gap analysis more relevant under low interest rates. Another effect of the securities'
rate is associated with convexity, since the higher this rate is, the lower will be the
effective duration for both assets and liabilities.
Although the above conclusions are based on the effective duration measure, most of
them remain valid under alternative duration measures. Among them are the need to
incorporate the sensitivity of goodwill and the existence of an impact of market
imperfections on exposure. The only difference is that under modified duration and
Macauley's duration a perfect hedge for assets and liabilities will require a higher
duration for the latter. See appendix 3.3 for details.
45This conclusion results from the constant elasticity assumption. Nevertheless, the use of a more general
assumption is not likely to significantly change the magnitude of the above elasticities, and has the
disadvantage of implying a much more complicated analytical framework.
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3.3.2. The Sensitivity of Goodwill
In order to evaluate the sensitivity of goodwill to market rates, one has to differentiate
it with respect to r, (recall expression 3.8):
dGW 
= 
1 ( dll 
+ K — GW)
dr,	 r, dr,
(3.15)
This means that changes in market interest rates have two effects upon the bank's
goodwill: the effect over future profits and the other on the opportunity cost of
capital used to discount future cash-flows. The first deserves closer attention:
dll_ an dr, + an dr,, ± an
dr, — Or, dr, arp dr, Ors
(3.16)
Recall that optimising behaviour was explicitly introduced in the model, requiring
conditions (3.5) to be always satisfied by the bank. In other words, this derivative is a
simple application of the widely known envelope theorem:
Thus, Dermine's (1985) total differential approach is not valid in a profit (or market-
value) maximisation context. In other words, in that article, an expression similar to
(3.16) is used, since that author, by ignoring first order conditions, uses the total
differential of the profit function with respect to the market rate, while it is possible to
show that for a profit maximising bank only the partial effect all/8r, is relevant. Thus,
the correct expression for goodwill's sensitivity is:
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	dGW 1 	 ap 1	 , aL ,
. [D(1— p) — L+—Vs (1— p) — rD — C ) + ---01 — r, — C L ) — GW1(3.18)
dr,	 r,	 arS	
D	 ars
where CD represents octal) and CL represents ac/EL.
So, changes in market rates have three effects on goodwill. One, is the direct effect
over bank's current margins, which we may call an income effect. Another is the
impact on future margins resulting from the consequent change of the balance sheet
composition, since depositors and lenders will adjust their demands to the new
conditions of the securities market. This is a substitution effect. Effects resulting from
changes in the bank's competition instruments are irrelevant by verification of first
order conditions. The last effect is due to the change in bank stockholders'
opportunity cost of capital. Converting the expression above into an elasticity form:
T1Gw r
'	 s
=
D	 rs (1 — p) — rD
 —
CD I., 1 r —r8 —CLL	 8 — 1[1	 P +	 TIGW	 r	 ,s GW]
	 [] 11
rs	 LYS
(3.19)
It is now interesting to compare (3.19) with Dermine's expression. In his model we
have L=0, p=0 and C=0. Thus, (3.19) is reduced to:
D  [
1
 r — r
71Gw.rs '
	
+ "
GW	 r,	 Dxs
(3.20)
and the bank's goodwill is now:
GW = r8 — rp	 D
	 (3.21)
r,
which allows (3.20) to be further simplified to:
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rIGW,rs
	 11D,r D
	 (3.22)
One of the interesting aspects of the above expression is its simplicity. The interest
rate sensitivity of goodwill is easily expressed as simply the sum of the two
elasticities of demand. This simple result is modified by the introduction of operating
costs in the model.
On the other hand, we have an alternative result proposed by Jean Dermine (1985,
expression 3.9), which is:
TIGW,Ts	 I1D,rdlrD ss +11D,rs	 ilx,rs	 (3.23)
where:
r — rx S D 
Expressions (3.22) and (3.23) should be equal, but there are two main differences
between them: the terms ri rDss and 'n
•xxs . These differences result directly from
Dermine's implicit assumption on the exogeneity of the bank's "own" interest rates.
In imperfect competition models firms, are not price-takers but, rather, price setters.
So, Ti ro- , is not exogenous to the firm since it represents the bank's optimal reaction
to changes in the market (exogenous) rates. Recalling the first order conditions and
assuming that the bank is free to set its own deposit rate, then, making CD = 0 in
expression (3.14) yields Th-Dxs = 1. But by mere application of the envelope theorem
(expression 3.17), this elasticity plays no role in the determination of interest rate
exposure. In other words, in such a context, marginal responses of deposit and loans'
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rates to securities' yields are zero by first order conditions. Thus, (3.23) must be
reduced to:
T1GW,r8
	 11D,r s ± 1 X,r s
	 (3.24)
and riu s has to be calculated using the partial derivative (that is assuming deposit
rate to be fixed). Then:
D
	  1=
rs
	 1=
r
°	 = TI D I'Drl X r .=
' S GW	 r- rD	r S — rDS 
(3.25)
Thus, Dermine's expression (3.23), by using the optimal expression for r i, , is reduced
to:
T1Gw,rs -= 2 .
 11 D.r E, ± 1 D,r s	 (3.26)
Expressions (3.22) and (3.26) have just one difference: the elasticity of deposits with
respect to their interest rate is doubled in (3.26). In other words, the neglect of the
first order condition (expression 3.5) on the evaluation of the total differential
(expression 3.16), generates a measurement error which overestimates exposure. It is
the wrongly added ii rp,rs term that is responsible for this result.
The appropriate measure of exposure is given by (3.22). That elasticity will almost
certainly be positive, since it is usually assumed that deposits are more sensitive to
their "own" rate than to their opportunity cost (r s). This means that increases in the
market interest rate will increase the charter value of the bank, because deposit
interest costs will rise less than security interest revenues, thus generating higher net
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interest margins, which more than outweighs the effect of the increase in
shareholders' opportunity cost of capital.
If we drop some of Dermine's implicit assumptions allowing for the existence of
required (or voluntary) cash reserves and introducing operating costs, expression
(3.22) will be slightly modified. Continuing to ignore loans and assuming constant
marginal costs, the expression for goodwill becomes:
1 rGW = —
r
[rs (1— p)— rD — CD].D (3.27)
and expression (3.19) is now reduced to:
rs (1—— rD — CD
GW 
[0
	 I1 —p+ 11D,rs
rs
(3.28)
which, after substitution of (3.27) in (3.28) and introduction of the optimal expression
for rp*, becomes:
1 C
riGw,r, =11D,rs + (i + .1) TID,rD
rD
(3.29)
Expression (3.29) is even more likely to be positive than its particular case (3.22),
since the positive component is now affected by a factor greater than one. One
obvious conclusion arises from this expression: operating costs increase the interest
rate sensitivity of goodwill.
The impact of operating costs may be easier to understand if expressed as (see
Appendix 3.1):
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And replacing (3.30) in (3.29) makes this last expression easier to understand:
TIGW,rs	 11DXS 11D rD	
CD 
rs(1—p)—CD (3.31)
As we can see, the left hand side of (3.31) exceeds the value of (3.24) because the
first is equal to the sum of the last with a positive number related to deposits'
operating costs. Thus, once again, we face an additional effect, usually neglected in
the interest rate risk literature, which makes a positive contribution to the interest
rate sensitivity of goodwill: The relation between operating costs and market interest
rates. This effect is particularly important for lower levels of the security rate. As that
rate rises, C D h-D declines, thus reducing this operating leverage (based on marginal
costs) effect on the bank's interest sensitivity of goodwill. So, ceteris paribus, the
less cost-efficient banks will face higher interest rate risk.
In expression (3.19) both deposit and loan markets were already considered in respect
to their contribution to the interest rate sensitivity of goodwill. In order to take
advantage of result (3.29), an additional hypothesis is introduced: the cost function is
separable, has a fixed cost (OFC) element and marginal costs are constant 46, that is:
C(D,L) = OFC + CD D + C, L	 (3.32)
46Although this assumption is made for analytical convenience, it requires no cost subadditivity and constant
returns to scale which are not rejected by most empirical studies on banking costs functions. See Forestieri
(1993).
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In that case the bank's goodwill is also separable into two components, one
attributable to deposit market imperfections (GW,,) and the other to loan market's
(GWO, that is GW = GW„+ GWL - OFC/r, , where GW„ is given by (3.24) and:
GWL =	 [rL
 — rs — CL].L (3.33)
Expression (19) can now be rewritten as:
GWD	 GWL OFC / rs (3.34)GW,	 11GWd	 '	 ' IGW	 GW	 GWI'rs ' GW
where:
1	 CD
1D,ID ( >0 ) (3.35)1GWD ,rs = T1DSS + ( I +
D
1	 CL
IlL,ri., (<0) (3.36)11GwL,rs = 11L,rs + ( 1 —	 .
r L
From the above it is clear that increases in the security rate raises the goodwill
associated with deposits. Despite facing a higher opportunity cost for discounting
future profits, that movement allows increases in the bank's deposit rate which will
imply higher margins and higher volumes of deposits, thus making (3.35) be always
positive. Therefore, whenever interest rates rise, the bank's owners will profit from a
reduction of the market value of liabilities and an increase in their associated
discounted future profits.
In relation to loans, the situation is the opposite. Whenever interest rates increase the
bank will lose due to a reduction of the market value of current loans and the
148
Essays on Banking
discounted value of the profits associated with future periods. The latter results not
only from a higher discount rate, but also from reduced future loan demand.
Therefore deposits and loans have an opposite impact on the bank's exposure, both in
terms of market values and in terms of their respective goodwill. In other words, a
perfect immunisation strategy implies matching not only the durations of assets and
liabilities (adjusted by expression 3.11) but also would have to take care with the
sensitivity of goodwill, the sign of which is, a priori, undetermined, and has to be
estimated case by case.
It is also interesting to note the last part of the expression, i.e., the importance of the
present value of fixed costs upon goodwill. Thus it is, the higher the amount of fixed
costs the higher the interest rate exposure will be. This is just an operating leverage
effect, based upon the fixed costs, and it is obvious that this effect is increasing on
OFC and decreasing on rs . The latter is due to the obvious fact that, the higher the
security rate is, the lower will be the present value of future fixed costs. Thus, for
banks, as for any other firm, the higher the fixed costs are, the higher the risk
exposure to economic fluctuations will be.
Another meaningful alternative for (3.34) is:
11Gw,rs = aD( 11D,rs ± 11D,rD ) + a l, ( 11L,rs + "qui ±
(3.37)
(	 CD+ a DrID,rD
 .rD - aLTIL,ri, 
Ci:D j + OGFCw/rr	 ,
where,
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GW„	 GW, 
a =
	 and	 =	 (3.38)
° GW GW
C D (
l11D,r D	= k +11D,rj / CD 
	
\	 (
 
>0)	 (3.39)
rD	 rs — p)	 — CD
ilLsL
CL
 
= kl+ri,„r 	 CL 
r +C
s	 L
( <0 )	 (3.40)
From (3.37) to (3.40) we can now see clearly that there are four items contributing to
the interest rate sensitivity of goodwill. The first two have opposite signs, but the last
two are always positive. This combines the monopoly power and the operating costs
operating leverage effects, the first associated with marginal costs and the last with
fixed costs.
The higher the bank's monopoly power is the lower will be its goodwill exposure.
This results directly from the fact that, in a competitive framework, powerful banks
will have lower reactions to security rate moves than small fringe competitors. On the
other hand, the cost-inefficient banks will suffer from a high operating leverage effect
that increases their exposure. From (3.39), (3.40) and Appendix 3.1, we can also see
that the higher the level of rs is, the higher will be the spread between lending and
deposit rates, and the lower will be the impact of operating costs (both fixed and
variable) upon the bank's income statement. This is an important result because
despite its intuitiveness, these two factors of exposure have so far been ignored in the
literature, and are explored in the following sections.
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3.3.3. Operating Costs and the Bank's Exposure
From the previous two sub-sections it is possible to conclude that operating costs
affect exposure for both components of the market value of a bank (assets-liabilities
and goodwill). Consideration of both types of costs (fixed and variable) increases the
goodwill's sensitivity. From (3.11), (3.13), (3.14), (3.35) and (3.36), the impact of
changes upon the marginal costs of servicing deposits and loans may be computed:
d  r, 	 1, 	 rs 	 i-GW,, 
dcp 1- " mvss -1
 (rs
 —0 2 
L mv\ VD 
(1.+11 D r I	 ivD r 1
' ° MV	 ' °
	
d	
L	
GWL (111LrLI 1)
	 VL
	
dC	
iv r 1
[11myrsj—
	
rs	
mv L, L
•	 (rs +02 [ MV 	
'
(3.41)
(3.42)
Both expressions are positive which, combined with considerations made about the
fixed cost component, allow us to conclude that cost inefficiency increases have an
effect which is similar to an increase in duration of liabilities. This reinforces the
conclusion that traditional duration gap analysis is inappropriate for measuring
interest rate exposure for financial intermediaries operating in an imperfectly
competitive market. For the latter, perfect immunisation occurs for a situation in
which effective duration of assets exceeds that of liabilities due to their multiplicative
factors in (3.11). That "correct" difference depends upon the sign associated with
goodwill's exposure and is positively associated with bank costs, and is especially
significant at low levels of interest rates.
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3.4. Goodwill Exposure for the Oligopolist Bank
In this section, the monopoly assumption is relaxed in order to evaluate how much
bias may have been induced in the previous section by this assumption. Now, each
bank offers a specific (differentiated from competitor's) type of deposits and loans and
is going to face demand functions which will also depend upon the rival's interest
rates. From expressions (3.11), (3.13) and (3.14) it became clear that the monopoly
power of the bank and oligopolistic behaviour do not affect the sensitivity of the
market value of assets and liabilities to changes in riskless securities interest rates.
Thus, conclusions obtained in that section regarding the bias of the traditional
duration gap concept remain valid under more general assumptions regarding the
competitive nature of the markets. Nevertheless, those factors may affect exposure
through the interest rate sensitivity of goodwill. Therefore, oligopolistic interaction
may only affect our analysis through that component of the market value of the bank,
and consequently will constitute the main focus of this section.
Now, and considering n banks, the demand functions for the ith bank will be:
D' = (rD ,rs ) where	 r . = [r 1 r2	 riD	 D,•••) D )•••) D (3.43)
— (rL , rs )	 where [,1A L - 11,01,,-)1L)-)IL (3.44)
Concerning the competitive behaviour of firms, the recent article by Timothy Hannan
(1991) will be followed, where each firm offers a specific product (on both sides of
the balance sheet) and conjectural variations are incorporated in the elasticities of
demand. With the exception of (iii), all assumptions made in section 2 are kept and an
additional one has to be made in relation to the demand functions:
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aDi/aq, o, for j i and	 OLVar i' 0, for j i
The first order conditions for a maximum are determined as before and the reader may
be interested to see Hannan (1991) in order to analyse the assumptions made. Optimal
values for interest rates are the ones given in Appendix 1, but now the elasticities
account for market structure and rival's expected reactions. Since this article's focus is
not on oligopoly market equilibrium, those problems are not followed here.
Expressions (3.1) to (3.16) are still valid. Application of the envelope theorem to
determination of interest rate risk will account for the effects of the rival's reactions to
security rate changes, but changes in the bank's "own" rates (by first order conditions)
are still irrelevant. So, (3.16) becomes:
dfl' an	 arr dr 	 an dr'D
dr,	 Or,	 tr aro' dr,	 it arii, dr,
(3.45)
For analytical convenience I am going to keep the assumption of separability of the
cost function. Thus, interest rate sensitivity of the goodwill generated by deposits and
loans may be separated. For deposits:
dr' • /
	
n aD i ch%)]aDidGW,'„ 1 [ /
	 Gwi
	 Di + k r, (1— p) — 11, — CD )(T-rs +
arL dr,
D	 p) — D dr,dr,	 r,
(3.46)
Converting into an elasticity, using (3.27) and (3.45), and replacing with zero the
total differentials of profit in order to ii and rD (first order conditions), we have:
D i (1— p)
GWD
 ,rs
rii	 drDddr, drDi (3.47)
GWL	 1+ liDi ' rs	 /11D1 r	 dra /dr, dr,,, ro.
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The optimal interest rates given in Appendix 3.1 are only valid for a monopolist bank.
For an oligopolist, conjectures about other firms' reactions to individual decisions
have to be incorporated in the solution, because, for deposits, and analogously for
loans:
dD i	 ap i	 • dr iop'
drDi	 arDi	 ar,", drp'
(3.48)
The last term is the conjectural variations factor. In his article, Hannan (1991)
follows Cubbin (1983) and Waterson (1984) and computes an average conjectural
variation which simplifies the computation of the interest rate elasticity of deposits.
Following that approach, optimal values for interest rates are similar to the
expressions in Appendix 3.1, with that elasticity defined as:
= — OrD )6D,,rDi	 (3.49)
where:
aDi
s D i spi	 arDi D
aDi	 aDij rni=
„,,, D ,	 &rip,	arl) Di
(3.50)
(3.51)
where 13,D is the average reaction ( 0 _^ 	 1)
Elasticity (3.50) above corresponds to a Cournot conjecture, while the second one is
associated with collusive behaviour. With the elasticity (3.49) defined this way, we
may treat it as constant, as long as the conjectural variations parameter 13 remains
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unchanged, as well as the elasticity of demand. In other words, it no longer
represents just the behaviour of demand since it means the elasticity "perceived" by
the bank, which takes into account the expected reactions. On the other hand, the
"own" elasticity of demand under monopoly conditions is higher than under more
competitive conditions: 6 rD < DJD < GC)
In this context, using the optimal expressions for interest rates, expression (3.47) may
be converted into:
1
	
C' 
	 ,
	lliGWE,,r, = TIDA + 1 ± D
	Il DiSpi ± E rh),,r ---(0D,- PrD ) rirDi,rs	 (3.52)
	
D	 .ji	 Di rDj
dr/Di/dr,
where SD, = drDi /drS
The algebraic difference between (3.35) and (3.52) is just the last sum in this
expression, which represents the impact of the competitor's reactions upon security
interest rate changes. Nevertheless, the elasticity in the second term now includes
conjectural variations and is higher than the value for monopolist banks. The last term
is likely to be negative, since ri 	 0 for every j # i, and the value of the 6's in
the expression will be around unity while the 13's will always be equal to or less than
that value.
It is therefore difficult, quantitatively, to assess the difference between (3.35) and
(3.52). Nevertheless, if the "own" effect dominates, the increase on the second term
associated with more competitive conditions may overcome cross effects, and
therefore it is likely that (3.52) becomes larger than (3.35), thus making goodwill
generated by competitive deposits riskier than that resulting from monopoly deposits.
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Changes in the conjectural variations parameter 3 have opposite impacts upon the
two parts of expression (3.52): an increase in this variable lowers the absolute value
of both positive and negative parts of the above expression, making the final effect
undetermined. In Appendix 2 the value of this elasticity is computed for both extreme
cases, Cournot and collusive conjectures, and the final results are similar, although
there are good reasons to believe that it will be larger for the second of those cases.
This results directly from cartel behaviour which, by enhancing monopoly power of its
participants, although making their deposit interest rates less sensitive to security rate
moves, makes individual demand volume more sensitive to "own" rates and less
sensitive to other's.
This conclusion seems to indicate that the use of the monopoly measure (3.37) under
a more competitive framework will not imply a significant error, as long as
"perceived" rather than "actual" elasticities are employed. Another interesting
conclusion is that changes in the characteristics of demand and the degree of product
differentiation have a much higher importance than any changes in the conduct
parameters of the firm.
An analogous derivation for loans yields:
	
C i	r Li
ri GwL, rs = IlL i ss + ( 1 —	 (E rl
	
i	 Lisu	 Lij
	
rL 	 J ^ i	 rLi
•
leading to analogous conclusions, since 1 kist4 0 for every j # i . Expression (3.53)
above is similar to (3.37), the only differences being associated with a product
substitutability and competitor's reactions and the fact that "own" price elasticities no
longer represent demand parameters, but rather "perceived" elasticities (second term).
Now "own rate" elasticity of loans is higher (in absolute value) than its monopoly
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value and if "own" effects dominate cross-effects, the sum of the second and third
terms will be more negative, i.e. riskier, under competitive conditions.
As in the previous case, changes in the conjectural variations parameter have an
ambiguous and probably small effect over the magnitude of exposure (see appendix).
It is also important to note that, once again, marginal costs have a role to play, since
in both above expressions the cross elasticities factor is multiplied by the sensitivity of
the bank's "own" rate to changes in rs, which by expressions (3.13) and (3.14) has
been shown to be related to the values of security rates and marginal costs. The
higher the latter, the more important this factor becomes.
In short, for goodwill generated by both deposits and loans, the introduction of
competition may increase interest rate risk, provided that changes in "perceived
elasticities" dominate effects resulting from product substitutability and competitor's
reactions. When effects for deposits and loans are added, the final result is
undetermined, i.e., it is impossible to say what the final effect of increased
competition over the bank's goodwill exposure will be.
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3.5. Conclusions
As in Dermine (1985), it is shown that in imperfect bank markets, the interest rate
sensitivity of goodwill has to be considered when evaluating the bank's market value
exposure. However, by neglecting first order optimality conditions, his solution has
nothing to do with the bank's maximising behaviour and overestimates exposure.
Another important step made in this article is the result that market imperfections
also affect the bank's exposure in relation to the difference between the market values
of assets and liabilities whenever marginal costs of producing deposits and loans are
duly considered. In other words, the imperfections effect is not reduced by the need
to incorporate the duration of goodwill: it also (and mainly) affects the traditional
duration gap measure.
The use of a separable short-run real resources cost function allows us to separate the
bank's goodwill into two components, each one associated with each of the imperfect
markets in which the bank competes. Goodwill generated by deposits is positively
related to interest rates while the opposite occurs for the goodwill generated by
loans.
Operating costs have two effects: Fixed costs constitute a factor of exposure via
goodwill, and the higher their value, the greater the risk. On the other hand, marginal
costs on deposits and loans contribute to the sensitivity of both goodwill and the
difference between the market values of assets and liabilities. This last aspect is
particularly important since the main conclusion to be obtained from the model is that
a perfect immunisation of the market value of the bank will be ensured with a duration
of assets higher than liabilities', for the effective duration measure, the relationship
being exactly the inverse, whenever Macauley's or modified duration are used. The
higher the bank's cost inefficiency, the higher this difference will have to be. It is also
158
Essays on Banking
possible to show that an increase in the cost inefficiency of a bank has an effect similar
to an increase in duration of its liabilities.
This last conclusion becomes particularly important in a period when bank regulators
are trying to impose a standard measure of interest rate risk for evaluation of capital
adequacy purposes (BIS, 1993). So far, all proposed measures are based on the
traditional duration and maturity gap analysis. The first of them was already
criticisable under Dermine's (1985) arguments, due to their negligence of competitive
behaviour of banking, implying a bias associated with goodwill. Now, this chapter
raises an additional problem about these "mutual fund" type measures of interest rate
risk: financial intermediation costs and market power make those measures
inappropriate and biased for the evaluation of the exposure component associated
with the difference between the market values of assets and liabilities.
Consideration of competition leads to a better understanding of the problem of
measuring interest rate risk exposure for banks operating in an imperfect competition
context. Although this does not affect the sensitivity of the market values of balance
sheet items, it may affect goodwill. Deviations from a monopoly / collusive solution
through manipulation of conjectural variations may only slightly affect the measure of
exposure, which means that the use of results based on the monopoly model for this
purpose may only imply a small, and probably negligible, error.
In short, this article reaches the conclusion that traditional measures of interest rate
risk exposure are only valid for banks operating in frictionless perfectly competitive
markets. As we introduce market imperfections, via increased market power for
individual institutions (associated with imperfect substitutability) and operating costs
of financial intermediation, those traditional measures are shown to be incorrect and
biased, since perfect immunisation is achieved with an effective duration of assets
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which exceeds that of liabilities. More important is the conclusion that all
imperfections considered have the same effect (sign) in their contribution to the
magnitude of that bias.
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Appendix 3.1 Optimal Solutions for Interest Rates
As in Klein (1971), conditions given by (5) may be solved for the bank's interest rates.
For deposits:
on	 ,	 , op	op
=0<=>—D+[rs(1-0—r i	 —C	 o	 (A3.1.1)
arD	
D arD	 D A.
" D
Then,
(A3.1.2)r* ____ TID,rD  [ rs ( 1 _ p) - aciaD]
D 1+11D.rD
For loans,
OH
	 , aL aL,
— = o <=). L + (rL — rD )---C =0
arL 	 al arL L
Then,
*	 Ili, r11 —  ' [rs + awl]
i-Erksi,
(A3.1.3)
(A3.1.4)
where,
aL r
and rk r = —. with	 u, < —1 (A3.1.5)'n
 arL L
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Appendix 3.2	 Conjectural Variations and the Exposure of Goodwill
Expression (3.52) may be evaluated for Cournot's conjectures, sa ituation in which
we have On, =0:
(	
C Di (A3.2.1.)iGwD ,r, =
	 eDiXoi ± 1 ± 6D
i'
rD 
r (1— p) — C D1 lirphrs E	 r	
Opisi
rDj
The first two elements correspond to a monopolist's situation, since the elasticities
there are exactly the ones derived from the demand function, while the last one is
associated with product substitutability. Therefore, for the same value of the
elasticities of demand, a Cournot oligopolist will experience a lower exposure in the
goodwill generated by deposits than will a monopolist. This difference is positively
associated with the degree of substitutability between competitors and the bank's cost
inefficiency (through 3.14).
For collusive conjectures we have to make 13r0 = 1. Following Hannan's (1991, pg 77)
arguments, it will be assumed that in this situation the last part of (3.52) will be close
to zero, and therefore ignored:
' I GwD.rs = IlD i,rs + ,DiSpi (A3.2.2)I ± r i
Using (3.49) to (3.51) and (3.14), it may be converted into:
•
WD ,Ts	 lD1,r + c Di,roi + ( 1 + D i , rDi
C Di r	 • (A3.2.3)1,rth,rs E
rs 	 P) — up	 j^ i rDj
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It is interesting to note that the only difference between (A3.2.1) and (A3.2.3) is the 5
which is not present in the last of them. Since the average of these parameters will not
be too far from unity, the two expressions will yield similar results. Nevertheless, the
interest rates ratio in (A3.2.3) will be lower than in the "Cournot" solution (due to a
lower "own" rate), and therefore seems to yield a higher value for exposure.
It should be noted that expression (A3.2.3) falls into (3.31) whenever this last
expression is computed using "perceived" elasticities, instead of elasticities of
demand. And since a significant difference between (A3.2.1) and (A3.2.3) was not
found, it may be said that, regardless of the oligopolist's type of conjectures, the use
of the "monopoly" expression (3.31) is not significantly biased whenever "perceived"
elasticities are used.
A similar analysis may be conducted for loans. Let us define:
al,
	
L.,r = —	 and
ar L
	
Li	 i
=1 -+-
ji arlj, Li
Using the average conjectural variations concept, we may redefine:
= ( 1 -13J E L i .r„ +13
For Cournot conjectures, using an approach similar to the above, yields:
i	 C L	 ru
( 1 + 6	 ) r _ ci	 li rthrs ElLi	 6r —1-61Gw,,r,	 1-1Li ss ± Li,ru	 A3.2.4)r
S	 L	 'Lj
And for collusive conjectures, using assumptions similar to the above mentioned for
deposits, we obtain:
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CiL1L 1 , r, ± C L i 	(1 +,ru	 r
L 	 I 
± 11rr, Ei rs	 C 	 rLj (A3.2.5)
Appendix 3.3 - Exposure Measurement for Alternative Duration Measures
Some analysts and bank managers prefer to use the Modified Duration, instead of the
interest elasticity (or effective duration) used in the main text of the present chapter.
This measure is defined as:
a v.MD	 —. = .-x-- with V and r defined as in (3.12)8r V.
(A3.3.1)
The analog of expression (3.11) is:
	
a 	 Vs	 a rD 	 aGw 1 
	MDmv = MDL
a
	+ MDs 	 MDD	 (A3.3.2)
rs MV	 MV	 a rs mv a rs MV
The expression above shows that if the impact of goodwill is ignored, the modified
duration of liabilities must exceed assets' if a perfect hedge is to be achieved. This
results directly from the sensitivities of "own" interest rates to the market conditions,
loan rates being more sensitive than deposits', according to Appendix 3.1. In other
words, the higher the bank's market power, the greater that difference has to be if a
perfect immunisation strategy is followed. The curious thing about this result is the
fact that the relationship between durations of assets and liabilities is exactly the
opposite of the result for the effective duration. However, if market imperfections do
not exist, in both cases perfect immunisation will require equal durations for assets
and liabilities.
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A similar conclusion is achieved when Macauley's Duration is used. Unfortunately,
this measure does not provide an analog for (3.11), which is as easy to analyse as the
expression above. Defining that duration measure:
The analog for (3.11) is:
	
cDMV 
= a,  1+ rs VL	 Vs	 4.1 arD  1+ rs VD aGW 1+ Ts (A3.3.4)
	
a ars 1+ 11 MV	 MV °L'D ars 1+ rD MV ars MV
The expression above differs from (A3.3.2) because of the ratios of the "one plus
interest rate" effects. These, although not changing the conclusions above, reduce the
bias associated with the direct comparison between durations of assets and liabilities,
since they work as an opposite effect to the "own" interest rate impacts.
All of the conclusions obtained in the main text for the sensitivity of goodwill are un-
affected by the duration measure used, since those results are now simply multiplied
by exogenous constants.
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Appendix
Sample Description
Abreviation Bank's Name
Available
Sample
Used in
Chapter 2
ABN ABN Amro Bank 1991-92 Not used
BANIF Banco Internacional do Funchal 1991-92 Not used
BARCLAYS Barclays Bank, plc 1988-92 1988-92
BBI Banco Borges & Irrnao 1987-92 1988-92
BB V/LLOYDS Lloyds Bank, plc (until! 1990) 1988-92 1988-92
Banco Bilbao Viscaya (after 1990)
BCA Banco Comercial dos Acores 1987-92 1988-92
BCI Banco de Comercio & IndUstria 1988-92 1988-92
BCP Banco Comercial Portugues 1987-92 1988-92
BES Banco Espirito Santo 1987-92 1988-92
BEX Banco Exterior de Espanha 1991-92 Not used
BFB Banco Fonsecas & Burnay 1987-92 1988-92
BFE Banco de Fomento e Exterior 1987-92 1988-92
BNP Banque Nationale de Paris 1988-92 1988-92
BNU Banco Nacional Ultramarino 1987-92 1988-92
BPA Banco Portugues do Atlantico 1987-92 1988-92
BPSM Banco Pinto & SottoMayor 1987-92 1988-92
B.BRASE_, Banco do Brasil 1988-92 1988-92
BTA Banco Totta & Acores 1987-92 1988-92
CHASE The Chase Manhattan Bank 1988-92 1988-92
CITIBANK Citibank (Portugal) 1988-92 1988-92
CLP Credit Lyonnais Portugal 1988-92 1988-92
CHEMICAL Banco Chemical 1988-92 1988-92
DBI Deutsche Bank de Investimento 1991-92 Not used
GENERALE Generale de Banque 1991-92 Not used
MELLO Banco Mello 1991-92 Not used
MG/CEL Montepio Geral / Caixa Econ. de Lisboa 1988-92 1988-92
UBP Unido de Bancos Portugueses 1987-92 1988-92
CGD Caixa Geral de DepOsitos 1987-92 1988-92
CPP Credit° Predial Portugues 1987-92 1988-92
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